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Protestant or Other Faith, and Secular. 
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Evangelical schools in analogous trends.   
Findings suggest that, while a student’s ability is the driving force behind first 
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achievers in kindergarten into better students in the first grade.  Private schools offer no 
significant benefit for first grade enrollment to high achieving kindergarten students. 
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Chapter One:  
Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
Regardless of the outcome measured used and schooling level examined, Peterson 
(2003) identifies the downward trend of public education in the United States noting that 
“students are walking away from public schools…They seem to understand, better than 
anyone else, that the American schoolhouse is badly in need of reform” (Peterson 2003, 
p69).  All interested factions agree on is the necessity of school reform in the United 
States.  However, diverging opinions emerge once the dialogue shifts focus to the 
appropriate course of action that this restructuring should take.  One popular option cited 
is school choice; however, an increased choice set among school alternatives does not 
conjure up identical programs for all parties. 
In current policy discussions two distinct forms of school choice are being 
discussed and, to a lesser extent, implemented.  Both of these types of school choice force 
underperforming schools to improve due to newfound competition from higher 
performing challengers (Hoxby 1994; Chubb and Moe 1990).  Schools must now 
compete, based on academic achievement, to sustain enrollment levels.  First, there are 
school choice policies designed to heighten competition among public schools with no 
involvement from the private sector.  Examples of this include open enrollment 
programs, charter schools, and magnet schools.  The second school choice approach 
allows for even greater competition among schools by adding private schools into the 
choice set. 
1 
 The use of vouchers for private schools draws controversy primarily in regard to 
using public funds for students to attend religiously affiliated schools.  This criticism 
continues even after the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the use of government-funded 
vouchers to attend religious schools in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002).  In this case, 
the Cleveland voucher program allowed for a multitude of schooling options including 
attending a neighboring public school, a religious private school, a secular private school, 
and remaining at current public school and receiving tutoring assistance (Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris 2002).  Yet, faced with so many options, ninety-six percent of voucher 
program participants selected to attend a religiously affiliated private school (Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris 2002).  Historically, religious private schools have never been selected 
at such a high rate. 
Catholic schools no longer constitute the majority of religiously affiliated private 
schools.  Catholic school enrollment has declined because of a decrease in Catholic 
religiosity (Sander 2005).  While Catholic has fallen, there has been an increase in private 
schools, especially conservative Christian private schools (Sander 2005).  In 1999-2000, 
sixty-four percent of total elementary private students attended Catholic schools; 
however, only forty-eight percent of private first grade enrollment is Catholic 
(Broughman and Colaciello 2001).  Hence, studies focusing on Catholic schools as a 
proxy for all private education or all private religious education are missing important 
variances within the private school sector, especially at the first grade level. 
Lankford and Wyckoff (1992) acknowledge the tremendous variety within the 
religious and nonreligious sects, yet recognize data shortcomings for private school 
taxonomy exist. 
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 “Although it might be relevant to make fine distinctions between the 
various types of private schools when analyzing school choice, data 
typically only identify students as attending public, private religious or 
private independent schools (p 319).” 
 
In this study, I move beyond simply admitting these private sector differences exist by 
offering a rich model that incorporates the different types of private schools.1  In addition 
to including the public schooling option, I offer the most detailed typology of private 
schools to date by separating private schools into four distinct categories: Catholic, 
Evangelical or Fundamental Protestant (Evangelical), Mainline Protestant or Other Faith 
(Protestant), and Secular.2 
Focusing on the determinants of school selection enhances the policy forum 
regarding vouchers, tuition tax credits, and school choice (Lankford, Lee, and Wykcoff 
1995).  While treating a household’s choice between public and private school as simply 
a choice between public and Catholic schools may have been appropriate when 
examining the educational choices of households in the 1970s and 1980s. However, since 
then there have been numerous changes in the composition of private schools, which 
precipitate the need to examine the effects of attending religious private schools rather 
than Catholic private schools alone (Chubb and Moe 1990; Gaziel 1997).   
 School choice proponents assert that competition is required to incite 
transformation within public schools.  The choice-based market-driven approach 
employed by voucher programs forces underperforming schools to improve due to 
newfound competition from higher performing challengers (Hoxby 1994; Chubb and 
                                                          
1 This analysis concentrates on regular elementary schools and children without disabilities.  All schools for 
the disabled and all children with mild to severe disabilities have been eliminated from the data for this 
essay. 
2 Although public schools may be considered secular as well, through out this essay, secular refers to 
private secular schools only. 
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 Moe 1990).  Some purport that these better performing schools are located in the private 
sector by reasoning that private schools are forced to be more efficient in their operations 
and instructional methods, which leads to better schools that yield higher levels academic 
achievement for students (Bryk, Lee, and Holland 1993; Harris 2000; Hallinan 2000).  
Some studies call for the incorporation of Catholic school curriculum into the public 
school system as part of the reform of education system in the United States (Bushweller 
1997; Hudolin-Gabin 1994).  However, the foundation of these policies is the underlying 
assumption that private schools, not the abilities or backgrounds of their students, are 
generating the higher test scores. 
 The results of previous studies are mixed as to whether private schools yield a 
positive impact on student outcomes.  Critics argue that selection and omitted variable 
biases generate these observed positive effects for students rather than private school 
superiority.  I address criticisms of previous studies by using test scores from a student’s 
entrance into kindergarten to control for his or her ability as well as other unobservable 
characteristics.   
By controlling for previous test scores, it is possible to disentangle the selection 
effect.  Studies that do not control for prior student ability cannot be regarded as 
justification in support of or opposition to the existence of a positive private school effect 
(Peterson and Llaudet 2006).  I seek to examine whether these higher first grade test 
scores are the result of selection into the private sector (i.e., better students enrolling in 
private schools) or preeminence of the private sector (i.e., private schools are better than 
public ones). 
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 No studies, to my knowledge, isolate this choice made for first grade attendance 
or achievement at the beginning of a child’s academic career using a rich model of four 
private schooling options.3  Examining this decision at the start of a child’s schooling 
years is critical for three reasons.  First, a student’s academic achievement in the first 
grade predicts academic achievement in his or her junior year of high school 
(Cunningham and Stanovich 1997).  Second, elementary school test performance is an 
indicator of labor market productivity (Bishop 1989; Loury and Garman 1995; Murnane, 
Willett, and Levy 1995).  Lastly, evidence suggests that students do not switch between 
schooling alternatives often once a school type is selected.  Thus, this decision for first 
grade may determine a child’s entire schooling path.  Lee and Marks (1992) report that 
nearly one-half of their sample of high school seniors attended the same school since 
kindergarten while Goldhaber (1996) cites the “actual or perceived deleterious effects on 
children” (p59) as justification as for why parents are unlikely to switch school sectors. 
1.2 Results 
When estimating the choice of school to attend, I find kindergarten test 
performance, household income, and parental education levels are important factors in 
selecting a school.  Additionally, religiosity of the household and denomination 
membership in a county are significant determinants.  The two simulations presented 
indicate that not all voucher recipients would attend the same type of private school.  In 
particular, the differences appear to follow racial lines.  I observe in both simulations that 
white and Hispanic, in different households and area environments, exhibit very similar 
predicted enrollment probabilities among varying school types.  Evidence suggests that 
                                                          
3 While none focuses on first grade schooling, recent studies do employ increased schooling options when looking at 
academic achievement differences among the public and private sectors.  For example, see Lubienski and Lubienski 
(2006) and Kim and Placier (2004). 
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 African-American girls respond differently to school selection than white and Hispanic 
girls do.  The predicted probabilities in the simulations demonstrate that households do 
not view all private schools as identical.  In particular, the probability patterns over a 
change in income are very different for Evangelical and Protestant school types.   
Clearly, an increase in private school attendance does not translate to uniform 
enrollment increases at all types of private schools.  White and Hispanic girls display 
similar patterns for Catholic and Protestant schools.  African-American and white girls 
select Evangelical schools in analogous trends.  Thus, the design of voucher and school 
choice programs should be examined to accommodate different choices made by 
different households, especially along racial and ethnic divisions.  Findings indicate that a 
voucher program affects the diversity of student populations in private schools differently 
depending on the type of private school.   
Findings from the achievement estimations indicate that first grade private school 
enrollment transforms below average achievers in kindergarten into better students in the 
first grade, relative to their low achieving peers.  Yet, private schools offer no significant 
benefit for first grade enrollment to high achieving kindergarten students.  Above average 
kindergarten students see an increase in their first grade reading scores by attending an 
Evangelical or Secular school for first grade.  High achieving kindergarten students, in 
many cases, experience a significant decrease in first grade achievement scores because 
of private school enrollment, especially for Catholic school. 
Findings indicate that private school enrollment does not affect all students in the 
same manner.  Enabling private school enrollment for all students, through school choice 
and voucher programs, as a means of attaining blanket school reform is not optimal.  In 
 6
 effort to obtain higher a student achievement level, evidence suggests that reforms should 
tailor private school attendance for different student performance levels.  High achieving 
kindergarten students should not attend any type of private school in effort to gain higher 
first grade test scores.  Evangelical and Protestant first grade enrollment benefits students 
who are above average kindergarten achieving students.  Private school attendance in 
first grade, however, does transform below average achievers in kindergarten into better 
students in the first grade.  Policy reforms should target below average kindergarten 
students and encourage them to attend Evangelical and Protestant first grade schools 
while high performing kindergarten students should be enticed to remain in public 
schools.  Further investigation is warranted to investigate the possible explanations for 
why these different school types affect different students in very different ways.   
For a child’s first grade math test score, living in a state that requires kindergarten 
attendance significantly reduced a child’s score.  I find no significant result for the 
reading and general knowledge tests.  This finding for mandatory kindergarten programs 
for math tests is surprising since many presume mathematics is what schools teach.  
Since a child’s home environment strongly influences reading ability, research has 
focused attention to mathematics achievement in effort to capture more of a school’s 
contribution to a child’s education (Lubienski and Lubienski 2006; Figlio and Stone 
1999; Bryk, Lee, and Holland 1993; Heyneman 2005).  This finding suggests that 
mandatory kindergarten states have kindergarten programs with different emphases than 
those found in non-mandatory kindergarten states.  A comprehensive examination of 
mathematics curriculum in mandatory and non-mandatory kindergarten programs is 
needed to explore this further. 
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 1.3 Organization 
 In the first chapter of my dissertation, I offer an introduction to the elementary 
private schooling sector and provides a discussion of how school choice and student 
achievement connect to current school reform policies.  Increasing student mobility 
through school choice compels schools to compete for students under the implicit 
assumption that students select schools based on performance.  
Chapter Two surveys select school choice and school performance papers to 
provide an overview of previous works in these two education research lines.  I start by 
discussing the consensus with the choice and performance areas to highlight where my 
work fits.  Then, I provide a paper by paper synopsis of key choice and performance 
papers.  Within each grouping, I place papers in chronological order since most 
investigations coincide with new base year or follow up data releases. 
I estimate a household’s first grade school choice decision in the third chapter 
using bivariate and multivariate probit models.  This analysis employs the restricted-use 
version of the Kindergarten cohort of the Early Childhood Longitudinal Survey (ECLS-
K), a national data set, released by the National Center for Educational Statistics 
(NCES).4  Additional county level controls are added to these data from Census 2000 and 
Religious Congregations and Membership Data 2000.  Upon examining the determinants 
of school selection, I perform a simulation of the impact of receiving a voucher. 
I extend my empirical analysis in Chapter Four by regressing school type attended 
on first grade achievement.  I address criticisms of previous studies by using test scores 
from a student’s entrance into kindergarten to control for his or her ability as well as 
other unobservable characteristics.  I investigate whether positive private school first 
                                                          
4 Additional details regarding ECLS-K are available from NCES at http://www.nces.ed.gov/. 
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  9
grade test scores are the result of better students or better schools.  My dissertation 
concludes with a fifth chapter discussing general findings from the third and fourth 
chapters as well as policy implications of these results.   
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Chapter Two: 
Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Despite being an immense body of literature, for the purposes of my dissertation it 
is possible to classify studies in the economics of education as either studies on 
educational performance or educational choice.  Studies comparing public and private 
schooling performances focus on which type of school produces better students as 
measured by a variety of academic or non-academic outcomes.  Research on school 
choice examines the determinants of decision of enrolling in a public or private school as 
well as the implications of this selection.  Section 2.2 presents a synopsis of the 
progression of data and methodologies used in choice and performance papers to provide 
the context for my dissertation.  Section 2.3 offers detailed examinations of several 
school choice studies and while Section 2.4 offers this same discussion format for 
research pertaining to student achievement within schooling sectors. 
2.2 Current Consensus in Literature 
This section provides a summation of contemporary works in the choice and 
performance areas in effort to highlight the contribution of my dissertation within the 
scope of this recent literature. 
2.2.1 School Choice Studies 
 While there are many investigations into the determinants of private schooling, 
looking at these papers in chronological order offers an evolutionary perspective in terms 
of current data, methodologies, and findings.  While early studies employ aggregate data 
to examine the public or private binary decision (for example, see Gemello and Osman 
10 
 1984), new data and improved computing technology allow for individual-level data  for 
multiple schooling alternatives.  Long and Toma (1988) is the earliest micro-data analysis 
of school choice determinants to model religious and non-religious private education.  
The authors model school choice using an ordered probit since families will base their 
choice on cost primarily.   
Yet, anchoring this choice in the assumption of a hierarchy of tuition expense 
proves controversial for three reasons.  First, the cost to attend a private school varies 
greatly from city to city and state to state.  There is also substantial variation among 
school types.  It is reported in Table 60 of the Digest of Education Statistics (2004) that 
the average private elementary school tuition in 1999-2000 equals $3,267 while Catholic 
elementary school tuition is below this at $2,451 and Secular is substantially higher at 
$7,884.  Other religious school tuition, on average, is $3,503. 
Second, Long and Toma (1988) assume that religious school students receive 
reduced tuition because of their membership at the affiliated sponsor church.  Dynamic 
demographic shifts in student populations at Catholic schools indicates that religious 
school enrollment no longer follows parent church lines.  Students attending Catholic 
schools in the late 1990s were more likely to be non-Catholic, minority, or pay 
unsubsidized tuition (Baker and Riordan 1998).   
Finally, the third reason that an ordered probit is not the best model to use is that 
there are several salient reasons for attending a religious school that do not revolve 
around tuition expense.  Religious education as well as cultural and ethnic preservation 
are cited often as primary reasons for selecting a religious private school (Cohen-Zada 
2006; Sander 1996). 
 11
 Goldhaber (1994, 57) notes that these early school choice efforts need to 
incorporate “…controls in estimated models for the quality and cost of schools in the 
chosen and alternative sectors.”  Lankford and Wyckoff (1992) move toward better 
controls modeling a binary decision of public or private-religious elementary and high 
school attendance.  While restricting their analysis to New York state households, the 
authors link individual and family characteristics with school quality and tuition expense.  
They use additional variables to control for schooling alternatives and estimate this 
choice using binary logit model, which does not impose the strict ordering as found in 
Long and Toma (1988).     
 Lankford, Lee, and Wyckoff (1995) present a multinomial probit model of 
elementary and high school choice when households decide between three schooling 
options: public, religious, and secular.  They restrict the study to twenty-one states in the 
New England area since “…there is such great geographic variation in the composition of 
religious schools” (Lankford, Lee, and Wyckoff 1995, 241).   
This diversity within the private sector plagues any attempt to incorporate tuition 
amounts for these school types.  Within this region, Catholic schools represent the 
majority of religious schools; however, using Catholic schools to proxy all religious 
schools in general is ill-advised as there are tuition differences for Catholic and other 
religious schools as noted earlier (Digest of Education Statistics 2004).   
Lankford, Lee, and Wyckoff (1995) use National Association of Independent 
Schools (NAIS) regional tuition averages to proxy non-religious private school tuition.  
However, Dougherty and Becker (1995) note that while the cost of attending an 
independent school exceeds the cost of attending a religious school, it is not the case that 
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 all independent schools charge tuitions equal to NAIS tuitions.  Dougherty and Becker 
continue by stating that “less that ten percent of the nation’s private school students 
attend an NAIS school” (1995, 25).  Therefore, the use of NAIS tuition data to 
approximate tuition at all secular schools is not appropriate since this school type 
encompasses such a wide array of schools.  “Because military schools, 
nondenominational fundamentalist schools, schools for the handicapped and prep schools 
are all examples of independent schools, the independent school category includes 
schools with diverse orientations” (Lankford and Wyckoff (1992, 319).   
Cohen-Zada and Sander (2006) offer the most recent advancement within the 
choice literature.  The authors expand the choice set of households to include public, 
Catholic, Protestant, and independent private schools using a multinomial logit model.  
Employing a nationwide data set, the authors pay particular attention to religion and 
religiosity of households in that failure to control for these traits leads to biased estimates. 
Overall, there is a progression away from using aggregate data and toward micro-
level data incorporating multiple private schooling options while imposing no pre-
determined ordering of these alternatives.  While some studies attempt to approximate 
tuition for different school types, the measures used do not represent good proxies. 
2.2.2 Comparative Performance Studies 
The second category of works concentrates on the relative performances of the 
two school sectors while performance may represent a variety of outcome measures.  
Surrounding the issue of student performance is the matter of increasing school choice as 
a means by which to force public schools to improve.  Much effort is devoted to 
increasing the competition of public and private schools in effort to raise public school 
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 achievement levels.  Anticipated improvements in student achievement because of 
private school attendance are often challenged in part as a result of the different scopes of 
the data sources employed (Greene, Peterson, and Du 1999).  Furthermore, the level of 
aggregation present in the estimation data is one culprit of the myriad of achievement 
findings in the literature (Jepsen 2002). 
With one exception, using High School and Beyond data and any follow up 
surveys, results fall into one of two possible categories.  In the absence of controlling for 
self-selection into private schools, an observed gain in test score occurs (Coleman, 
Hoffer, and Kilgore 1981a).  Upon controlling for this, the positive results are eliminated 
or reduced substantially (Noell 1982; Goldberger and Cain 1982); Murnane 1981; Willms 
1985; Alexander and Pallas 1985).  The exception is Sander’s (1996) finding that eight 
years of Catholic education leads to higher sophomore test scores in the areas of 
vocabulary, reading, and mathematics even after controlling for self-selection into 
Catholic schools.  Furthermore, results indicate that the recipients of these achievement 
gains are non-Catholics (Sander 1996), which is important since students enrolled in 
Catholic schools more likely to be non-Catholic according to Baker and Riordan (1998).   
There is no overwhelming evidence to support the hypothesis that religious and 
non-religious private school students outscore their public school peers using National 
Educational Longitudinal Study data.  While Jeynes (2002a) finds evidence that religious 
private schools students attain higher achievement levels than non-religious school 
students, many others support the consensus that private school attendance yields higher 
student cognitive achievement (for example, see Goldhaber 1996; LePore and Warren 
1997; Figlio and Stone 1999).  Figlio and Stone (1999) point to environmental reasons 
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 such as religious teaching, disciplinary policies, and peer groups as to why parents pay 
for private schools.   
Most recently, Kim and Placier (2004) concentrate on comparing performance 
within the private sector to see if Catholic schools outperform non-Catholic ones at the 
high school level.  While evidence suggests a positive non-Catholic effect for reading 
tests, there are no achievement growth for either private school type in mathematics, 
social studies, and sciences.  Kim and Placier’s (2004) findings, using National 
Educational Longitudinal Study data, quell other reports claiming that Catholic schooling 
leads to achievement gains.  Furthermore, the authors use a variety of subjects to assess 
student academic performance.  Since a child’s home environment strongly influences 
reading ability, research has focused attention to mathematics achievement in effort to 
capture more of a school’s contribution to a child’s education (Lubienski and Lubienski 
2006; Figlio and Stone 1999; Bryk, Lee, and Holland 1993; Heyneman 2005). 
.  Peterson (2003) follows a cohort through all three designated National 
Assessment of Educational Progress testing times to compare test scores for performance 
purposes and finds no evidence to suggest positive academic achievement growth over 
time.  Lubienski and Lubienski (2005) conclude the higher test scores within the private 
school sector are the result of students with higher socioeconomic backgrounds selecting 
into the private sector.  Peterson and Llaudet (2007) compare performance on fourth and 
eighth grade tests in the private sector as a whole and in separate Catholic, Lutheran, and 
Evangelical Protestant groupings.  Once controls are added for student characteristics, 
there is no positive private school effect observed for fourth graders for reading and math 
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 tests.  On the fourth grade math tests specifically, evidence suggests that public schools 
outperform their private school peers by more than four points.   
However, Peterson and Llaudet (2007) are careful to emphasize that these results 
of higher private school achievement are not indicative of private school attendance 
benefits or detriments.  National Assessment of Educational Progress data are not without 
shortcomings (Peterson 2003).  In particular, since these data do not include an initial 
student aptitude measure, the authors call for all student performance comparisons using 
these data to cease. 
While not all papers do, many works employ some control, either an exogenous 
characteristic or statistical method, to account for omitted variable bias due to 
unobservable traits.  While early works using High School and Beyond indicate a 
statistically significant improvement in the achievement of private school students, later 
papers demonstrate that these observed gains of private school enrollment are the result 
of omitted variable bias.   
Regardless of data used, upon controlling for self-selection into the private sector, 
any previously positive findings are reduced or eliminated.  In addition to self-selection 
bias, any observed gains in student achievement because of private school attendance are 
often challenged in part as a result of the different scopes of the data sources employed 
(Greene, Peterson, and Du 1999).  Furthermore, the level of aggregation present in the 
estimation data is one culprit of the myriad of achievement findings in the literature 
(Jepsen 2002). 
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 2.3 Public and Private School Choice 
The earliest studies of school choice focused on the binary choice of public or 
private schools, though in many studies Catholic schooling served as a proxy for private 
schooling.  Examples of these studies include Gustman and Pidot (1973); Stiglitz (1974); 
Clotfelter (1976); Sonstelie (1979); Sonstelie (1982); and Gemello and Osman (1984).  
More recently, rather than treating the choice of schools as a binary decision, studies such 
as Long and Toma (1988); Lankford and Wyckoff (1992); Lankford, Lee, and Wyckoff 
(1995); and Cohen-Zada and Sander (2006), have expanded the choice of schools to 
include different types of private and public schools.5  Usually, these papers draw 
implications regarding the implementation of a voucher system as means of educational 
reform. 
2.3.1 Binary Decision Studies 
Sonstelie (1979) notes household preferences regarding public school quality, 
measured by expenditure level, are double-peaked.  High spending per pupil signals high 
caliber public school districts to parents and thus these public schools have high 
enrollment levels while low spending amounts indicate poor quality public schools and 
high enrollment levels in the private sector.  Upon reducing educational spending in 
California because of imposed spending limits, the author predicts that it is not likely to 
move toward the low-level equilibrium using census tract data from the 1970 Census in 
the Los Angeles area specifically.   
Gemello and Osman (1984) employ school district data at two different 
aggregation levels, school district and census tract, to investigate the wide array of 
                                                          
5 Houston (1999) and Belfield (2004) expand the choice set beyond the public and private schooling sectors 
with the incorporation of home schooling. 
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 elementary and secondary enrollments in California.  Separating the private sector into 
parochial and non-parochial schools, the authors report that fluctuations in enrollments 
are not random.  Integral factors are socioeconomic status, racial and ethnic composition, 
and percent Catholic.  Speculating that spending per pupil signals school quality to 
parents, the imposition of public school spending caps in California would increase 
private school attendance when these limits provided a less than desired expenditure 
level. 
Hamilton and Macauley (1991) exclude both rural and central city areas from 
their investigation of separate estimations for elementary and secondary schooling levels 
in New Jersey school districts.  Significant results include a positive relationship for the 
percentage black in the area and a negative finding for the average size of household for 
the elementary private school attendance level.  The authors purport that educational 
quality measures are not necessary since inference of these are obtained through parental 
observation.  The probability of attending a private elementary school is positively and 
significantly influenced by increasing the standard deviation of income within a district. 
Lee and Marks (1992) expand the school choice issue to examine the decision to 
attend a single-sex or coeducational nonreligious private school.  Data are the 1989 senior 
classes attending sixty different schools, where schools are evenly distributed between 
the three school types: boys only, girls only, and coeducational.  A student’s academic 
history in kindergarten through sixth grade proves to explain this schooling decision in a 
highly significant way.  The authors contend that families opt for their daughters to attend 
a single-sex private school is made at the start of her academic career. 
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 Goldhaber (1994) combines these two areas of choice and performance by 
looking at school sector chosen at the high school level once a child’s achievement 
differential between sectors is included using National Educational Longitudinal Study of 
1988 data.  Controlling for self-selection into private schools, the author finds no 
significant improvement in mathematics or reading performances for students enrolled in 
private schools leading to the conclusion that a voucher system is not a viable educational 
reform to improve student academic achievement levels.  While acknowledging that there 
are many private schooling options from which to select, the simplifying assumption that 
parents face a binary public or private choice is made.  There are no school quality 
variables are included since it is assumed that parents include these attributes into their 
children’s expected achievement.  A higher socioeconomic status increases the likelihood 
of attending a private school.  Smaller class size does as well.   
 Sander (2005) uses data from the General Social Survey to explain the decline in 
Catholic school enrollment by examining the determinants of the choice to attend a 
Catholic school.  Evidence suggests that Catholic religiosity has a large effect on a 
child’s likelihood of attending a Catholic school.  Tracking frequency of church 
attendance since the 1970s shows a downward trend in Catholic religiosity and thus 
supports the conclusion that Catholic school enrollment is down because of lower 
Catholic religiosity levels.  Implications of this finding are widespread since Catholic 
religiosity, an omitted explanatory variable in many school choice studies, is a significant 
and important determinant in selecting to attend Catholic schools.  Furthermore, it is 
determined that Catholic religious membership and Catholic school attendance are not 
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 endogenously related.  The author does not incorporate Catholic school tuition or public 
school quality measures due to data shortcomings.   
2.3.2 Multiple Schooling Options 
 Long and Toma (1988) is the earliest micro-data analysis of school choice 
determinants to model multiple private schooling alternatives.  The authors find that both 
demand and supply related determinants affect a household’s choice to attend a public or 
private school with the private sector separated into parochial and nonreligious.  The 
authors point out that parents do not view these two types of private schools as the same.  
Ordered probit estimations for primary and secondary schooling levels are performed as 
well as a combined estimation for both levels using individual 1970 and 1980 Census 
data.  The authors state that the use of an ordered probit model is correct since families 
will base their choice on cost primarily.  Thus, the tuition expenses of the three school 
types establishes the ordering of schooling alternatives used as public, religious private, 
and nonreligious private since religiously affiliated schools receive subsidization from 
their church sponsors.  Determinants relating to the demand factors are household income 
level, parental educational attainment, and race.  The availability and access to private 
schools is clearly an important supply factor in this school choice analysis.  Findings 
suggest that the effects of race and income have diminished over time from 1970 to 1980.   
Using 1980 individual data, Lankford and Wyckoff (1992) estimate the 
determinants for enrollment in elementary and secondary religious private and public 
schooling options for white households living in New York State.  Excluding New York 
City, the authors present simulations for the impact of a zero cost religious alternative to 
public schooling indicating that parents view religious and public schools in urban areas 
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 as substitutes, especially Catholic schools.  Findings indicate that academic performance 
within a school is a significant and positive factor in the decision-making process.  
Student-teacher ratios and mathematics test scores, proxies for school quality, are 
important for elementary religious private school selection while only test score results 
are significant.  Specifically, there is a negative relationship observed for the student 
teacher ratio and a positive one for test scores.  In particular, these two findings indicate 
that it is the quality of the school that parents examine when making their school choice 
decisions.   
Lankford, Lee, and Wyckoff (1995) examine school choice among religious and 
independent schools as well as their public alternative at the elementary and secondary 
schooling levels using 1985 Current Population Survey data.  Findings indicate that racial 
demographics of public schools, living in a central city, share of lay teachers in Catholic 
schools, and the juvenile crime rate all affect school choice decisions.  As expected, 
parental income and educational attainment do as well.  Specifically, living in a central 
city increases a child’s probability of attending a religious elementary school by nine 
percent.  Private school tuition and the proxy used for public school quality, spending per 
pupil, do not significantly impact the school enrollment decision.  This study is restricted 
to white families living in suburban and urban areas located in twenty-one northeast 
states due to the small sample size of nonwhites in these data and to the heterogeneity 
present among religious schools through out the entire country.  While the majority of the 
region’s religious schools are Catholic, there are other religious private schools that are 
not explicitly considered.   
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 In many multiple schooling analyses, religious and non-religious schools are 
separated so that Catholic schools proxy for all religious schools and a particular subset 
of independent schools proxies for all non-religious schools (for example, see Lankford, 
Lee, and Wyckoff 1995).  For the independent school alternative tuition data gathered 
from the National Association of Independent Schools (NAIS) serves as tuition data for 
all non-religious private schools when NAIS affiliates represent only a small portion of 
all independent schools.  In fact, Dougherty and Becker (1995) note that while the cost of 
attending an independent school exceeds the cost of attending a religious school, it is not 
the case that all independent schools charge tuitions equal to NAIS tuitions.  Dougherty 
and Becker continue by stating that “less that ten percent of the nation’s private school 
students attend an NAIS school” (1995, 25).  Therefore, caution is advised when 
grouping schools into similar categories based upon religious and non-religious 
affiliations. 
In addition to providing important contributions to the school choice literature, 
Lankford and Wyckoff (1992) develop a random utility model of school choice.  Since 
Lankford, Lee, and Wyckoff (1995) and Lankford and Wyckoff (1992) use this random 
utility model, they do not impose a restrictive ordering of schooling alternatives like the 
ordered probit does in Long and Toma (1988).   
While my dissertation seeks to increase the detail within the private schooling 
sector, Houston (1999) expands the scope of the school choice decision to include home 
schooling as an alternative to public and private schools.  Of interest for this analysis is 
that Catholic adherents are associated with private schooling enrollment while 
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 Evangelical Protestant denominations are connected with home schooling, while this 
finding is only significant for Catholic. 
Cohen-Zada and Sander (2006) examine private school attendance, with no 
distinction among schooling levels, using individual observations from the General 
Social Survey combined with aggregate data from several sources to control for county 
racial and ethnic populations as well as Catholic adherents and concentration of Secular 
private schools.  While other religious private schools are excluded, the authors employ 
one of the most detailed breakdowns of the private sector: Catholic, Protestant, and 
Secular.  This work represents the first effort to surpass a model of school choice 
employing three schooling options: public, religious and non-religious private schools.  
In addition to incorporating non-Catholic private schools into the analysis, unique to this 
work is the inclusion of religious membership and religiosity on school choice.  Omitting 
household religiosity from the demand for private schooling causes results to be biased.  
While religious affiliation is insignificant, religiosity is shown to have a significant 
positive impact on private school attendance.  Also of note is the finding for Catholic 
adherents in a county, the authors find a significant concave effect suggesting that once a 
desired threshold level of Catholics attending public school is reached, the demand for 
Catholic school among Catholics falls. 
 2.3.3 Policy Extensions of School Choice 
 Kirby and Darling-Hammond (1988) look at the effect of a tax subsidy for private 
school tuition on school choice in Minnesota.  Findings indicate that high income 
households locate in high caliber public school districts while low income households 
seek other schooling options as they are less likely to consider residence relocation as a 
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 possibility.  Private school enrollment for low income families is unaffected by tax 
deductions since these households do not itemize their federal tax returns.  Rather, higher 
income households benefit from the deduction.  However, the small size of the deduction 
signals that it likely to benefit those who would make the same private school decision 
regardless of the deduction.  In addition to private schooling expense, other key factors 
are parental schooling sector as well as desire for religious education.  The authors 
conclude that a tax subsidy does not provide an increased choice set of schooling 
alternatives. 
West and Palsson (1988) contrast variations in state enrollment levels for the 
private sector.  The share of the population that is Catholic, student teacher ratio, per 
capita income, and the frequency and duration of teacher strikes significantly affect 
parental selection of private schooling.   
 While most studies examine the decision to select the public or private sector, 
Schneider, Schiller, and Coleman (1996) seek to explain public school choice to learn 
who enrolls in public schools of choice and who opts for the residential location assigned 
public schools for high school using NELS data.  Results indicate that minorities and 
lower income households are more likely to utilize the option to attend public schools of 
choice.  This evidence rebuts the speculation that an increased choice set benefits white 
and higher income households only. 
Hoyt and Lee (1998) examine the impact of a voucher system.  Under certain 
assumptions, vouchers may prove beneficial for all households in a given community, 
even low income families.  If a poor household is accepted into the voucher program, 
then a child benefits from private school attendance.  Households that are least likely to 
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 participate in the voucher program still benefit from a voucher program by paying less in 
taxes.  A voucher equaling one thousand dollars will reduce taxes in every state provided 
the voucher causes a decrease in public school enrollments of just over five percent. 
Epple and Romano (1998) present a theoretical model of the impact of vouchers 
on public and private school enrollments.  Specifically, the incorporation of a voucher 
program increases access to private schooling by increasing the number of private 
schools in the area.  Connecting vouchers to student achievement, the authors 
demonstrate that vouchers and the associated private school attendance lead to increased 
cognitive performance for students.  Students who remain in the public sector are made 
worse off as a result of a increased school competition between schooling sectors. 
2.4 Educational Performance 
 This portion of the review of the literature concentrates on academic outcomes 
and is arranged by data set used in the analysis.  The first three data sets discussed below 
are High School and Beyond, National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988, and 
National Assessment of Educational Progress.  These are nationwide data sets governed 
by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).  The fourth grouping of data 
discussed below is a catchall category highlighting the many different and unique data 
sets studies have used that are not NCES affiliated. 
2.4.1 High School and Beyond 
One of the first works to compare cognitive performance in different school 
sectors is Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore (1981a).6  Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore’s 
examination of achievement differences in public and private schools finds the private 
                                                          
6 A very similar version of Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore (1981a) was published as Coleman, Hoffer, and 
Kilgore (1982). 
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 sector outperforms the public one before and after controlling for parental educational 
attainment, race, and socioeconomic status.  The authors credit these gains to the private 
sector’s increased emphasis on challenging homework assignments, applying disciplinary 
actions, and employing engaged teachers. 
Although the intention of this report was to enable a critical evaluation of private 
school involvement in public school reform, the main outcome of this work is the 
rebuttals invoked because of the report’s dissemination, primarily due to the statistical 
and inference methods they employed in reaching sweeping conclusions.  Several of 
these works are featured below, prompted the authors to issue a response (Coleman, 
Hoffer, and Kilgore 1981b). 
Catterall and Levin (1982) find that minority and low income households are less 
likely to take advantage of tuition tax credits than white and high income families.  The 
authors then suggest that private schools would also take measures to dissuade the use of 
these credits.     
Noell (1982) comments on the lack of controls used in Coleman et. al. (1981a) by 
noting that gender, disability status, region of residence, and college enrollment 
expectations are all likely associated with selection into Catholic school.  Once these 
additional controls are added, the author finds no impact of Catholic school attendance on 
test scores.  This analysis is restricted to public and Catholic schools only as the twenty-
seven non-Catholic schools constitute too small of a sample for estimation purposes. 
Goldberger and Cain (1982) assert that there are no sensible conclusions to reach 
from Coleman et. al. (1981a) findings due to inept conduct of standard research 
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 procedures and failure to present evidence from empirical work shoring up their 
conclusions. 
While Murnane (1981) dismisses the findings and the report as inadequate due to 
lack of control for self-selection into private schools, Finn (1981) and Heyns (1981) 
advocate a qualified interpretation of the report.  While contributing to the public and 
private school forum on a descriptive basis, it is unable to address critical policy 
implications with its findings due to data shortcomings. 
Braddock (1981) contends that public schools are too diverse in their missions 
and outlooks.  Private schools succeed in improving academic achievement of students 
since the majority of these schools are college preparatory for the middle class.  Bryk 
(1981) presents evidence that Coleman et. al. (1981a) should not make nation-wide 
claims based on their findings due to the two stage sapling procedures used by the NCES 
as they so not guarantee a nationally representative sample.  Guthrie and Zusman (1981) 
charge a private school would have to abandon it central mission, religious connection, 
and physical disciplinary policy only to abide by government sanctioned educational 
methods and standards to transform into, or rather behave like, a public school. 
Willms (1985) employs HSB data to examine academic performance for a 
student’s junior and senior years of high school.  Controlling for tenth grade test scores as 
well as student and family characteristics, achievement gains on reading, vocabulary, 
writing, and mathematics tests for Catholic school students are not observed, yet these are 
very small in magnitude.  For the science and civics subject tests, public school students 
score slightly higher than their private school peers do.   
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 Using HSB data, Alexander and Pallas (1985) find that the best evaluation of 
tenth to twelfth grade academic achievement is less than one year’s improvement, which 
leads the authors to label this small effect as inconsequential and irrelevant as a topic of 
school reform within the public policy arena. 
Greeley (2002) investigates minority achievement levels in Catholic and public 
schools.  Upon controlling for family and student characteristics, Hispanic and African-
American students outperform their public school counterparts.  Incorporating additional 
control variables for religious affiliation, school discipline, and instruction quality, these 
observed gains are stamped out.  Greeley concludes that there Catholic schools are better 
than public schools at educating minority students. 
Chubb and Moe (1990) maintain ruling educational administrations are inept, so 
as a result any school reforms that are enacted are doomed to failure by association.  To 
revolutionize the public school system, the authors affirm that the private sector 
possesses the solutions.  Specifically, the universal remedy to all educational problems 
including low student achievement is school choice.   
Sander and Krautmann (1995) use the third follow up of HSB data and devote 
careful attention to the issue of selection into Catholic schools.  The authors find that 
Catholic school attendance increases the likelihood of graduating from high school, but 
has no positive impact on post-secondary schooling attainment.   
Sander (1996) examines the effect of elementary Catholic school attendance on 
high school test scores using HSB data.  Eight years of Catholic education leads to higher 
sophomore test scores in the areas of vocabulary, reading, and mathematics.  Upon 
controlling for self-selection into Catholic schools, results indicate that the recipients of 
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 these achievement gains are non-Catholics.  Thus, non-Hispanic white Catholics enrolled 
in Catholic schools do not experience higher academic achievement because of their 
school choice.  The author suggests the appeal of Catholic school for these families is one 
of religious-based instruction. 
2.4.2 National Educational Longitudinal Study 
 Focusing specifically on urban areas, Gamoran (1996) finds that Catholic schools 
have a positive impact on mathematics achievement while non-religious private schools 
do not offer any achievement advantage.  The author also includes public magnet schools 
as a schooling alternative in addition to regular public schools and controls for student 
and family background characteristics.  For reading, social studies, and science tests, the 
public magnet school students experience achievement gains.   
Goldhaber (1996) concludes that private school students do not have higher 
achievement levels than public school students.  There is no positive private school effect 
on student academic achievement for reading or mathematics when looking at the private 
sector as a whole.  Dividing private schools into two sections, Catholic and non-Catholic, 
does not affect these results.   
LePore and Warren (1997) find no significant evidence that single-sex Catholic 
schools offer an academic boon to students in the form of higher test scores.  Initial 
achievement measures and background characteristics significantly explain the variation 
in student scores.   
Accounting for selection into Catholic and independent private schools, Lee, 
Chow-Hoy, Burkam, Geverdt, and Smerdon (1998) find that Catholic schools dictate an 
authoritative and controlling stance for student course selection.  Students attending 
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 private schools enroll more often in advanced math classes compared to their public 
school peers.  It is the program of study that Catholic schools follow that leads to higher 
mathematics achievement among its students. 
 Upon finding no evidence of religious and non-religious private schools 
outscoring their public school peers, Figlio and Stone (1999) point to environmental 
reasons such as religious teaching, disciplinary policies, and peer groups as to why 
parents pay for private schools.  Acknowledging that private schools are not 
homogeneous, the authors perform unique selections into each private school type. 
While other works focus on test score performance, Grogger and Neal (2000) 
investigate the effect of Catholic schooling on high school graduation and college 
enrollment rates.  Minority and white students living in urban areas are significantly more 
likely to graduate from high school when they attend Catholic high schools while only 
minority urban students experience a significant increase in college attendance rates. 
Jeynes (2002a) finds evidence that religious private schools students attain higher 
achievement levels than non-religious school students.  Continuing this query, Jeynes 
(2002b) outlines and tests five criteria, including homework assignments, increased 
security measures, disciplinary codes, and religious teachings, as explanations for this 
phenomenon.  While the author views each of these principles as distinct, it is reasonable 
to categorize all of them as part of the environment within a religious private school.  The 
author concludes that religious private schools provide all five characteristics better than 
public schools.  Thus, the students attending private schools are enables to excel and 
reach higher achievement scores. 
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 Kim and Placier (2004) concentrate on comparing performance within the private 
sector to see if Catholic schools outperform non-Catholic ones at the high school level 
using National Educational Longitudinal Study of 1988 (NELS) data.  While evidence 
suggests a positive non-Catholic effect for reading tests, there are no achievement growth 
for either private school type in mathematics, social studies, and sciences.  The authors 
determine that a child’s gender as well as active parent participation and Catholicism are 
significant.  These findings quell other reports claiming that Catholic schooling leads to 
achievement gains.  Furthermore, the authors use a variety of subjects to assess student 
academic performance whereas many studies examining the existence of a Catholic 
schooling effect use mathematics only.   
2.4.3 National Assessment of Educational Progress 
Peterson (2003) states that National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) 
data are not without shortcomings, yet there is something to be learned from a student’s 
performance on its reading, math, and science tests administered at ages nine, thirteen, 
and seventeen.  Furthermore, these data offer the opportunity to perform an across-the-
board examination of many students in many schools.  Observed gains at any particular 
age is not evidence of cognitive growth.  It is necessary to follow a cohort through all 
three testing times to compare test scores for performance purposes.  When the age 
seventeen, in 1996, cohort is tracked through all three testing phases, there is no evidence 
to suggest positive academic achievement growth over time.    
Lubienski and Lubienski (2005) conclude that while, on average, private school 
test scores are higher than public school test scores, this is not the result of better schools 
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 in the private sector.  Rather, it is the result of students with higher socioeconomics 
backgrounds selecting into the private sector. 
Peterson and Llaudet (2007) compare performance on fourth and eighth grade 
NAEP tests in private schools to public schools.  In addition to the private sector as a 
whole, the authors separate private schools into Catholic, Lutheran, and Evangelical 
Protestant groupings.  Once controls are added for student characteristics, there is no 
positive private school effect observed for fourth graders for reading and math tests.  On 
the fourth grade math tests specifically, evidence suggests that public schools outperform 
their private school peers by more than four points.  Evangelical Protestant schools are 
above public ones for reading; however, they are on par with public schools in math.  
Upon presenting these findings, the authors are careful to emphasize that these results of 
higher private school achievement are not indicative of private school attendance benefits 
or detriments.  Since there is no initial student aptitude measure included, the authors 
assert that NAEP data cannot ensnare performance comparisons. 
Continuing in their critique of NAEP data, the authors find these data prone to 
classification bias as well as school influence bias.  The incentives that lead public 
schools to overstate the share of disadvantaged students for government assistance 
actually work in the opposite direction for private schools.  Consistency of groupings 
must be maintained in order to avoid classification bias.  It is possible to conceive of a 
situation in which a school directly influences the number of books in a child’s home.  As 
a result of this, the variable is biased due to school influence.   
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 2.4.4 Studies using Other Data Sources 
Looking at data for Illinois, Sander (1999) finds that the concentration of private 
schools provides no increase to public school achievement levels.  The author concludes 
that the gain in public school student performance cancels the negative impact of “cream 
skimming” performed by private schools on public school achievement, resulting in what 
appears to be a nil effect on public school achievement.   
While this review focuses on academic outcomes, it is possible that schools affect 
a student’s nonacademic conduct as well.  Specifically, Evans, Oates, and Schwab (1992) 
examine teenage pregnancy and high school drop out rates using National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth of 1979 (NLSY) data.7  The impact of a student’s peer group provides 
statistically significant decreases in the probability of teenage pregnancy and high school 
drop out rates when the number low income peers is small.  However, the decision of 
where to live is made at the same time as the selection of one’s peer group and other 
locally provided programs.  Controlling for this endogeneity issue by simultaneous 
equation estimation, the results are stamped out.  The significant single estimation results 
are driven by households selecting schools with a small number of low income peers.  Of 
particular importance for this review is the reversal of these findings because of selection 
prompts caution when studying choices made by households.  In many situations, 
households are able to apply leverage in order to achieve their desired outcomes.   
Wolfe (1987) lengthens the time horizon to examine the effects of Catholic school 
enrollment using the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 
(NLS) data and finds evidence of a loss in mathematics achievement for Catholic school 
                                                          
7 For other papers examining Catholic schooling effects on student behavior, see Figlio and Ludwig (2000) 
and Mocan, Scafadi, and Tekin (2002). 
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 students.  There is no positive or negative long-term impact linked to Catholic school 
attendance for vocabulary performance. 
In opposition to the assertion made by many authors that Catholic schools 
constitute the most homogeneous schools within the private sector (for example, see 
Braddock 1981; Grogger and Neal 2000), Riordan (1985) contends that there are distinct 
types of Catholic schools: coeducational and single-sex.  Using NLS data, findings 
indicate that males and females attending single-sex Catholic schools have higher 
achievement levels in mathematics and vocabulary when compared to their peers 
attending coeducational Catholic schools as well as public schools. 
Jepsen (2005) uses Prospects data and finds little to connect teacher experience 
and first grade gains in student performance.  Findings suggest “that teacher 
characteristics are not strongly associated with teacher effectiveness” at the first grade 
level in general and for reading in particular (p 312). 
According to Hoxby (2000), reducing the student teacher ratio is one public 
school reform that finds backing among parents, teachers, school administrators, and 
teacher unions in spite of a no preponderance of evidence lending support.  Using 
Connecticut data on elementary public schools, there is no effect on test score 
performance when class size is reduced.  The author concludes that lowering class size is 
an example of increasing expenditure for a public school resource that does not improve 
cognitive growth.   
 Some achievement studies use random experiment data collected during the 
implementation of a voucher plan.  These data do not suffer from selection bias since the 
distribution of vouchers is random.  Greene, Peterson, and Du (1999) find achievement 
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 gains because of participation in Milwaukee’s school choice program, which offered only 
a small increase in a household’s schooling choice set due to many limitations on school 
participation.  
Howell and Peterson (2002) observe significant achievement gains for African 
American students who participate in the School Choice Scholarships Foundation in New 
York City, another randomized field trial.  Krueger and Zhu (2004a) find that relaxing the 
requirements of membership within different racial categories, from both parents to either 
parent, diminishes the strength of Howell and Peterson’s results.  Peterson and Howell 
(2004a) dismiss these contradictory findings citing that results maintain significance and 
positive sign with the more relaxed racial determination scheme.  The authors accuse 
Krueger and Zhu of running “barefoot through data in hopes of finding desired results” 
(Peterson and Howell 2004a, 702).  The firestorm continues to rage and generate 
response from both sides (Krueger and Zhu 2004b; Peterson and Howell 2004b). 
Campbell, West, and Peterson (2005) use a national sample of voucher applicants 
to estimate both stages of the voucher process: application and utilization.  Evidence 
suggests that at both stages of the voucher process, religiosity and religion are 
significant.8  Families who attend a religious service frequently are significantly more 
likely to petition as well as use a voucher.  Attending a school within the private sector is 
very attractive to Catholic or Evangelical Protestant households.  It is the household’s 
religious beliefs and habits more than income level or educational attainment that 
differentiates voucher participants from all eligible households. 
                                                          
8 The authors use “religious commitment” to indicate the church attendance whereas “religion” signifies the 
religion practiced by the household.    
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2.5 Conclusion 
In modeling and estimating school choice, current research uses micro-level data 
incorporating multiple private schooling options while imposing no pre-determined 
ordering of these alternatives.  While some studies attempt to approximate tuition for 
different school types, the measures used do not represent good proxies. 
When using any one of three nationwide data surveys and controlling for self-
selection into the private sector, current literature supports the conclusion that any 
positive test score results for private school attendance are due to better students 
attending private schools.  In addition to self-selection bias, any observed gains in student 
achievement are often challenged in part as a result of the different scopes of the data 
sources employed (Greene, Peterson, and Du 1999).  Furthermore, the level of 
aggregation present in the estimation data is an additional culprit of the myriad of 
achievement findings in the literature (Jepsen 2002). 
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 Chapter Three:  
An Empirical Analysis of Schools Selected by Households at the First Grade Level:  
Who Takes the Voucher Bait and Where Do They Go? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Education choices made at first grade are particularly important as they may 
condition decisions and outcomes throughout a child’s academic career.  While most 
Catholic schooling is undertaken at the elementary school level, the focus of academic 
research on the effects of private schools on performance and measures of educational 
outcomes has been primarily on Catholic high schools (Sander 1996).  The implication of 
this is that the vast majority of secondary school choice studies are incomplete; the 
elementary schooling decision of the parents should be included for all secondary school 
choice analyses.   
Evidence suggests that a child’s elementary school years are critical school years 
in which a child learns the foundational information of history, science, and fine arts as 
well as other school subjects (Peterson 2003).  Furthermore, Peterson (2003) continues 
that it is within these years that a child learns how to relate and connect to others and 
their surrounding environment.  First grade academic achievement predicts cognitive 
performance in a child’s junior year of high school (Cunningham and Stanovich 1997).  
A child’s elementary educational history is an important determinant in the decision to 
attend a single-sex or coeducational independent private secondary school (Lee and 
Marks 1992).  Thus, it is plausible to expect that a child’s elementary education play an 
important role in school selection overall. 
In this essay, I examine the issue of school choice at the first grade level.  Upon 
determining the relevant factors of school selection, it is possible to evaluate the potential 
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 effects of implementing a voucher program at this schooling level.  No studies, to my 
knowledge, isolate this choice made for first grade attendance at the beginning of a 
child’s academic career using a rich model of private schooling options.9   
Evidence suggests that students do not switch between schooling alternatives 
often.  Lee and Marks (1992) report that nearly one-half of their sample of high school 
seniors attended the same school since kindergarten while Goldhaber (1994, 59) cites the 
“actual or perceived deleterious effects on children” as justification as to why parents are 
unlikely to switch school sectors.  My sample supports the claim that students do not 
switch school types.  As shown in Table 3.1, there are only two hundred twenty-five 
children who switch to a different school type from kindergarten to first grade out of 
nearly eight thousand children for which kindergarten and first grade school types are 
known.  
Within the school choice literature, some papers focus on the elementary and 
secondary levels combined (for example, see Long and Toma 1988; Lankford, Lee, and 
Wykoff 1995; Lankford and Wykoff 1992) while others restrict their analyses to the 
secondary level only (for example, see Goldhaber 1996).  While Goldhaber (1996) 
evaluates the private versus public school choice using an all-inclusive private school 
variable, others have enriched the choice framework by incorporating various types of 
private schools such as parochial and non-parochial (for example, see Long and Toma 
1988) and religious and independent (for example, see Lankford, Lee, and Wykoff 1995).  
Others have looked at public schools versus Catholic schools and ignored other types of 
private schools (for example, see Noell 1982; Jensen 1986; Greeley 2002; Sander 2005). 
                                                          
9 While none focus on the first grade schooling level, recent studies do employ increased schooling options when 
looking at academic achievement differences among the public and private sectors.  For example, see Lubienski and 
Lubienski (2006) and Kim and Placier (2004). 
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 Public Catholic Evangelical Protestant Secular Total,by row
Public 5,900 30 15 0 5 5,950
Catholic 30 1,055 5 0 0 1,090
Other Religiousb 25 0 340 135 5 505
Secular 65 25 0 20 140 250
Undetermined 530 85 25 15 10 665
Total, by column 6,550 1,195 385 170 160 8,460
b A detailed breakdown of other religious schools is unavailable.  Additional information 
on this is provided in footnote 29.
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Table 3.1: School Type Switchers from Kindergarten to First Gradea
aThere are 665 students for which kindergarten school type is undertermined.  It is impossible to 
know if these students switched school types in between kindergarten and first grade.   
Source: Data are from the retricted use ECLS-K, 1999-2000.
Sample sizes are rounded to comply with NCES restricted use data reporting standards.
 
 While treating a household’s choice between public and private school as 
synonymous with a choice between public and Catholic schools may have been 
appropriate when examining the educational choices of households in the 1970s and 
1980s, since then there have been numerous changes in the composition of private 
schools, which precipitate the need to examine the effects of attending religious private 
schools rather than Catholic private schools alone (Chubb and Moe 1990; Gaziel 1997).  
Catholic schools no longer constitute the majority of religiously affiliated private schools.  
Catholic school enrollment has declined because of a decrease in Catholic religiosity 
(Sander 2005).  While Catholic has fallen, there has been an increase in private schools, 
especially conservative Christian private schools (Sander 2005). 
With the exception of Cohen-Zada and Sander (2006), who separate private 
schools into Catholic, Protestant, and secular classifications, there has been no effort to 
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 estimate private school choice using three private schooling alternatives in addition to 
public.  There is a void in the school choice literature regarding the determinant of 
demand for other religious education (Cohen-Zada and Sander 2006).  As the authors 
note, it is incorrect to treat all private schools as homogeneous since distinctions among 
private sector schooling options exist.  Even within Catholic schools, long considered the 
most homogeneous schools within the private schooling sector, there have been 
compositional changes since 1970 (Goldhaber 1994).  Students attending Catholic 
schools in the late 1990s were more likely to be non-Catholic, minority, or pay 
unsubsidized tuition (Baker and Riordan 1998).  While elementary Catholic schools 
typically have a lower non-Catholic enrollment than is found at the secondary schooling 
level, the southeast Catholic elementary enrollment is one-third non-Catholic (Baker and 
Riordan 1998). 
While only using parochial and non-parochial school types, Long and Toma 
(1988) do recognize the myriad of schools available, especially religiously affiliated non-
Catholic schools.  In a similar vein, Lankford and Wyckoff (1992, 319) acknowledge that 
“although it might be relevant to make fine distinctions between the various types of 
private schools when analyzing school choice, data typically only identify students as 
attending public, private religious or private independent schools.” 
In this study, I move beyond admitting these private sector differences are present 
to augment the scope of this choice by offering a rich model that incorporates the 
different types of private schools.10  In addition to including the public schooling option, 
my essay offers the most detailed typology of private schools to date by separating 
                                                          
10 This analysis concentrates on regular elementary schools and children without disabilities.  All schools 
for the disabled and all children with mild to severe disabilities have been eliminated from the data for this 
essay. 
 40
 private schools into four distinct categories: Catholic, Evangelical or Fundamental 
Protestant (Evangelical), Mainline Protestant or Other Faith (Protestant), and Secular.11   
Private school enrollment at the first grade level is different from the elementary 
private sector level as a whole.  Lankford, Lee, and Wykcoff (1995) emphasize that 
focusing on the determinants of school selection enhances the policy forum regarding 
vouchers, tuition tax credits, and school choice.  When a household is presented with a 
voucher to attend a private school of its choice, it is of interest to know what school is 
selected.  It is important to know if not only households will accept the voucher, but also 
how they will use them.  With the exception of Campbell, West, and Peterson (2005), 
there has been little empirical estimation of voucher usage.  This essay seeks to examine 
school choice using a detailed private school typology and then apply the choice made to 
voucher policy participation to see if the household’s decision changes. 
I find kindergarten test performance, household income, and parental education 
levels are important factors in selecting a school.  Additionally, religiosity of the 
household and denomination adherents in a county are significant determinants.  The two 
simulations presented indicate that not all voucher recipients would attend the same type 
of private school.  In particular, the differences appear to follow racial lines.  I observe in 
both simulations that white and Hispanic, in different households and area environments, 
exhibit very similar predicted enrollment probabilities among varying school types.  
Evidence suggests that African-American girls respond differently to school selection 
than white and Hispanic girls do.  The predicted probabilities in the simulations 
demonstrate that households do not view all private schools as identical.  In particular, 
                                                          
11 Although public schools may be considered secular as well, through out this essay, secular refers to 
private secular schools only. 
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 the probability patterns over a change in income are very different for Evangelical and 
Protestant school types.  Clearly, an increase in private school attendance does not 
translate to a uniform enrollment increase at all types of private schools. 
The section that follows highlights some recent shifts in private schools.  After 
this, I present a brief discussion of the model used in this essay.  Section 3.4 offers a 
description of the data I use while the fifth section presents the estimation results and 
policy simulations based on these findings.  Finally, this essay rounds out with a few 
concluding remarks. 
3.2 Trends in Private Schooling 
This section provides an in-depth look at trends in private school enrollment and 
supply in the United States during the past fourteen years from 1989 - 2003.  My source 
of data, The Private School Universe Survey (PSS), is a survey conducted every two 
years by the U.S. Census Bureau for the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).  
The initial round for this survey was first undertaken during the 1989-1990 academic 
year.  In this survey, private schools are categorized by religious and secular sects as well 
as grade-level instruction: elementary, secondary, or combined.12     
Figure 3.1 illustrates the number of private elementary schools by orientation, 
expressed as a percentage of total private elementary schools.  Catholic schools comprise 
thirty-eight percent of all private elementary schools in 2003 - 2004.  This is down from a 
high of forty-six percent in 1991 - 1992.  Other religious schools have remained stable at 
approximately forty percent for its share of elementary private schools.  Secular schools 
                                                          
12 Prior to 1995, PSS defines the elementary schooling level as Pre-kindergarten – 6th grade.  Starting in 
1995, PSS includes terminal kindergarten programs in the elementary schooling level.  PSS defines the 
secondary schooling level as 6th grade – 12th grade.  Additionally, the secondary schooling level includes 
schools with some combination of these elementary and secondary grade levels. 
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 experience an increase from thirteen percent of schools in 1989 - 1990 up to twenty 
percent of private schools in 2003 - 2004.   
Figure 3.1: Elementary Private Schools by Orientation
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10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
1989-90 1991-92 1993-94 1995-96 1997-98 1999-00 2001-02 2003-04
Academic Year
Pe
rc
en
ta
ag
e 
of
 T
ot
al
 
El
em
en
ta
ry
 P
riv
at
e 
Sc
ho
ol
s
 As shown in Table 3.2, first grade enrollment in the private sector constitutes 
approximately ten percent of total private school enrollment while twelfth grade 
enrollment is below six percent for all academic years provided except one.  In 2000 - 
2001, six percent of total private school enrollment is at the twelfth grade level.  It is 
useful to look at a particular class of students and follow the enrollment trends as these 
students progress through secondary education.  Reflecting back to when these seniors 
enrolled in first grade, ten percent of total private school enrollment was at the first grade 
level during 1989 - 1990.  This downward trend indicates that there is some attrition from 
the private school sector as students continue their elementary and secondary educations.  
As Table 3.2 indicates, the percentage of students enrolled in private school has remained 
relatively stable over time for a particular grade level.  It is the composition of school 
types within the private sector that has changed. 
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 1989-90 1991-92 1993-94 1995-96 1997-98 1999-00 2001-02 2003-04
Kindergarten 9.5% 9.6% 10.1% 10.6% 10.1% 9.9% 9.7% 9.2%
1st Grade 9.8% 9.8% 9.7% 9.8% 9.6% 9.3% 9.1% 8.7%
2nd Grade 9.3% 9.1% 9.1% 9.0% 9.1% 8.9% 8.6% 8.4%
3rd Grade 8.8% 8.7% 8.7% 8.5% 8.6% 8.6% 8.4% 8.2%
4th Grade 8.5% 8.4% 8.2% 8.1% 8.2% 8.4% 8.2% 8.0%
5th Grade 8.1% 8.1% 7.9% 7.9% 7.8% 8.0% 8.0% 7.9%
6th Grade 7.7% 8.0% 8.0% 7.8% 7.8% 7.9% 8.1% 8.0%
7th Grade 7.4% 7.6% 7.7% 7.5% 7.6% 7.6% 7.7% 7.8%
8th Grade 7.0% 7.2% 7.4% 7.3% 7.3% 7.3% 7.4% 7.8%
9th Grade 6.4% 6.5% 6.5% 6.6% 6.6% 6.6% 6.7% 7.0%
10th Grade 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.2% 6.2% 6.2% 6.4% 6.6%
11th Grade 5.7% 5.7% 5.6% 5.6% 5.7% 5.8% 6.0% 6.3%
12th Grade 5.8% 5.4% 5.2% 5.2% 5.4% 5.5% 5.6% 6.0%
School Year
Table 3.2: Private School Enrollment as Percentage of Total 
                        Private Enrollment by Grade Level and Academic Year
 
 
Looking specifically at private school elementary enrollment by school 
orientation for the academic year of my data, Figure 3.2a shows over sixty percent of 
elementary private school students attend a Catholic school.  Enrollments in secular as 
well as non-Catholic religious schools represent nine percent and twenty-six percent of 
total private school enrollment in 1999 - 2000, respectively.  The composition of private 
school enrollment at the elementary level as a whole is different than at the first grade 
level.  When isolating the first grade private school enrollment, the enrollment shares by 
school type are different as Figure 3.2b indicates.   
  
 
 
 44
 Figure 3.2a: Private Elementary School Enrollment 1999-
2000
Catholic  64%
  Secular  9%
Other Religious, 
combined  27%
 
Figure 3.2b: Private First Grade Enrollment 1999-2000
Catholic  48%
Other 
Religious 
39%
    Secular  13%
Other Religious,
Conservative
Christian 43%
Other Religious,
Not Conservative Christian 
57%
Note: For the purposes of this essay, the terms “conservative Christian” and “Evangelical Protestant” are 
synonymous.  The Department of Education prefers to use the former while I believe that the latter better 
categorizes this schooling type.  Campbell, West, and Peterson (2005) also note this nomenclature 
disparity and support to my decision to use Evangelical Protestant.
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 While sixty-four percent of total elementary enrollment was in Catholic schools in 
1999 – 2000, only forty-eight percent of private first grade enrollment was Catholic.  
Hence, studies focusing on Catholic schools as a proxy for all private education or all 
private religious education, especially at the first grade level, are missing important 
variances within the private school sector.  Secular schools possess thirteen percent while 
non-Catholic religious schools represent thirty-nine percent of first grade private school 
enrollment.  Of the non-Catholic religious schools, Conservative Christian denominations 
experience an enrollment share of seventeen percent in 1999 - 2000.  Schools affiliated 
with Conservative Christian denominations have experienced a stable upward trend in 
enrollment share from thirteen percent in 1989 - 1990 to seventeen percent in 2003 – 
2004. 
3.3 Model 
First, I posit a model of household behavior and school choice that is used in 
Lankford, Lee, and Wyckoff (1995).  While this model does not provide any particular 
theoretical insights, it does provide a framework to motivate and structure the empirical 
model I generate later in this essay.  
In this model, each household surveys its finite set of mutually exclusive 
schooling options and then selects the school that maximizes its utility.  Allow there to be 
J school types where Umj , j = 1,2,…,J, is the utility of the mth household if the jth 
schooling option is chosen.  Schooling alternative i is selected only if Umi > Umk for all k 
≠ i.  Let the utility of household m with one child enrolled in first grade at schooling 
option j be given by 
  ( , , , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )Z E Amj m j m mj m m j m m m mjU U Z E A U Z C U E C U A Cε ε= = + + +           (3.1) 
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 where Z is a composite commodity (non-educational private consumption); E is a vector 
of educational attributes; A is a vector of location (county) amenities and characteristics; 
and C is a vector of background characteristics for the child and his or her family13.  The 
error term, εmj, is assumed to be normally distributed to yield a multinomial probit model. 
 I assume that the child’s parents make decisions to maximize their utility.  Then 
the observed type of school selected by the parents maximizes their utility, given 
available information and the constraints they face14.  Since both Umj and εmj are random 
variables, the probability that the mth household chooses the ith schooling option is Pmi = 
P(Umi ≥ Umk, for all k ≠ i).  In this study, there are five categories of schooling options 
representing all of the different school classifications in this model: public, Catholic, 
Evangelical, Protestant, and Secular.  
 
3.4 Data Description 
While there has been virtually no effort to dissect the private sector in greater 
detail for school choice investigations, highly specified school type separations have been 
performed recently for achievement differential purposes (Kim and Placier 2004; 
Lubienski and Lubienski 2006).15 
This analysis employs the restricted-use version of the Kindergarten cohort of the 
Early Childhood Longitudinal Survey (ECLS-K), a national data set, released by the 
                                                          
13 I do not include any school or teacher specific variables for the school attended.  Parents have already 
included the impacts of these variables into their schooling decision as well as their child’s expected 
academic achievement (Goldhaber 1994). 
14 I acknowledge the possibility of endogeneity regarding the residential and schooling decisions of the 
household.  In metropolitan areas, a resident’s ability to relocate is cited as incentive for public schools to 
compete (Tiebout 1956).  Thus, a household can select to live in a schooling area reflective of its 
preferences.  This implies that local public school characteristics may not be exogeneous.  Data and 
computational limitations prevent further investigation of the concern. 
15 A noted exception to this, Cohen-Zada and Sander (2006) divide the private school sector into Catholic, 
Protestant, and Secular categories for their school choice analysis. 
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 National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES).16  Coupling the Private School 
Survey’s (PSS) detailed religious affiliation data and Glenmary Research Center’s 
categorizations of all religious affiliations, private schools in my data are grouped as 
follows: Catholic, Evangelical, Protestant, and Secular schools.17  Matching the child’s 
home zip code from ECLS-K to area characteristics for the child’s home county, I add 
additional explanatory variables from Census 2000 and Religious Congregations and 
Membership Data 2000 at the county level.  The estimation sample size is 8,460 student-
level observations.18   
3.4.1 Description of Sample  
Table 3.3 offers definitions, sources, and means of variables in my data.19  
Overall sixty-six percent of these data are white.  The percent white for public as well as 
Secular schools is similar to this average for the overall sample.  All of the religiously 
affiliated private schools are at least seventy-five percent white.  While fifteen percent of 
students attending a public school are African-American, only five percent of African-
American students attend a private school.  
                                                          
For all six tests administered, public school students have the lowest number of 
correctly answered questions on average while Secular school students boast the highest 
averages.  On average, test scores for private school students exceed their public school 
peers’ scores by over one point for each test.  Eighteen percent of the mother’s of public 
school students possess a college Bachelor’s degree compared to over thirty percent of 
16 Additional details regarding ECLS-K are available from NCES at http://www.nces.ed.gov/. 
17 Glenmary Research Center’s grouping of affiliations is consistent with the American Religion Data 
Archive’s taxonomy.  Refer to Appendix A for a detailed list of affiliations within each category. 
18 Since these data are nested, Tables B.1a and B.1b in Appendix B offer additional information regarding 
the number of students, schools, counties and states used in this essay. 
19 Table B.2 in Appendix B provides variable means once Other Religious schools is separated into 
Evangelical and Protestant categories.  Table B.3 in Appendix B provides maximum and minimum values 
for all variables that are continuous. 
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private school students’ mothers.  Private school students, on average, have mothers and 
fathers with higher educational attainment than public school students.  Nearly forty 
percent of Secular fathers hold an advanced degree whereas only nine percent of public 
school fathers do.  Religiosity, Head is sixty percent for all religious private school 
students while public and Secular are thirty-six percent and twenty-eight percent, 
respectively.   
There is a much higher concentration of Other Religious schools in the Midwest 
and South while nearly half of all Secular schools are in the West.  Thirty-eight percent 
of Catholic schools are located in the Midwest, which is unusual.  To reduce the vast 
diversity present in the private schooling sector, some papers restrict their analysis to a 
specific area or region (for example, see Gemello and Osman 1984).  Frequently, studies 
look at Catholic schools specifically focusing on New England due to the large number of 
Catholic schools in that area (Lankford and Wyckoff 1992; Lankford, Lee, and Wyckoff 
1995).  Sander (2005) and LePore and Warren (1997) restrict their investigations to 
Catholic schooling while Lee and Marks (1992) use students attending National 
Association of Independent Schools affiliates.  My data are not restricted to urban areas.  
Yet, seventy-six percent of students live in an urban or suburban area compared to a 
small town or rural area indicates that the majority of my sample is urban.  There is a 
larger portion of Other Religious schools in rural and small town areas since only 
seventy-seven percent of these schools were located in urban areas. 
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Variable Variable Description Overall Public Private Catholic OtherReligious Secular
0.49 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.41
(0.50)
0.66 0.63 0.76 0.76 0.81 0.64
(0.47)
0.13 0.15 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.06
(0.33)
0.12 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.11
(0.32)
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.14
(0.22)
0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.06
(0.21)
6.52 6.16 7.75 7.41 7.74 10.31
(3.98)
10.88 10.56 12.01 11.70 12.12 13.92
(3.87)
5.32 5.05 6.27 6.17 6.26 7.14
(2.95)
8.24 7.97 9.18 9.02 9.34 9.81
(3.03)
Reading test, administered during 
fall of Kindergarten year  (Maximum: 20)
Reading test, administered during 
spring of Kindergarten year  (Maximum: 20)
Math test, administered during 
fall of Kindergarten year   (Maximum: 16)
Math test, administered during
spring of Kindergarten year   (Maximum: 16)
Equals one if student is Black,
zero otherwise
Equals one if student is
Hispanic, zero otherwise
Equals one if student is Asian,
zero otherwise
Equals one if student is Multiracial 
or Other race, zero otherwiseMultiracial
Fall Reading, K
Spring Math, K
Spring Reading, K
Fall Math, K
Equals one if student is male,
zero otherwiseMale
White Equals one if student is white,zero otherwise
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Table 3.3: Data Definitions and Meansa
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5.40 5.09 6.44 6.39 6.44 6.81
(2.93)
7.06 6.80 7.92 7.87 7.86 8.53
(2.81)
1.49 1.51 1.43 1.49 1.45 0.99
(1.08)
0.08 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.27)
0.27 0.29 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.09
(0.44)
0.34 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.25
(0.47)
0.22 0.18 0.33 0.34 0.31 0.32
(0.41)
0.08 0.06 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.28
(0.26)
0.07 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
(0.25)
0.23 0.24 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.06
(0.42)
Table 3.3: Data Definitions and Meansa (continued)
Father, 
High School
Fall General, K
Spring General, K
Siblings
Mother, Some 
High School
Mother, 
High School
Mother, 
Some College
Mother, BA
Mother, Advanced
Father, Some 
High School
General Knowledge test, administered
during fall of Kindergarten year   (Maximum: 12)
General Knowledge test, administered
during spring of Kindergarten year   (Maximum: 12)
Number of siblings student has
Equals one if student's mother completed
some high school or less, zero otherwise
Equals one if student's mother completed
high school or equivalent, zero otherwise
Equals one if student's mother completed
some college, zero otherwise
Equals one if student's mother has
Bachelor's degree, zero otherwise
Equals one if student's mother has an
advanced degree, zero otherwise
Equals one if student's father completed
some high school or less, zero otherwise
Equals one if student's father completed
high school or equivalent, zero otherwise
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0.23 0.22 0.24 0.27 0.22 0.16
(0.42)
0.18 0.16 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.25
(0.39)
0.11 0.09 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.37
(0.31)
0.41 0.36 0.57 0.59 0.61 0.28
(0.49)
0.27 0.22 0.43 0.44 0.48 0.18
(0.44)
0.21 0.23 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.17
(0.40)
0.19 0.18 0.21 0.25 0.14 0.14
(0.39)
0.29 0.27 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.07
(0.45)
0.31 0.34 0.21 0.16 0.28 0.30
(0.46)
Table 3.3: Data Definitions and Meansa (continued)
Father, 
Some College
Father, BA
Father, Advanced
Religiousity, Head
Religiosity, Spouse
Single Parent
Northeast
Midwest
South
Equals one if student's father has
Bachelor's degree, zero otherwise
Equals one if student's father has an
advanced degree, zero otherwise
Equals one if student's father completed
some college, zero otherwise
Equals one if head of student's household
attends religious services at least once per
week, zero otherwise
Equals one if spouse or partner of head of
student's household attends religious services at least 
once per week, zero otherwise
Equals one if student lives in a single parent 
household, zero otherwise
Equals one if student lives in New England,
zero otherwise
Equals one if student lives in Midwest,
zero otherwise
Equals one if student lives in South,
zero otherwise
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0.21 0.21 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.49
(0.41)
0.76 0.74 0.83 0.84 0.77 0.99
(0.43)
0.08 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00
(0.27)
0.05 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.21)
0.05 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01
(0.21)
0.07 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.25)
0.05 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02
(0.23)
0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.04
(0.25)
0.11 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.06
(0.31)
0.20 0.19 0.26 0.28 0.25 0.13
(0.40)
Table 3.3: Data Definitions and Meansa (continued)
Income, 40-50 Equals one if annual household incomeis between $40,000 and $50,000, zero otherwise
Income, 50-75 Equals one if annual household incomeis between $50,000 and $75,000, zero otherwise
Income, 30-35 Equals one if annual household incomeis between $30,000 and $35,000, zero otherwise
Income, 35-40 Equals one if annual household incomeis between $35,000 and $40,000, zero otherwise
West
Urban
Income, 0-15
Income, 15-20
Income, 20-25
Income, 25-30
Equals one if student lives in West,
zero otherwise
Equals one if student lives in urban or
suburban area, zero otherwise
Equals one if annual household income
is below $15,000, zero otherwise
Equals one if annual household income
is between $20,000 and $25,000, zero otherwise
Equals one if annual household income
is between $15,000 and $20,000, zero otherwise
Equals one if annual household income
is between $25,000 and $30,000, zero otherwise
 
 
  
Variable Variable Description Overall Public Private Catholic OtherReligious Secular
0.13 0.11 0.17 0.19 0.13 0.19
(0.33)
0.10 0.08 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.25
(0.30)
0.03 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.19
(0.18)
129,128 127,365 135,174 134,114 125,609 175,847
(66,229)
44,200 44,070 44,646 44,502 44,076 47,669
(11,055)
0.71 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.58
(0.21)
0.24 0.23 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.27
(0.15)
0.14 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.09
(0.13)
0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.13
(0.09)
15.86 15.69 16.44 16.38 16.32 17.38
(4.71)
Income, 200+ Equals one if annual household incomeis above $200,000, zero otherwise
Table 3.3: Data Definitions and Meansa (continued)
Income, 75-100 Equals one if annual household incomeis between $75,000 and $100,000, zero otherwise
Income, 100-200
Equals one if annual household income
is between $100,000 and $200,000, 
zero otherwise
Student-Teacher,
Public b
House Value,
County b
Income, County b
Evangelical, County  c
Protestant, County c
White, County b
Catholic, County c
Median house value in student's home
county, in dollars
Median household income in student's
home county, in dollars
Per capita white population in student's
home county
Per capita Catholic adherents in student's
home county
Per capita Evangelical or Fundamental
Protestant adherents in student's home county
Per capita Mainline Protestant or
Other Faith adherents in student's home county
Average student-teacher ratio in public
schools in student's home county
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16.73 16.70 16.83 16.64 17.32 16.54
(18.87)
12.87 12.47 14.23 12.44 14.62 26.11
(17.07)
25.52 25.37 26.03 24.48 27.23 33.44
(17.68)
Number of observations 8460 6550 1910 1195 555 160
Source: Unless otherwise indicated, data are from the restricted use ECLS-K, 1999-2000.
aStandard Errors of overall sample are in parenthesis
b denotes Census 2000 data
c  denotes Glenmary Research Center's 2000 Religious Congregations & Membership Data
Average percent Hispanic students enrolled
in public schools in student's home county
Average percent students receiving free or reduced 
lunch in public schools in student's home county
Average percent Black students enrolled
in public schools in student's home county
Hispanic, Public b
Free Lunch b
Black, Public b
Table 3.3: Data Definitions and Meansa (continued)
Note: Sample sizes, means, and standard deviations are all the unweighted ECLS-K reporting samples.  They are not weighted
to represent students and schools nationwide.  Sample sizes are rounded to comply with NCES restricted use data reporting standards
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 I use a set of eleven dummy variables to represent household income.  The 
majority of lower income students attend public schools up to Income, 35-40 where at 
this level the percent of students attending other religious schools equals that of public 
schools.  Fourteen percent of students attend other religious schools at a household 
income level range of forty to fifty thousand dollars, which exceeds the public school 
mean of seven percent.  Twenty-eight percent of students attend Catholic schools in the 
fifty to seventy-five thousand dollar income range.  One quarter of students attending 
Secular schools have a household income between one hundred thousand and two 
hundred thousand dollars. 
The means for median house value and income level in a student’s home county 
are lowest for public and other religious private schools.  White, County is seventy 
percent for all schools except Secular, which are fifty-eight percent.  The Protestant 
adherents in a student’s home county are higher on average for Other Religious schools at 
a mean of sixteen percent.  With the exception of Black, Public all of the county level 
public school characteristics are much higher for students attending Secular schools.  For 
instance, the overall sample average for Hispanic, Public is approximately thirteen 
percent while it is twenty-six percent for Secular schools. 
 3.4.2 Anticipated Results 
 Here, I present a brief discussion of anticipated results based on previous 
empirical findings.  I expect Black to be negatively related to the probability of attending 
all types of private schools as past studies have found that whites are more likely to enroll 
children in religiously affiliated, as well as non-religious, schools (Noell and Myers 1983; 
Long and Toma 1988). 
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 Educational attainment levels of a child’s parents are expected to be positively 
related to private school enrollment (Long and Toma 1988; Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore 
1982; Gemello and Osman 1983; Martinez-Vazquez and Seaman 1985).  Based on 
Cohen-Zada and Sander’s (2006) findings, I expect Religiosity, Head and Religiosity, 
Spouse to be positively related to the probability of attending a religious school.  As 
household income rises, I expect the child’s likelihood of attending a private school 
increases (Sander 2005). 
 Looking at Catholic adherents at the state level, Long and Toma (1988) report a 
positive relationship to private school enrollment.  While controlling for Catholic, 
Evangelical, and Mainline Protestant adherents separately at the county level, I expect 
that a positive relationship exists between adherents of a particular group and their 
affiliated private school type.  However, there is a possibility of a negative relationship 
for same type adherent and school groupings.  As observed by Cohen-Zada and Sander 
(2006), the share of Catholics in the population has a significant concave effect on the 
likelihood of attending a Catholic school indicating that Catholic households have a 
positive relationship, increasing the probability of attending a Catholic school, up to a 
threshold level of Catholic adherents in the total population.  Once this threshold level is 
reached, then households opt to send their children to public school, experiencing a 
negative probability of Catholic school attendance.   It is unclear whether positive or 
negative relationships exist across the three separate adherent groups and four private 
school types, especially with the separation of Other Religious schools into two 
categories.  In keeping with Clotfelter’s (1976) “white flight” and Betts and Fairlie’s 
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 (2001) “immigrant flight”, it is possible that “adherent flight” exists for cross-types of 
religious memberships and school types. 
 The above discussion for adherent variables provides insight when the demand 
side of first grade school choice is considered.  However, it is possible to consider the 
adherents variables as supply side variables.  Thus, alternative interpretations of the 
adherent variables relate to the availability of a certain school type in a given area.  The 
greater the proportion of Catholic adherents in a county indicates that there is a greater 
likelihood for that county to have at least one Catholic school.  The same principle holds 
for other adherent groups.  When this supply perspective is used, the estimations for 
school choice represent reduced-form equilibrium points.   
3.5 Results 
I follow the traditional approach in school choice literature and estimate a model 
in which households simply choose between sending their child to either public or any 
private school ignoring the distinctions in the type of private school (for example, see 
Goldhaber 1996).  Through out this analysis, the reference individual is a white female 
who attends public school for kindergarten and first grade. 
The results from this probit model are reported in Table 3.4.  Also reported in 
Table 3.4 are the results of a probit in which we examine the choice between public 
schooling and a single type of private schooling, Catholic, following the works of Sander 
(2005), Greeley (2002), Jensen (1986), and Noell (1982).  This, of course, restricts the 
sample to students attending public schools or Catholic schools. 
As discussed, I expand upon the existing literature by estimating an expanded 
schooling choice model.  Specifically, I estimate several specifications of multinomial 
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 probit models in which the household chooses to send its child to a public school or 
several alternative types of private schools.  The results from estimating these models are 
reported in Table 3.5.  I begin by estimating a model in which a household can send its 
child to either public school, Catholic, or Non-Catholic.  The next model I estimate 
considers four alternatives: public, Catholic, Other Religious, and Secular Private.  In the 
final model, I divide “Other Religious” into Evangelical and Protestant categories based 
on the religious affiliation of each school.   
3.5.1 Single Private Schooling Options 
 Table 3.4, model A, reports the results of a probit of public versus private 
schooling.  When I do not distinguish among types of private schools, I find that a child 
is less likely to attend a private school compared to public school if the child is a minority 
with this finding significant if the child is African-American or Asian.  In addition, 
Siblings significantly reduces the likelihood of a child attending a private school.  If the 
child lives in the South or West, then he or she is less likely to attend a private school 
than if he or she lived in New England.  A positive, yet insignificant, coefficient is found 
for Midwest.  Income, County has a significant, negative impact on the child’s likelihood 
of attending a private school.  
With the exception of the insignificant negative result for a child’s fall math test, 
the child’s fall and spring reading and general knowledge tests have positive impacts on 
the child’s likelihood of attending private school while only significant for fall general 
knowledge.  The educational attainment of the child’s mother and father at all levels, 
relative to not completing high school, are significant positive factors in the probability of 
the child attending a private school of any type.  The coefficients on the religiosity of the 
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 household head and spouse are also positive and significant.  An unexpected result is that 
a child living in a single parent household is more likely to attend a private school than a 
child living in a two parent household.  Perhaps, this relationship is showing an explicit 
agreement between the child’s parents for where the child attends school. 
As expected, Urban is positive.  This significant finding is expected, as it is 
frequently the case that there are few private schooling options in rural areas.  I find the a 
child’s probability of attending a private school is negatively related to Income, 15-20 
and Income, 20-25, compared to households with an income of less than fifteen thousand 
dollars.  Income levels above forty thousand dollars are significantly and positively 
associated with a greater likelihood of private school attendance.  Catholic as well as 
Evangelical and Protestant adherents in a child’s home county are positively related while 
only Catholic adherents in the county are significant.  The average student-teacher ratio, 
the average percentage of students who are African-American, and the average number of 
students receiving reduced or free lunches are positively related to the child’s probability 
of attending a private school.  
For this analysis, the reference individual is a white female who attends public 
school for kindergarten and first grade with all other variables evaluated at their means.  
Looking at the marginal effects presented in Table 3.4, model A, the reference 
individual’s probability of attending a private school is eleven percentage points lower if 
she is black.  If her mother possesses an advanced degree, then the reference individual is 
nineteen percentage points more likely to attend a private school when compared to 
having a mother who is not a high school graduate.  The share of religious adherents 
influences the reference individual’s likelihood of attending private as well.  When 
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Catholic adherents in the county increase by ten percent, the reference individual’s 
probability increases by thirty-four percentage points.  When Evangelical adherents in the 
county increase by ten percent, the reference individual’s probability increases by nearly 
thirteen percentage points. 
 
 
 [Marginal Effect] Coefficient [Marginal Effect]Variable Coefficient(z-score) (z-score) (z-score) (z-score)
-0.025 [-0.007] -0.012 [-0.002]
(-0.800) (-0.80) (-0.330) (-0.33)
-0.506 [-0.110] -0.513 [-0.074]
(-3.64)*** (-4.36)*** (-2.74)*** (-3.44)***
-0.076 [-0.019] 0.104 [0.020]
(-0.860) (-0.88) (1.070) (1.02)
-0.215 [-0.051] -0.098 [-0.017]
(-1.72)* (-1.90)* (-0.750) (-0.79)
-0.058 [-0.015] -0.094 [-0.016]
(-0.510) (-0.53) (-0.710) (-0.75)
0.011 [0.003] -0.001 [-0.00012]
(1.280) (1.28) (-0.070) (-0.07)
0.014 [0.004] 0.008 [0.002]
(1.430) (1.42) (0.710) (0.71)
-0.006 [-0.002] 0.004 [0.0008]
(-0.600) (-0.60) (0.400) (0.40)
0.011 [0.003] 0.005 [0.0009]
(1.080) (1.08) (0.460) (0.46)
0.042 [0.011] 0.041 [0.007]
(3.87)*** (3.75)*** (3.39)*** (3.24)***
-0.014 [-0.004] -0.012 [-0.002]
(-1.140) (-1.14) (-0.810) (-0.81)
-0.050 [-0.013] -0.022 [-0.004]
(-2.35)** (-2.33)** (-1.000) (-0.99)
0.370 [0.104] 0.388 [0.079]
(4.13)*** (3.82)*** (3.92)*** (3.52)***
0.553 [0.156] 0.556 [0.114]
(6.29)*** (5.68)*** (5.48)*** (4.64)***
0.668 [0.203] 0.702 [0.163]
(6.78)*** (5.88)*** (6.18)*** (4.84)***
0.602 [0.191] 0.492 [0.115]
(5.04)*** (4.35)*** (3.60)*** (2.90)***
Fall Math, K
Male
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Multiracial
Fall Reading, K
Mother, 
High School
Spring Reading, K
Spring Math, K
Fall General, K
Spring General, K
Siblings
Mother, 
Some College
Mother, BA
Mother, Advanced
Table 3.4: Binary Probit Estimates for Private versus Public 
Model A - Private, All Inclusive Model B - Private, Catholic Only
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 Variable Coefficient(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
0.327 [0.092] 0.264 [0.053]
(3.67)*** (3.39)*** (2.48)** (2.26)**
0.328 [0.093] 0.283 [0.057]
(3.59)*** (3.31)*** (2.53)** (2.30)**
0.361 [0.104] 0.263 [0.054]
(3.60)*** (3.28)*** (2.21)** (1.99)**
0.357 [0.105] 0.210 [0.043]
(3.14)*** (2.82)*** (1.610) (1.47)
0.321 [0.086] 0.383 [0.074]
(6.22)*** (5.72)*** (6.69)*** (5.52)***
0.238 [0.065] 0.199 [0.039]
(4.27)*** (3.99)*** (3.21)*** (2.93)***
0.388 [0.112] 0.248 [0.050]
(4.19)*** (3.82)*** (2.22)** (2.03)**
0.181 [0.049] 0.056 [0.011]
(0.880) (0.86) (0.250) (0.24)
-0.192 [-0.049] -0.426 [-0.071]
(-0.730) (-0.75) (-1.410) (-1.56)
-0.062 [-0.016] -0.240 [-0.040]
(-0.210) (-0.21) (-0.710) (-0.79)
0.338 [0.081] 0.421 [0.068]
(1.80)* (1.98)** (1.92)* (2.23)**
-0.263 [-0.061] -0.253 [-0.040]
(-2.29)** (-2.61)*** (-1.98)** (-2.33)**
-0.147 [-0.036] -0.286 [-0.044]
(-1.310) (-1.39) (-2.17)** (-2.53)**
0.028 [0.008] -0.039 [-0.007]
(0.310) (0.31) (-0.370) (-0.38)
0.032 [0.008] -0.037 [-0.007]
(0.340) (0.33) (-0.330) (-0.33)
0.133 [0.037] 0.052 [0.010]
(1.550) (1.47) (0.490) (0.48)
Model A - Private, All Inclusive Model B - Private, Catholic Only
Table 3.4: Binary Probit Estimates for 
Private versus Public (Continued)
West
Urban
Income, 20-25
Income, 25-30
Income, 15-20
Income, 30-35
Income, 35-40
South
Father, BA
Father, Advanced
Religiousity, Head
Religiosity, Spouse
Single Parent
Midwest
Father, 
High School
Father, 
Some College
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 Variable Coefficient(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
0.316 [0.092] 0.245 [0.051]
(3.99)*** (3.54)*** (2.60)*** (2.26)**
0.348 [0.099] 0.365 [0.077]
(4.86)*** (4.33)*** (4.34)*** (3.59)***
0.352 [0.103] 0.377 [0.082]
(4.33)*** (3.83)*** (4.02)*** (3.28)***
0.381 [0.113] 0.393 [0.087]
(4.43)*** (3.87)*** (3.80)*** (3.08)***
0.589 [0.189] 0.478 [0.113]
(4.59)*** (3.92)*** (3.10)*** (2.46)**
0.000002 [0.0000006] 0.000003 [0.0000006]
(1.380) (1.38) (1.610) (1.63)
-0.00002 [-0.0000063] -0.00003 [-0.0000064]
(-2.09)** (-2.09)** (-2.52)** (-2.55)**
-0.035 [-0.009] -0.415 [-0.076]
(-0.060) (-0.06) (-0.630) (-0.63)
1.297 [0.339] 1.279 [0.235]
(2.06)** (2.05)** (1.81)* (1.80)*
0.492 [0.129] 0.261 [0.048]
(0.620) (0.62) (0.280) (0.28)
0.147 [0.039] -0.604 [-0.111]
(0.210) (0.21) (-0.730) (-0.73)
0.025 [0.007] 0.034 [0.006]
(1.560) (1.56) (1.68)* (1.71)*
0.002 [0.00047] -0.001 [-0.00014]
(0.300) (0.30) (-0.110) (-0.11)
-0.004 [-0.0011] -0.014 [-0.003]
(-0.560) (-0.56) (-1.66)* (-1.65)*
Model A - Private, All Inclusive Model B - Private, Catholic Only
Table 3.4: Binary Probit Estimates for 
Private versus Public (Continued)
House Value,
County a
Evangelical, County  b
Protestant, County b
Student-Teacher,
Public a
Black, Public a
Hispanic, Public a
Income, County a
White, County a
Catholic, County b
Income, 200+
Income, 75-100
Income, 100-200
Income, 40-50
Income, 50-75
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Variable Coefficient(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
0.004 [0.0010] 0.001 [0.00018]
(0.720) (0.73) (0.170) (0.17)
Constant -2.712 -1.908
(-3.49)*** (-2.27)**
Observations
Log Likelihood
Wald chi2(47)
Pseudo R-squared
Source: Unless otherwise indicated, data are from the restricted use ECLS-K, 1999-2000.
*p<0.10 ; **p<0.05 ; ***p<0.01
Sample sizes are rounded to comply with NCES restricted use data reporting standards.
a denotes Census 2000 data
b  denotes Glenmary Research Center's 2000 Religious Congregations & Membership Data
0.1553 0.1666
Free Lunch a
Table 3.4: Binary Probit Estimates for 
Private versus Public (Continued)
-3,817.07
556.16
-2,779.59
551.84
Model A - Private, All Inclusive Model B - Private, Catholic Only
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 Several studies (Sander 2005; Greeley 2002; Jensen 1986; Noell 1982) have 
focused solely on Catholic schools as the only private school option available.  I follow 
these studies and only consider the choice between public and Catholic schools, 
discarding any observations where the student chooses another type of private school.  
These results, reported in Table 3.4, model B, are similar to the all-inclusive private 
probit results.  Asian, Siblings, and Father, Advanced maintain the same sign as in the all-
inclusive private probit, but the statistical significance of the explanatory variable 
disappears.  Since the Catholic-only sample is smaller, this is not unexpected.   
There are three significant results for attending a Catholic school only that are 
insignificant for model A, the all-inclusive private school probit discussed earlier.  Two 
of these three variables are related to the public schools in a child’s home county.  More 
specifically, the average student-teacher ratio and the average percentage of Hispanic 
students enrolled in public schools in the child’s home county differ in sign, yet both are 
significant.  As the student-teacher ratio in public schools rises, a child is more likely to 
attend a Catholic school.  As Hispanic, Public increases, a child is less likely to attend a 
Catholic school.  The third significant finding is a lower probability for attending 
Catholic when a child’s household income level falls between twenty thousand and 
twenty-five thousand dollars, compared to having a household income below fifteen 
thousand.   
Focusing attention on marginal effects presented in Table 3.4, model B, West and 
South reduce the probability that the reference individual attends a Catholic school by 
four percentage points and seven percentage points, respectively.  A ten percent increase 
in Protestant, County lowers the likelihood of attending a Catholic school by eleven 
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 percentage points.  Catholic, County shows an increase of nearly twenty-four percentage 
points.  Having a father with a college degree, compared to a high school dropout, 
indicates the child is five percentage points more likely to attend a Catholic school while 
this increases to sixteen percentage points when it a child’s mother holds a college 
degree, compared to a high school dropout. 
3.5.2 Multiple Private Schooling Choices 
 Most of the early work on school choice, explicitly or implicitly, assumed that the 
choice was strictly between public schools and Catholic schools for the vast majority of 
private schools.  The first studies to explicitly model heterogeneity in private schools 
classified private schools as either Catholic and Non-Catholic or Religious and Non-
Religious (Loma and Toma 1988; Lankford, Lee, and Wyckoff 1995). Here, as reported 
in Table 3.5, model C, I replicate these studies by considering these three alternative 
schooling choices:  Public, Catholic, and Non-Catholic. 
There are many results that are consistent in sign for both of these groupings of 
private schools shown in Table 3.5, model C.  If the child is African-American, then he or 
she is significantly less likely to attend a Catholic school as well as a Non-Catholic 
school.  This finding holds if the child is Asian and Multiracial as well although it is only 
significant for the probability of Asian students attending non-Catholic schools. 
A positive and significant result for attending both types of private school types is 
found for the child’s fall general knowledge kindergarten test score.  Increasing the 
number of siblings lowers the probability that the child attends either type of private 
school while only significant for Non-Catholic.  All of the educational attainment 
variables for the child’s mother and the child’s father show positive, significant 
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 relationships for increasing the child’s probability of attending both types of private 
schools.  Religiosity, Head and Religiosity, Spouse are positive and significant for 
attending Catholic as well as Non-Catholic schools.  Consistent with the all-inclusive 
private school probit discussed above, an unexpected and significant positive result is that 
a child living in a single parent household is more likely to attend both types of private 
schools than a child living in a two parent household.      
For marginal effects, the religiosity of the household head significantly increases 
the likelihood of a child attending a Catholic school and Non-Catholic school by seven 
percentage points and one percentage point, respectively.  In terms of attending a Non-
Catholic school, Religiosity, Spouse yields a similar positive impact for both school types 
of roughly three percent.  A child is roughly two percent more likely to attend a Catholic 
school and twelve percentage points more likely to attend a Non-Catholic one if 
Evangelical, County increases by ten percentage points.  When the percentage of 
protestant adherents in the county increases by ten percentage points, the probability of 
attending a Catholic school drops by eleven percentage points while the likelihood of 
attending a Non-Catholic school increases by nearly thirteen percentage points.  When 
Catholic adherents in the county increase by ten percent, a child’s likelihood of attending 
a Catholic school rises by twenty percentage points while the probability of enrolling in a 
non-Catholic school increases by twelve percentage points.  For cross-denomination 
adherents, there is a positive impact on Catholic and non-Catholic school attendance 
when there are more Catholic or Evangelical adherents present.  There is a negative 
cross-denomination effect for Protestant adherents and Catholic school enrollment while 
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 a positive relationship is found for Protestant adherents and non-Catholic school 
enrollment. 
In addition to Protestant, County, there are several variables have different 
opposing effects on a child’s likelihood of attending one private school type over the 
other type.  A child is significantly less likely to attend a Catholic school when he or she 
lives in the southern or western regions compared to New England.  A child is more 
likely to attend a Non-Catholic school when he or she lives in the South, West, or 
Midwest rather than New England.  The percentage of the population that is white has a 
negative impact on the child’s likelihood of attending a Catholic school but a positive 
effect for the probability of the child attending a Non-Catholic school.  The average 
percentage of Hispanic students in public schools in the child’s home county yields a 
significant negative relationship for attending Catholic school and a positive, yet 
insignificant result for Non-Catholic.  
Table 3.5, model D, reports the results of a model in which I decompose private 
schooling into three categories: Catholic, Other Religious, and Secular.  For many years, 
Catholic schools were the most prevalent private schooling option and in some cases, 
Catholic schools were the only non-public school choice available.  As discussed in 
Section 3.2 of this essay, the landscape of private sector schools has changed 
dramatically.  Today there are many private schools, with specific religious affiliation 
and religious instruction, in addition to Catholic schools.  This boom in upstart non-
Catholic, religious private schools occurred at the same time that the Catholic schools 
experienced a decline in enrollments and consolidations across Dioceses.  There is no 
reason to presume that the significant factors in selecting a Catholic school are identical 
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to those that are salient when choosing another type of religious school.  Of course, 
secular schooling has always been available, which is a particularly diverse portion of the 
private school sector, including military academies and college preparatory programs 
among others (Lankford and Wyckoff 1992).  Once again, there is no reason to presume 
that the important reasons for selecting this type of private schooling are the same as 
factors influencing the choice to attend Catholic schools, Other Religious private schools, 
or public schools. 
If the child is black, he or she is significantly less likely to attend a Catholic or 
other religious private schools.  A negative, yet insignificant result is found between 
attending a Secular school and Black.  Hispanic and Asian children are significantly less 
likely to attend other religious schools.   
The child’s fall and spring kindergarten reading test scores are positive and 
significant factors for attending a secular school.  Spring kindergarten math test score is 
positive and significant in deciding to attend an other religious private school.  A child’s 
fall kindergarten general knowledge test score is the only test score that significantly 
impacts the decision to attend a Catholic school; it is positive and significant for 
attending Catholic as well as other religious schools. 
 The educational attainment of the child’s mother and father are both positive and 
significant elements in determining if a child attends a Catholic or other religious school.  
A father with an advanced degree is not significant for attending Catholic.  With the 
exception of a child’s mother having her high school degree, there are not significant 
marginal effects related to parental educational attainment for attending Secular. 
  
 Catholic Non-Catholic Catholic Other Religious Secular Catholic Evangelical Protestant Secular
Variable
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
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Male -0.016 -0.052 -0.016 -0.014 -0.168 -0.016 -0.020 -0.010 -0.167
(-0.340) (-1.000) (-0.340) (-0.260) (-2.080)** (-0.340) (-0.320) (-0.130) (-2.080)**
[-0.001] [-0.005] [-0.002] [-0.001] [-0.001] [-0.002] [-0.001] [-0.00002] [-0.001]
(-0.200) (-0.980) (-0.280) (-0.180) (-1.640) (-0.280) (-0.240) (-0.030) (0.000)
Black -0.730 -0.570 -0.735 -0.603 -0.325 -0.746 -0.253 -1.485 -0.346
(-2.930)*** (-2.640)*** (-2.970)*** (-2.510)** (-1.030) (-3.000)*** (-1.020) (-4.240)*** (-1.090)
[-0.070] [-0.034] [-0.073] [-0.027] [-0.001] [-0.077] [-0.005] [-0.004] [-0.001]
(-3.390)*** (-2.480)** (-3.480)*** (-2.360)** (-0.430) (-3.690)*** (-0.470) (-1.870)** (-0.620)
Hispanic 0.096 -0.401 0.092 -0.464 -0.087 0.088 -0.522 -0.169 -0.078
(0.730) (-2.460)** (0.700) (-2.450)** (-0.500) (0.670) (-2.410)** (-0.720) (-0.460)
[0.020] [-0.032] [0.019] [-0.028] [-0.0003] [0.017] [-0.021] [-0.001] [-0.0003]
(1.070) (-3.020)*** (1.000) (-2.980)*** (-0.380) (0.910) (-2.940)*** (-0.680) (-0.360)
Asian -0.160 -0.445 -0.168 -0.864 0.048 -0.171 -1.084 -0.452 0.050
(-0.900) (-1.870)* (-0.950) (-3.280)*** (0.170) (-0.970) (-3.200)*** (-1.510) (0.180)
[-0.014] [-0.031] [-0.014] [-0.038] [0.001] [-0.016] [-0.028] [-0.002] [0.001]
(-0.670) (-2.200)** (-0.650) (-4.360)*** (0.500) (-0.730) (-4.540)*** (-1.610) (0.490)
Multiracial -0.097 -0.097 -0.102 -0.125 0.021 -0.102 -0.101 -0.088 0.017
(-0.540) (-0.550) (-0.570) (-0.650) (0.080) (-0.570) (-0.470) (-0.380) (0.060)
[-0.011] [-0.007] [-0.012] [-0.007] [0.0004] [-0.013] [-0.004] [-0.0004] [0.0003]
(-0.500) (-0.490) (-0.530) (-0.610) (0.220) (-0.560) (-0.410) (-0.280) (0.190)
Fall Reading, K 0.004 0.028 0.004 0.013 0.079 0.004 0.007 0.023 0.080
(0.290) (1.770)* (0.300) (0.710) (5.160)*** (0.310) (0.340) (1.040) (5.200)***
[-0.000004] [0.0026] [0.0002] [0.0008] [0.0005] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0005]
(0.000) (1.730)* (0.140) (0.630) (2.420)** (0.190) (0.250) (0.870) (2.450)**
Spring Reading, K 0.011 0.030 0.011 0.025 0.030 0.011 0.042 -0.013 0.028
(0.720) (1.680)* (0.710) (1.280) (1.570) (0.700) (1.910)* (-0.570) (1.450)
[0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.002] [0.0001] [0.001] [0.0020] [-0.0001] [0.0001]
(0.470) (1.570) (0.530) (1.170) (1.220) (0.490) (1.770)* (-0.870) (1.100)
Fall Math, K 0.006 -0.030 0.006 -0.032 -0.024 0.007 -0.069 0.034 -0.019
(0.380) (-1.530) (0.370) (-1.480) (-0.740) (0.440) (-2.950)*** (1.270) (-0.580)
[0.0013] [-0.0029] [0.001] [-0.0024] [-0.0001] [0.002] [-0.0036] [0.0003] [-0.0001]
(0.680) (-1.600) (0.640) (-1.510) (-0.650) (0.800) (-2.490)** (1.340) (-0.450)
Table 3.5: Multinomial Probit Estimates for Public versus Multiple Private Schooling Options
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Spring Math, K 0.007 0.025 0.007 0.040 -0.020 0.007 0.054 0.017 -0.022
(0.490) (1.320) (0.510) (1.990)** (-0.710) (0.470) (2.510)** (0.610) (-0.790)
[0.0005] [0.002] [0.0004] [0.0028] [-0.0002] [0.0004] [0.0027] [0.0001] [-0.0002]
(0.260) (1.270) (0.230) (1.880)* (-0.880) (0.190) (2.140)** (0.360) (-0.960)
Fall General, K 0.056 0.051 0.057 0.059 -0.004 0.056 0.068 0.017 -0.005
(3.480)*** (2.660)*** (3.500)*** (2.850)*** (-0.120) (3.480)*** (2.840)*** (0.730) (-0.170)
[0.0067] [0.0037] [0.0069] [0.0035] [-0.0001] [0.0070] [0.0029] [-0.000008] [-0.0001]
(3.030)*** (2.060)** (3.090)*** (2.240)** (-0.760) (3.110)*** (2.370)** (-0.050) (-0.790)
Spring General, K -0.016 -0.019 -0.017 -0.038 0.060 -0.017 -0.042 -0.012 0.061
(-0.860) (-0.930) (-0.890) (-1.810)* (1.450) (-0.880) (-1.660)* (-0.440) (1.480)
[-0.002] [-0.001] [-0.002] [-0.0026] [0.0004] [-0.002] [-0.0020] [-0.00004] [0.0004]
(-0.750) (-0.790) (-0.720) (-1.680)* (1.480) (-0.760) (-1.580) (-0.210) (1.500)
Siblings -0.039 -0.112 -0.038 -0.073 -0.310 -0.037 -0.138 0.063 -0.304
(-1.310) (-2.340)** (-1.280) (-1.490)* (-3.920)*** (-1.250) (-2.740)*** (0.940) (-3.850)***
[-0.0031] [-0.0097] [-0.0037] [-0.0046] [-0.0018] [-0.0033] [-0.0065] [0.0006] [-0.0018]
(-0.790) (-2.190)** (-0.920) (-1.280) (-2.850)*** (-0.820) (-2.430)** (1.230) (-2.810)***
Mother, 0.548 0.450 0.547 0.692 -0.133 0.548 0.691 0.707 -0.132
 High School (4.040)*** (2.450)** (4.040)*** (3.250)*** (-0.550) (4.060)*** (3.120)*** (1.940)* (-0.550)
[0.0722] [0.0335] [0.0695] [0.0500] [-0.0018] [0.0729] [0.0348] [0.0050] [-0.0018]
(3.250)*** (1.630) (3.100)*** (2.220)** (-1.730)* (3.230)*** (1.990)** (1.090) (-1.710)
Mother, 0.786 0.701 0.785 0.952 0.120 0.788 0.886 1.146 0.129
 Some College (5.690)*** (4.070)*** (5.700)*** (4.770)*** (0.510) (5.740)*** (4.610)*** (2.730)*** (0.560)
[0.1016] [0.0541] [0.0998] [0.0674] [-0.0010] [0.1053] [0.0417] [0.0095] [-0.0010]
(4.280)*** (2.690)*** (4.170)*** (3.110)*** (-0.930) (4.360)*** (2.720)*** (1.390) (-0.830)
Mother, 0.971 0.797 0.971 1.068 0.206 0.974 0.935 1.418 0.222
 BA (6.330)*** (4.330)*** (6.320)*** (5.060)*** (0.840) (6.360)*** (4.610)*** (3.370)*** (0.900)
[0.1405] [0.0627] [0.1368] [0.0824] [-0.0010] [0.1448] [0.0447] [0.0173] [-0.0009]
(4.450)*** (2.530)** (4.290)*** (2.900)*** (-0.900) (4.500)*** (2.330)** (1.520) (-0.760)
Mother, 0.719 0.894 0.716 1.078 0.436 0.716 0.714 1.607 0.456
 Advanced (3.900)*** (4.210)*** (3.890)*** (4.290)*** (1.620) (3.910)*** (2.650)*** (3.490)*** (1.700)*
[0.0924] [0.0945] [0.0897] [0.1059] [0.0006] [0.1005] [0.0329] [0.0378] [0.0009]
(2.520)** (2.600)*** (2.410)** (2.500)** (0.290) (2.630)*** (1.330) (1.480) (0.410)
Table 3.5: Multinomial Probit Estimates for Public versus Multiple Private Schooling Options (Continued)
Model C Model D Model E
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 Catholic Non-Catholic Catholic Other Religious Secular Catholic Evangelical Protestant Secular
Variable
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Father, 0.395 0.458 0.400 0.487 0.033 0.399 0.562 0.401 0.035
 High School (2.710)*** (3.020)*** (2.740)*** (2.980)*** (0.130) (2.750)*** (3.380)*** (1.560) (0.140)
[0.0478] [0.0391] [0.0506] [0.0337] [-0.0007] [0.0518] [0.0289] [0.0022] [-0.0007]
(2.090)** (2.200)** (2.170)** (2.100)** (-0.550) (2.200)** (2.150)** (0.900) (-0.550)
Father, 0.426 0.397 0.428 0.365 0.342 0.427 0.450 0.298 0.347
 Some College (2.800)*** (2.610)*** (2.820)*** (2.250)** (1.180) (2.820)*** (2.670)*** (1.130) (1.200)
[0.0544] [0.0312] [0.0576] [0.0215] [0.0013] [0.0581] [0.0204] [0.0012] [0.0014]
(2.240)** (1.850)** (2.320)*** (1.510) (0.580) (2.330)** (1.720)* (0.560) (0.580)
Father, 0.409 0.561 0.413 0.548 0.387 0.410 0.600 0.640 0.392
 BA (2.540)** (3.250)*** (2.570)** (2.860)*** (1.380) (2.560)** (3.060)*** (2.180)** (1.390)
[0.0475] [0.0522] [0.0513] [0.0401] [0.0015] [0.0521] [0.0319] [0.0050] [0.0016]
(1.850)* (2.360)** (1.950)* (2.000)** (0.640) (1.960)** (1.930)* (1.160) (0.640)
Father, 0.335 0.639 0.334 0.518 0.716 0.331 0.420 0.699 0.726
 Advanced (1.910)* (3.210)*** (1.910)* (2.400)** (2.420)** (1.900)* (1.710)* (2.570)** (2.460)**
[0.0332] [0.0679] [0.0386] [0.0396] [0.0059] [0.0415] [0.0198] [0.0070] [0.0064]
(1.220) (2.330)** (1.380) (1.680)* (1.150) (1.450) (1.090) (1.270) (1.190)
Religiosity, 0.527 0.256 0.526 0.353 -0.029 0.521 0.489 0.039 -0.037
 Head (6.750)*** (2.680)** (6.740)*** (3.550)*** (-0.190) (6.660)*** (5.300)*** (0.230) (-0.240)
[0.0694] [0.0137] [0.0695] [0.0182] [-0.0011] [0.0694] [0.0203] [-0.0009] [-0.0012]
(5.420)*** (1.500) (5.400)*** (2.230)** (-1.150) (5.350)*** (3.190)*** (-0.770) (-1.210)
Religiosity, 0.275 0.407 0.274 0.474 -0.015 0.277 0.421 0.631 -0.004
 Spouse (3.270)*** (3.830)*** (3.260)*** (4.280)*** (-0.080) (3.290)*** (4.560)*** (2.830)*** (-0.020)
[0.0304] [0.0356] [0.0311] [0.0346] [-0.0008] [0.0338] [0.0203] [0.0052] [-0.0007]
(2.420)** (2.880)*** (2.450)** (3.130)*** (-0.870) (2.620)*** (2.990)*** (1.280) (-0.770)
Single Parent 0.385 0.667 0.388 0.650 0.506 0.388 0.663 0.785 0.518
(2.540)** (4.370)*** (2.560)** (3.730)*** (2.220)** (2.560)** (3.870)*** (2.490)** (2.270)**
[0.0402] [0.0663] [0.0442] [0.0510] [0.0025] [0.0462] [0.0366] [0.0071] [0.0027]
(1.710)* (3.150)*** (1.840)* (2.600)*** (1.050) (1.900)* (2.370)** (1.340) (1.080)
Midwest 0.070 0.580 0.070 0.550 -0.275 0.072 0.484 0.613 -0.234
(0.230) (1.520) (0.230) (1.340) (-0.500) (0.230) (1.050) (1.130) (-0.430)
[-0.0027] [0.0605] [0.0005] [0.0458] [-0.0019] [0.0031] [0.0274] [0.0054] [-0.0017]
(-0.070) (1.360) (0.010) (1.190) (-0.830) (0.070) (0.890) (0.830) (-0.700)
Table 3.5: Multinomial Probit Estimates for Public versus Multiple Private Schooling Options (Continued)
Model C Model D Model E
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South -0.573 0.213 -0.574 0.053 0.128 -0.568 -0.139 0.784 0.204
(-1.410) (0.450) (-1.410) (0.100) (0.240) (-1.390) (-0.240) (1.110) (0.380)
[-0.0737] [0.0312] [-0.0724] [0.0120] [0.0015] [-0.0724] [-0.0024] [0.0105] [0.0022]
(-1.740)* (0.660) (-1.650)* (0.310) (0.400) (-1.620) (-0.090) (1.020) (0.500)
West -0.367 0.478 -0.367 0.431 0.143 -0.360 -0.038 1.432 0.233
(-0.820) (0.890) (-0.820) (0.740) (0.240) (-0.800) (-0.060) (1.800)* (0.400)
[-0.0535] [0.0599] [-0.0522] [0.0435] [0.0010] [-0.0508] [-0.0012] [0.0330] [0.0018]
(-1.200) (0.910) (-1.130) (0.760) (0.240) (-1.070) (-0.040) (1.080) (0.360)
Urban 0.569 0.226 0.566 0.182 1.420 0.560 -0.008 1.397 1.433
(1.900)* (0.720) (1.900)* (0.540) (2.520)** (1.890)* (-0.020) (2.110)** (2.560)**
[0.0638] [0.0109] [0.0646] [0.0048] [0.0048] [0.0658] [-0.0072] [0.0058] [0.0050]
(2.150)** (0.430) (2.140)** (0.220) (3.130)*** (2.150)** (-0.380) (1.950)* (3.150)***
Income, 15-20 -0.366 -0.316 -0.370 -0.286 -0.417 -0.367 -0.339 -0.158 -0.415
(-2.060)** (-1.330) (-2.080)** (-1.170) (-0.950) (-2.070)** (-1.220) (-0.470) (-0.940)
[-0.0382] [-0.0202] [-0.0400] [-0.0138] [-0.0014] [-0.0406] [-0.0113] [-0.0003] [-0.0014]
(-2.170)** (-1.230) (-2.260)** (-1.000) (-0.900) (-2.260)** (-1.120) (-0.160) (-0.890)
Income, 20-25 -0.377 0.042 -0.380 0.163 -0.650 -0.380 0.166 0.084 -0.637
(-2.120)** (0.200) (-2.140)** (0.790) (-1.250) (-2.140)** (0.800) (0.210) (-1.240)
[-0.0439] [0.0104] [-0.0461] [0.0194] [-0.0021] [-0.0464] [0.0141] [0.0012] [-0.0021]
(-2.570)** (0.510) (-2.670)*** (1.010) (-1.890)* (-2.630)*** (1.010) (0.310) (-1.840)*
Income, 25-30 -0.032 0.144 -0.034 0.109 0.230 -0.032 0.032 0.256 0.237
(-0.230) (0.820) (-0.240) (0.580) (0.840) (-0.230) (0.160) (0.830) (0.870)
[-0.0070] [0.0149] [-0.0066] [0.0088] [0.0017] [-0.0057] [0.0016] [0.0024] [0.0018]
(-0.390) (0.810) (-0.360) (0.570) (0.650) (-0.310) (0.150) (0.630) (0.690)
Income, 30-35 -0.023 0.133 -0.021 0.147 -0.079 -0.022 0.127 0.048 -0.074
(-0.150) (0.840) (-0.140) (0.910) (-0.230) (-0.140) (0.730) (0.190) (-0.220)
[-0.0056] [0.0137] [-0.0051] [0.0121] [-0.0005] [-0.0045] [0.0073] [0.0003] [-0.0005]
(-0.290) (0.830) (-0.260) (0.890) (-0.300) (-0.220) (0.730) (0.160) (-0.260)
Income, 35-40 0.087 0.320 0.087 0.330 0.151 0.089 0.192 0.776 0.170
(0.610) (2.240) (0.610) (2.260)** (0.520) (0.630) (1.200) (3.840)*** (0.590)
[0.0050] [0.0325] [0.0060] [0.0270] [0.0006] [0.0077] [0.0086] [0.0111] [0.0007]
(0.260) (1.840)* (0.300) (1.770)* (0.270) (0.380) (0.870) (1.400) (0.330)
Table 3.5: Multinomial Probit Estimates for Public versus Multiple Private Schooling Options (Continued)
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 Catholic Non-Catholic Catholic Other Religious Secular Catholic Evangelical Protestant Secular
Variable
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Income, 40-50 0.367 0.512 0.368 0.536 0.208 0.371 0.509 0.645 0.217
(2.920)*** (3.940)*** (2.940)*** (4.200)*** (0.660) (2.960)*** (3.590)*** (4.030)*** (0.690)
[0.0426] [0.0489] [0.0451] [0.0417] [0.0003] [0.0481] [0.0267] [0.0059] [0.0004]
(2.060)* (2.680)*** (2.140)** (2.720) (0.140) (2.240)*** (2.240) (1.270) (0.190)
Income, 50-75 0.514 0.382 0.512 0.381 0.264 0.513 0.422 0.367 0.264
(4.570)*** (3.060)*** (4.550)*** (3.000)*** (1.090) (4.570)*** (2.890)*** (2.090) (1.090)
[0.0700] [0.0273] [0.0722] [0.0213] [0.0006] [0.0738] [0.0173] [0.0017] [0.0006]
(3.490)*** (1.940)* (3.550)*** (1.840) (0.370) (3.590)*** (1.720)* (0.880) (0.370)
Income, 75-100 0.541 0.351 0.537 0.274 0.582 0.538 0.268 0.387 0.580
(4.300)*** (2.600)*** (4.270)*** (2.110)** (2.050)** (4.280)*** (1.780)* (2.420)** (2.060)**
[0.0778] [0.0233] [0.0806] [0.0110] [0.0037] [0.0823] [0.0069] [0.0020] [0.0037]
(3.300)*** (1.550) (3.360)*** (1.040) (1.040) (3.400)*** (0.800) (1.030) (1.040)
Income, 100-200 0.556 0.429 0.551 0.314 0.577 0.550 0.283 0.382 0.574
(4.080)*** (3.170)*** (4.060)*** (2.430)** (2.190)** (4.060)*** (1.810)* (2.540)** (2.190)**
[0.0789] [0.0321] [0.0831] [0.0142] [0.0036] [0.0853] [0.0076] [0.0019] [0.0037]
(3.070)*** (1.990)** (3.170)*** (1.290) (1.120) (3.210)*** (0.810) (1.050) (1.120)
Income, 200+ 0.702 0.839 0.697 0.662 1.161 0.700 0.393 0.806 1.168
(3.490)*** (4.330)*** (3.470)*** (3.190)*** (3.470)*** (3.470)*** (2.020)** (3.470)*** (3.520)***
[0.0926] [0.0879] [0.1013] [0.0452] [0.0146] [0.1110] [0.0100] [0.0075] [0.0162]
(2.320)** (2.710)*** (2.440)** (1.830) (1.390)** (2.580)*** (0.840) (1.350) (1.440)
House Value, 0.0000049 0.0000012 0.0000049 -0.0000007 0.0000006 0.0000049 -0.0000026 -0.0000007 0.0000005
 County a (1.660)* (0.470) (1.670)* (-0.230) (0.220) (1.670)* (-0.670) (-0.190) (0.200)
[0.00000064] [0.00000002] [0.00000069] [-0.00000013] [-0.000000002] [0.00000071] [-0.00000019] [-0.00000001] [-0.000000002]
(1.690)* (0.080) (1.780)* (-0.580) (-0.170) (1.810)* (-0.970)* (-0.440) (-0.130)
Income, County a -0.000049 -0.000001 -0.000049 0.000007 0.000002 -0.000050 0.000012 0.000004 0.000001
(-2.540)** (-0.070) (-2.550)** (0.410) (0.090) (-2.560)** (0.640) (0.160) (0.070)
[-0.0000066] [0.0000008] [-0.0000069] [0.0000013] [0.00000007] [-0.0000070] [0.0000012] [0.00000010] [0.00000007]
(-2.660)*** (0.580) (-2.700)*** (1.040) (0.610) (-2.700)*** (1.230) (0.560) (0.590)
White, County a -0.475 1.768 -0.467 2.263 -0.388 -0.463 1.159 2.660 -0.361
(-0.520) (1.060) (-0.510) (0.970) (-0.340) (-0.510) (0.560) (0.800) (-0.320)
[-0.0971] [0.1728] [-0.0975] [0.1732] [-0.0034] [-0.0805] [0.0628] [0.0195] [-0.0026]
(-0.800) (1.150) (-0.780) (1.060) (-0.530) (-0.640) (0.610) (0.790) (-0.390)
Table 3.5: Multinomial Probit Estimates for Public versus Multiple Private Schooling Options (Continued)
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Catholic Non-Catholic Catholic Other Religious Secular Catholic Evangelical Protestant Secular
Variable
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Catholic, County b 1.689 1.675 1.708 2.152 -1.967 1.713 1.513 3.623 -1.822
(1.820)* (1.430) (1.840)* (1.700)* (-1.340) (1.840)* (1.140) (1.890)* (-1.250)
[0.1970] [0.1240] [0.2044] [0.1336] [-0.0156] [0.2182] [0.0577] [0.0230] [-0.0149]
(1.630) (1.180) (1.650)* (1.500) (-1.960)** (1.730)* (0.880) (1.640) (-1.830)*
Evangelical, 0.308 1.318 0.329 2.130 -4.053 0.295 2.206 -0.772 -4.227
 County b (0.250) (0.970) (0.270) (1.470) (-1.980)** (0.240) (1.410) (-0.300) (-2.070)**
[0.0171] [0.1166] [0.0183] [0.1542] [-0.0263] [0.0241] [0.1129] [-0.0071] [-0.0277]
(0.110) (0.970) (0.110) (1.530) (-2.210)** (0.140) (1.480) (-0.410) (-2.240)**
Protestant, -0.673 1.244 -0.670 1.759 -1.689 -0.720 0.905 3.298 -1.538
 County b (-0.580) (1.150) (-0.580) (1.470) (-1.310) (-0.620) (0.840) (2.060)** (-1.230)
[-0.1141] [0.1279] [-0.1162] [0.1403] [-0.0106] [-0.1130] [0.0528] [0.0249] [-0.0094]
(-0.750) (1.330) (-0.750) (1.620) (-1.400) (-0.710) (0.980) (1.700)* (-1.290)
Student-Teacher, 0.048 0.007 0.049 0.012 -0.017 0.048 0.050 -0.036 -0.020
 Public a (1.720)* (0.310) (1.730)* (0.490) (-0.540) (1.720)* (1.920)* (-1.140) (-0.620)
[0.0064] [-0.0002] [0.0065] [0.0002] [-0.0002] [0.0062] [0.0021] [-0.0004] [-0.0002]
(1.770)* (-0.120) (1.770)* (0.100) (-0.920) (1.660)* (1.640) (-1.330) (-1.080)
Black, Public a -0.00016 0.015 -0.00006 0.022 -0.006 0.00025 0.005 0.044 -0.005
(-0.020) (1.060) (-0.010) (1.210) (-0.450) (0.030) (0.300) (1.650)* (-0.390)
[-0.0003] [0.0014] [-0.0003] [0.0016] [-0.0001] [-0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0003] [-0.00004]
(-0.250) (1.090) (-0.270) (1.260) (-0.710) (-0.070) (0.280) (1.380) (-0.520)
Hispanic, Public a -0.016 0.019 -0.016 0.025 0.003 -0.016 0.020 0.025 0.002
(-1.470) (1.110) (-1.470) (1.100) (0.180) (-1.470) (0.930) (0.810) (0.140)
[-0.0026] [0.0021] [-0.0026] [0.0021] [0.00002] [-0.0025] [0.0012] [0.0002] [0.00002]
(-1.730)* (1.330) (-1.730)* (1.300) (0.210) (-1.650)* (1.100) (0.800) (0.220)
Table 3.5: Multinomial Probit Estimates for Public versus Multiple Private Schooling Options (Continued)
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Catholic Non-Catholic Catholic Other Religious Secular Catholic Evangelical Protestant Secular
Variable
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Coefficient
(z-score)
[Marginal Effect]
(z-score)
Free Lunch a 0.0007 0.014 0.0007 0.013 0.022 0.0006 0.009 0.008 0.022
(0.090) (1.600) (0.090) (1.390) (1.640) (0.070) (1.060) (0.580) (1.650)*
[-0.0002] [0.0013] [-0.0001] [0.0009] [0.0001] [-0.0001] [0.0005] [0.00005] [0.0001]
(-0.150) (1.690)* (-0.110) (1.430) (1.440) (-0.060) (1.050) (0.480) (1.490)
Constant -2.776 -7.529 -2.784 -8.793 -4.435 -2.770 -7.840 -11.410 -4.521
(-2.430)** (-3.880)*** (-2.430)** (-3.330)*** (-2.990)*** (-2.420)** (-3.320)*** (-2.790)*** (-3.040)***
Observations
Log Likelihood
Wald chi2 (df)
Source: Unless otherwise indicated, data are from the restricted use ECLS-K, 1999-2000.
(df) denotes degrees of freedom
*p<0.10 ; **p<0.05 ; ***p<0.01
Sample sizes are rounded to comply with NCES restricted use data reporting standards.
a denotes Census 2000 data
b  denotes Glenmary Research Center's 2000 Religious Congregations & Membership Data
932.85 (94)
8,460
-5,271.18
2,657.74 (188)
8,460
-5,124.41
1,541.69 (141)
8,460
-4,928.33
Table 3.5: Multinomial Probit Estimates for Public versus Multiple Private Schooling Options (Continued)
Model C Model D Model E
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 Religiosity, Head and Religiosity, Spouse are positive and significant for attending 
a Catholic or other religious school while an insignificant negative effect is found for 
secular schools.  Consistent with my early results, a child living in a single parent 
household is more likely to attend Other Religious or Catholic.  
Living in the Midwest increases the likelihood of the child attending an other 
religious private school by approximately five percent while living in the South region 
decreases the probability of attending a Catholic school by seven percent when compared 
to living in New England.  Urban increases the likelihood of the child attending a 
Catholic school by over six percent. 
 When household income is between twenty thousand and twenty-five thousand 
dollars, a child is significantly less likely to attend a Catholic or Secular school.  When 
household income falls within thirty-five to forty thousand dollars, a child is significantly 
more likely to attend an other religious school.  This positive relationship between 
household income and other religious school attendance continues for all higher income 
levels.  A positive and significant relationship for household income and Catholic school 
attendance is found once income is greater than forty thousand dollars.  When income is 
higher than seventy-five thousand dollars, then a positive and significant relationship for 
Secular attendance is present.   
The median house value is positive and significant while the median household 
income is negative and significant for attending Catholic school.  When the average 
student-teacher ratio in public schools rises, the child is significantly more likely to attend 
a Catholic school.  When the percentage of blacks in public schools rises, a child is more 
likely to attend an other religious school. 
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  When Catholic, County increases by ten percent, the child’s likelihood of 
attending a Catholic school increases to roughly twenty percentage points.  The 
probability of attending a Catholic school drops by twelve percentage points when 
Protestant, County increases by ten percent.  Once again a negative cross-denomination 
effect for Catholic school attendance and Protestant adherents in a county is 
demonstrated.  A ten percent increase in Catholic, Evangelical, or Protestant adherents 
increases the probability of Other Religious by thirteen percentage points, fifteen 
percentage points, and fourteen percentage points, respectively.  The Catholic and 
Evangelical adherent populations have a significant negative effect on Secular 
enrollment.  Specifically, the likelihood of attending a Secular school falls by two 
percentage points when Catholic adherents increases by ten percent and by three 
percentage points when Evangelical adherents increase by ten percent. 
 Using so many types of private schools allows for the possibility that private 
schools are not homogeneous as many studies have treated them, but rather they are 
heterogeneous.  While it is impossible to look at every type of private school on an 
individual basis, this study moves one step closer to distinguishing important factors in 
determining which school type to attend: public, Catholic, Evangelical, Protestant, or 
Secular. 
The results of estimating a multinomial probit model with a further dichotomy of 
private schools are reported in Table 3.5, model E.  Black, Hispanic, Asian, and 
Multiracial are negatively related to attending Evangelical schools while these findings 
are significant if a child is Asian or Hispanic.  Fall Reading is positive and significant for 
attending Secular while Fall General Knowledge is positive and significant for attending 
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 Catholic and Evangelical.  Spring and fall kindergarten math scores are significant only 
for attending an Evangelical school.  A child’s kindergarten math score in the fall shows 
a significant negative likelihood of attending an Evangelical school while a child’s spring 
kindergarten math score indicates a significant positive probability of attending an 
Evangelical school.  If the child has siblings, then he or she is significantly less likely to 
attend Evangelical and Secular schools.  Many of the results for parental educational 
attainment and household religiosity are positive and significant for attending Catholic or 
Evangelical.   
Compared to an income level below fifteen thousand dollars, when a household’s 
income is between fifteen thousand and twenty-five thousand dollars a child is 
significantly less likely to attend Catholic.  When a household income falls in the highest 
category, a child is approximately one percent more likely to attend an Evangelical or 
Protestant school and a slightly over one percent likelihood of attending a Secular school.  
This is in contrast to an increase of eleven percent for Catholic. 
Compared to living in New England, living in the western region increases the 
likelihood of attending a Protestant school by over three percentage points.  Living in an 
urban or suburban area, relative to a rural area or small town, increases a child’s 
probability of attending Protestant and Secular by less than one percent for each school 
type.  When household income is above two hundred thousand, the likelihood of a child 
attending a Catholic school is eleven percentage points higher than a child whose 
household income is below fifteen thousand dollars.  Even at the highest income category 
the likelihood of attending an Evangelical or Protestant school is less than one percentage 
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 point higher than the reference individual.  Secular attendance is roughly two percentage 
points higher.   
When Catholic, County rises by ten percent, the child is twenty-two percentage 
points more likely to attend Catholic school, six percentage points more likely to attend 
an Evangelical school, and two percentage points more likely to attend a Protestant 
school.  The likelihood of attending a Secular drops by nearly two percentage points 
when Catholic, County increases by ten percent.  A ten percent increase in Evangelical, 
County leads to an increase of eleven percentage points that the child attends an 
Evangelical school while a ten percent increase in Protestant, County indicates an 
increase of nearly three percentage points in attending a Protestant school.  This same 
increase in Protestant, County reduces the likelihood that the child attends a Catholic 
school by eleven percentage points. 
3.5.3 Voucher Simulations  
The results from the estimation of the model can be expressed as predicted 
probabilities for first graders to attend different school types as well as private, in general.  
However, these simulations should be viewed as short run, or marginal, in their outlook.  
They do not reflect a longer time horizon in which a new general equilibrium point can 
be determined. 
The first grader can be assigned any number of different characteristics in the 
process of calculation these predicted probabilities.20  It is useful to see how an increase 
in household income affects a child’s enrollment in private or public school.  While this 
increase could be the result of a number of factors, treating the increase in household 
income as a voucher is the most policy relevant.  In this case, a dollar value is not 
                                                          
20 The specific values used for each simulation are provided in Appendix C. 
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 assigned to the voucher; rather, it is assumed that the voucher is large enough in value to 
move the household from one income category to the next highest category within the 
lower household income categories.21  It is reported in Table 60 of the Digest of 
Education Statistics (2004) that the average private elementary school tuition in 1999-
2000 equals $3,267 while Catholic elementary school tuition is below this at $2,451 and 
Secular is substantially higher at $7,884.  Other religious school tuition, on average, is 
$3,503.  Clearly, the income simulations equal to a one thousand dollar increase in 
income, as performed by Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore (1981a), do not reflect current 
private school tuition.   
The possible impact of a voucher on a household’s budget constraint is shown in 
Figure 3.3.  The absence of the provision of public schooling would force households to 
purchase education as a private good, shown as point A.  Upon establishing public 
schooling, households have the option of point B, which is a fixed amount of publicly 
provided schooling.  Public schools must serve all households in an area where as private 
schools are able to specialize in a myriad of areas including college preparatory and 
religious education (Gemello and Osman 1984).  As drawn, the public schooling option 
enables the household to reach a higher indifference curve.  However, if selecting point B 
does not maximize the household’s utility, then the household enrolls in private school 
and consumes according its budget constraint, point A.22  A voucher represents a lump 
                                                          
21 In the lower income level categories, this difference between groups is $5,000 while this difference 
increases as the higher income levels are reached.  Rouse (1998) states that a Milwaukee voucher was 
valued at roughly $3200 in 1995.  The New York city voucher program had vouchers worth up to $1400 
each year for three years to children from low income families (Howell and Peterson 2004; Krueger and 
Zhu 2004a).  Mayer, Peterson, Myers, Tuttle, and Howell (2002) note that the New York city voucher helps 
cover cost of attending private school, but the voucher amount does not result in free (e.g., zero cost) 
private school enrollment for participating families.   
22 The selection of point A or B depends solely on the shape of the household’s indifference curves.  Point A 
could be located anywhere along the household’s budget constraint.  The point in the figure represents only 
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 sum transfer to the household and shifts the budget constraint to the right to express the 
increased consumption possibilities. As illustrated, the household is able to reach a higher 
level of utility by using the voucher to attend a private school of its choice, point C.   
   
Figure 3.3: Impact of Voucher (Lump Sum Transfer) on Household’s Budget Constraint
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
U0
U2
A
B
All Other Goods 
Education
U1 
C
Voucher Amount
 
It is the intent of the simulations that follow to investigate where different 
students would choose to attend private school as the result of receiving a voucher.  There 
is no reason to assume that the impact on private school enrollment would be uniform 
across all private school types.  Thus, it is necessary to see the impact is for various 
groups.  For the first simulation, I focus on a female student with three siblings living in a 
single parent household.  Her mother has her high school degree while her father is a high 
school dropout.  The household is not religious and lives in an urban area in the northeast.  
Many of the qualities that will remain constant through out these simulations relate to the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
one of many maximization possibilities.  As indicated, I assume that point A provides less utility and more 
education than public schooling point B. 
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 child’s home county and include the median house value and median household income 
in the county as well as the percentage of the county population that is white and 
religious adherents for Catholic, Evangelical, and Protestant.  For this simulation, she 
lives in a poor county with below average religious adherents and bad public schools.  
The second simulation features a female student earning average test scores.  She is the 
only child of two religious and college educated parents.  She lives in an urban area in the 
northeast.  With the exception of the quality of public schools, area characteristics are 
evaluated at their mean values for this second simulation.  The first simulation uses bad 
quality public school characteristics while the second looks at public schools classified as 
horrible, which are outlined in detail in Appendix C.  Results from both simulations are 
presented in Tables 3.6 and 3.7, respectively. 
In the first simulation, regardless of race, a female student with average test 
scores is more likely to attend a private school as a result of receiving a voucher and 
moving from Income, 20-25 to Income, 25-30.  As indicated in Table 3.6, this increase in 
likelihood of attending a private school is not observed when a voucher results in moving 
from Income, 25-30 to Income, 30-35.  All predicted probabilities for this income level 
change remain the same.  If a voucher increases income level from Income, 30-35 to 
Income, 35-40, the probability increases once again.  At an income level of thirty-five 
thousand to forty thousand dollars, a white girl has a sixteen percent likelihood of 
attending a private school while a Hispanic girl experiences a fifteen percent probability.  
An African-American girl has a seven percent likelihood of attending a private school. 
However, only examining the likelihood of attending a private school is not 
sufficient.  There are differences in the probability to attend each school type.  For any 
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 income category, African-American girls have the lowest probability of attending a 
Protestant school while Hispanic girls have the lowest probability of attending an 
Evangelical school.  For the lowest income category, white and Hispanic girls display 
similar predicted probabilities for all private school types expect Evangelical.  African-
American and white girls exhibit nearly equal likelihoods of thirteen and sixteen 
percentage points in Evangelical enrollment, respectively.  When household income is 
below fifteen thousand dollars, a white girl experiences a ten percent likelihood of 
attending a Catholic school while Hispanic and African-American girls have a twelve 
percent and five percent predicted probabilities, respectively.  The likelihood of Secular 
or Protestant enrollment is less than two percent and one percent, respectively for both 
white and Hispanic girls.  As income increases to the next category, where household 
income falls between fifteen and twenty thousand dollars, as a result of receiving a 
voucher, all of the predicted probabilities drop.  The likelihood of a white girl attending a 
Catholic school is now seven percentage points while a Hispanic girl experiences a 
likelihood of eight percentage points.   
It is clear from the first simulation that these girls are not the students attending 
Evangelical schools as a result of receiving vouchers.  The highest predicted probability 
for attending an Evangelical school for all three races is less than three percent and 
occurs for white girls living in households with an income level of twenty to twenty-five 
thousand dollars as a result of the voucher.  Protestant schools will likely encounter an 
increase in white and Hispanic female enrollments displaying characteristics similar to 
those used in this prediction.  African-American girls display a large increase in the 
probability of attending Protestant, but this likelihood remains extremely low indicating 
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 that African-American enrollment at Protestant schools will not change because of a 
voucher.  Catholic and Secular will observe small increases for all three racial groups.   
Income Level, Race Private, All Inclusive Catholic Evangelical Protestant Secular
Income $0-$15,000  (33%)  
White 0.136 0.104 0.016 0.007 0.014
Black 0.054 0.038 0.013 0.0002 0.009
Hispanic 0.120 0.120 0.005 0.005 0.012
Income $15,000 - $20,000  (100%)
White 0.087 0.066 0.010 0.006 0.007
Black 0.031 0.022 0.008 0.0002 0.004
Hispanic 0.075 0.077 0.003 0.004 0.006
Income $20,000 - $25,000  (100%)
White 0.106 0.062 0.026 0.009 0.004
Black 0.040 0.020 0.020 0.0003 0.002
Hispanic 0.093 0.074 0.009 0.007 0.003
Income $25,000 - $30,000  (100%)  
White 0.142 0.097 0.017 0.011 0.021
Black 0.057 0.035 0.014 0.0004 0.015
Hispanic 0.126 0.113 0.006 0.008 0.019
Income $30,000-$35,000  (100%)
White 0.143 0.101 0.021 0.007 0.012
Black 0.058 0.036 0.017 0.0003 0.008
Hispanic 0.126 0.116 0.007 0.005 0.010
Income $35,000-$40,000  (100%)
White 0.167 0.110 0.021 0.029 0.017
Black 0.070 0.042 0.018 0.002 0.012
Hispanic 0.149 0.128 0.007 0.022 0.015
Table 3.6: Probability of Female with Average Test Score Attending Private 
School by Income, Race, and School Type with a $5,000 Voucher
Note: While all private school types are represented, they are not represented equally.  Over one-half of 
the sample attends Catholic schools.  Due to this large proportion of Catholic students in the sample, 
changes in the probability of attending a Catholic school have a greater impact on the probability of 
attending a private school overall than the remaining three private school types do.  Thus, the sum of the 
probabilitiy of attending each school type separately will not equal the probability of attending a private 
school, all-inclusive. Assuming income is uniformly distributed through all eleven categories, the 
probability of moving up one level to a higher category is the dollar value of the voucher divided by the 
dollar range of the category.  These probabilities of moving up one cateogory are in parentheses in the 
table above, next to each income level.  Voucher amount is assumed to be five thousand dollars.
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Figure 3.4, parts a through d, depict these probability changes for each racial 
group over all six income levels.23  Figure 3.4a shows that white and Hispanic girls 
follow a similar probability pattern for attending Catholic as income increases.  While the 
line for African-American girls has the same general trend as white and Hispanic girls, it 
is much flatter and lower reflecting a lower likelihood of attending Catholic.  For Figure 
3.4b, white girls have the highest probability of attending Evangelical at all income 
levels, followed by African-American girls.  Figure 3.4c shows that white and Hispanic 
girls follow the same pattern.  While white has the highest probability for attending 
Evangelical and Protestant schools, the trend lines are very different.  Enrollment in 
Evangelical is much more responsive at lower income levels than Protestant.  It is only at 
the Income, 30-35 and above that the likelihood of attending Protestant dramatically rises.  
For probability of attending Secular shown in Figure 3.4d, all three racial groups display 
extremely similar, tightly grouped together, trends reflecting very similar probabilities of 
attending this school type. 
23 Due to the construction of these simulations, the peaks are the same for all simulations. 
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Figure 3.4a: Probability of Attending Catholic 
Female Student, Average Test Scores
0%
5%
10%
15%
0
-
1
5
1
5
-
2
0
2
0
-
2
5
2
5
-
3
0
3
0
-
3
5
3
5
-
4
0
Income Level (in thousands)
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
Figure 3.4b: Probability of Attending Evangelical 
Female Student, Average Test Scores
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Figure 3.4c: Probability of Attending Protestant
Female Student, Average Test Scores
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Figure 3.4d: Probability of Attending Nonsectarian 
Female Student, Average Test Scores
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 For the second simulation, the race of the girl and quality of the area public 
schools is varied.  Isolating horrible public schools, when income increases from Income, 
30-35 to Income, 35-40 because of a voucher, the probability of attending private school 
increases to nearly five percent for white and Hispanic girls.  African-American girls 
experience a probability of three percentage points.  As shown in Table 3.7 for Income, 
30-35 to Income, 35-40, the types of private schools selected are different when a more 
detailed breakdown of private schools is used.  White girls see a one percent decrease in 
the probability of attending Catholic and a three percent drop in the probability of 
attending Evangelical.  There is less than a one percent increase for Secular.  There is an 
eleven percent increase in the likelihood of attending a Protestant school for white girls as 
a result of a voucher.  For an African-American girl, the likelihood of attending a 
Catholic, Evangelical, or Secular school increases by one percent or less.  The biggest 
increase is a two percent rise in the probability for Protestant.  These likelihoods for 
Hispanic girls are similar to the ones reported for white girls.  Hispanic girls observe a 
reduction in the probability of attending a Catholic school and Evangelical school by one 
and two percent respectively.  Secular remains constant.  The probability of attending 
Protestant increases by eleven percent.   
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Income Level, Race Private, All Inclusive Catholic Evangelical Protestant Secular
Income $0-$15,000  (33%)
White 0.429 0.166 0.264 0.074 0.014
Black 0.246 0.078 0.266 0.006 0.013
Hispanic 0.399 0.222 0.148 0.067 0.015
Income $15,000 - $20,000  (100%)
White 0.329 0.124 0.210 0.076 0.008
Black 0.171 0.054 0.203 0.007 0.007
Hispanic 0.302 0.165 0.112 0.068 0.009
Income $20,000 - $25,000  (100%)
White 0.372 0.093 0.332 0.086 0.003
Black 0.202 0.040 0.324 0.008 0.003
Hispanic 0.344 0.136 0.201 0.084 0.004
Income $25,000 - $30,000  (100%)
White 0.440 0.149 0.262 0.106 0.021
Black 0.255 0.072 0.272 0.011 0.020
Hispanic 0.410 0.203 0.147 0.098 0.023
Income $30,000-$35,000  (100%)
White 0.441 0.153 0.299 0.075 0.011
Black 0.257 0.071 0.300 0.007 0.010
Hispanic 0.412 0.209 0.173 0.070 0.012
Income $35,000-$40,000  (100%)
White 0.481 0.144 0.268 0.188 0.013
Black 0.290 0.077 0.303 0.028 0.014
Hispanic 0.451 0.199 0.153 0.178 0.015
Income $40,000-$50,000  (50%)
White 0.554 0.183 0.346 0.128 0.011
Black 0.356 0.098 0.380 0.016 0.012
Hispanic 0.524 0.255 0.208 0.124 0.013
Table 3.7: Probability of Female Attending Private School
With Horrible Public Schools by Income, Race, and School Type
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Income Level, Race Private, All Inclusive Catholic Evangelical Protestant Secular
Income $50,000-$75,000  (20%)
White 0.567 0.234 0.322 0.086 0.014
Black 0.368 0.125 0.348 0.009 0.014
Hispanic 0.537 0.312 0.187 0.080 0.015
Income $75,000-$100,000  (20%)
White 0.569 0.251 0.272 0.092 0.028
Black 0.369 0.137 0.299 0.010 0.028
Hispanic 0.539 0.326 0.151 0.084 0.030
Income $100,000-$200,000  (5%)
White 0.580 0.253 0.275 0.091 0.027
Black 0.380 0.139 0.303 0.010 0.027
Hispanic 0.550 0.329 0.153 0.082 0.029
Income $200,000+  (0%)
White 0.659 0.251 0.259 0.139 0.062
Black 0.462 0.147 0.304 0.019 0.066
Hispanic 0.631 0.328 0.143 0.128 0.066
Table 3.7: Probability of Female Attending Private School
With Horrible Public Schools by Income, Race, and School Type
Note: While all private school types are represented, they are not represented equally.  Over one-half of the sample attends 
Catholic schools.  Due to this large proportion of Catholic students in the sample, changes in the probability of attending a 
Catholic school have a greater impact on the probability of attending a private school overall than the remaining three 
private school types do.  Thus, the sum of the probabilitiy of attending each school type separately will not equal the 
probability of attending a private school, all-inclusive.  Assuming income is uniformly distributed through all eleven 
categories, the probability of moving up one level to a higher category is the dollar value of the voucher divided by the 
dollar range of the category.  These probabilities of moving up one cateogory are in parentheses in the table above, next to 
each income level.   Voucher amount is assumed to be five thousand dollars.
(continued)
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 Figure 3.5, parts a through d, depict these probability changes for each racial 
group over all eleven income categories.24  Figure 3.5a shows that Hispanic girls are the 
most likely to attend a Catholic school at all income levels.  The trend line for white girls 
follows closely along the Hispanic line, just lower.  African-American girls have a much 
lower probability of attending Catholic, yet the trend line does have a similar shape to 
those of Hispanic and white.  Figure 3.5b shows that, upon reaching an income level of 
thirty-five thousand to forty thousand dollars, African-American girls have the highest 
likelihood of attending Evangelical.  The Hispanic trend line is much lower.  Figure 3.5c 
illustrates that white and Hispanic girls follow a nearly identical trend line while the line 
for African-American girls is flat at a very low likelihood.  There is a tremendous spike 
in the probability of attending Protestant for white and Hispanic at a household income 
between thirty-five thousand and forty thousand dollars.  Figure 3.5d indicates that all 
three racial groups have the same probability pattern for attending Secular. 
The two simulations presented indicate that not all voucher recipients would 
attend the same type of school.  In particular, the differences appear to follow racial lines.  
I observe in both simulations that white and Hispanic, in different household and area 
environments, exhibit very similar predicted enrollment probabilities among varying 
school types.  The probability of attending a Protestant school increases the greatest 
magnitude in each simulation suggesting that white and Hispanic girls, displaying similar 
characteristics to featured households, will use a voucher to attend Protestant much more 
than the other three school types.  African-American girls, in both simulations, are more 
likely to attend Catholic or Secular schools because of a voucher.  Race does not appear 
to a distinguishing factor in Secular enrollment patterns resulting from an
                                                          
24 Due to the construction of these simulations, the peaks are the same for all simulations. 
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Figure 3.5a: Probability of Attending Catholic
Female Student, Horrible Public Schools
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Figure 3.5b: Probability of Attending Evangelical 
Female Student, Horrible Public Schools
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Figure 3.5d: Probability of Attending Nonsectarian 
Female Student, Horrible Public Schools
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
0
-
1
5
1
5
-
2
0
2
0
-
2
5
2
5
-
3
0
3
0
-
3
5
3
5
-
4
0
4
0
-
5
0
5
0
-
7
5
7
5
-
1
0
0
1
0
0
-
2
0
0
2
0
0
+
Income Level (in thousands)
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
Figure 3.5c: Probability of Attending Protestant 
Female Student, Horrible Public Schools
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increase in income since the trend lines for white, African-American, and Hispanic girls 
are superimposed.  Clearly, an increase in private school attendance does not translate to 
a uniform enrollment increase at all types of private schools. 
3.6 Conclusions 
While numerous papers have focused on the choice of schooling types for the 
high school grades, there have been only a handful of studies concentrating on this public 
or private choice on the elementary school echelon.  This paper seeks to contribute to this 
under researched area by focusing on the type of school a household selects to send their 
child to school for the first grade.  Choices by consumers at this level are particularly 
important in that they may condition decisions and outcomes throughout a child’s 
academic career.  The implication of this is that most secondary school choice studies are 
incomplete; the elementary schooling decision of the parents should be included for all 
secondary school choice analyses performed. 
This essay proceeds to break up the standard public or private taxonomy found in 
the literature and separate private schools into a more detailed typology.  After all, Other 
Religious and Secular categories for private schools encompass quite a range of private 
schools.  Using a 1999-2000 national dataset permits the separation of elementary 
schools at the national level into the following groupings: public, Catholic, Evangelical, 
Protestant, Secular schools.  Supplemental data including per capita adherents for various 
religious memberships and county level demographics are incorporated to assist in 
controlling for many population shift factors present in this demand for elementary 
education analysis.  
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I find kindergarten test performance, household income, and parental education 
levels are important factors in selecting a school.  Additionally, religiosity of households 
and denomination adherents are significant determinants.  The two simulations presented 
indicate that not all voucher recipients would attend the same type of school.  In 
particular, the differences appear to follow racial lines for religious schools.  I observe in 
both simulations that white and Hispanic, in different households and area environments, 
exhibit very similar predicted enrollment probabilities among varying school types.  
Evidence suggests that African-American girls respond differently to school selection 
than whites and Hispanics.  The predicted probabilities in the simulations demonstrate 
that households do not view all private schools as identical.  In particular, the probability 
patterns over a change in income are very different for Evangelical and Protestant school 
types.  Race does not appear to a distinguishing factor in Secular enrollment patterns 
resulting from an increase in income since the trend lines for white, African-American, 
and Hispanic girls are superimposed.  Clearly, an increase in private school attendance 
does not translate to a uniform enrollment increase at all types of private schools. 
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 Chapter Four:  
Academic Achievement of Private School Students:  
Do Private Schools Make Good Students or Do Good Students Make Private Schools? 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The choice-based market-driven approach employed by voucher programs forces 
underperforming schools to improve due to newfound competition from higher 
performing challengers (Hoxby 1994; Chubb and Moe 1990).  In metropolitan areas, a 
resident’s ability to relocate is cited as incentive for public schools to compete (Tiebout 
1956).  Some purport that these better performing schools are located in the private sector 
by reasoning that private schools are forced to be more efficient in their operations and 
instructional methods, which leads to better schools that yield higher levels of academic 
achievement for students (Bryk, Lee, and Holland 1993; Harris 2000; Hallinan 2000).  
Some studies have called for the incorporation of Catholic school curriculum into the 
public school system as part of the reform of education system in the United States 
(Bushweller 1997; Hudolin-Gabin 1994).  However, the foundation of these policies is 
the underlying assumption that private schools, not their students, are generating the 
higher test scores. 
While several works focus on various non-academic outcome measures associated 
with private school attendance such as sexual activity and drug use (Figlio and Ludwig 
2000; Mocan, Scafidi, and Tekin 2002) or teen pregnancy (Evans, Oates, and Schwab 
1992), most concentrate on academic-based results like graduation rates (Evans and 
Schwab 1995; Grogger and Neal 2000; Neal 1997; Coleman and Hoffer 1987), high 
school dropout rates (Sander and Krautmann 1995; Evans, Oates, and Schwab 1992), and 
college attendance rates (Grogger and Neal 2000; Neal 1997; Evans and Schwab 1995).  
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 Within this academic achievement arena, mathematics test scores are most common 
(Sander 1996; Gamoran 1996; Willms 1985; Kim and Placier 2004; Goldhaber 1996; 
Grogger and Neal 2000; Peterson and Llaudet 2006; Lubienski and Lubienski 2006; 
Bryk, Lee, and Holland 1993).  In addition to mathematics, studies have employed 
vocabulary, reading, social studies, civics, and science test results (Sander 1996; 
Gamoran 1996; Willms 1985; Noell 1982; Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore 1982; Kim and 
Placier 2004; Goldhaber 1996; Lee, Chow-Hoy, Burkam, Geverdt, and Smerdon 1998; 
Peterson and Llaudet 2006; Lubienski and Lubienski 2006). 
Results are mixed as to whether private schools yield a positive impact on student 
outcomes.  Specifically isolating test scores, many papers find positive gains for students 
attending private schools (Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore 1982; Coleman and Hoffer 
1987; Chubb and Moe 1990; Gamoran 1996; Bryk, Lee, and Holland 1993; Greeley 
2002; Grogger and Neal 2000; Peterson and Llaudet 2006; Keith and Page 1985) while 
critics argue that selection and omitted variable biases generate these observed positive 
effects for students rather than private school superiority (Noell 1982; Goldberger and 
Cain 1982; Murnane 1981; Murnane, Newstead, and Olsen 1985; Witte 1990; Witte 
1992; Cookson 1994; Evans, Oates, and Schwab 1992). 
The selection of a child’s peer group is endogenous with other household 
decisions, including school enrollment, such that single equation estimation overstates the 
peer group’s impact (Evans, Oates, and Schwab 1992).  Simultaneous estimation of a 
child’s peer group and an outcome measure eliminates the observed peer group effects 
present in single equation estimation (Evans, Oates, and Schwab 1992).  Thus, in order 
not to overstate estimates when using a simple single equation, it is imperative to control 
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 for unobservable characteristics (Evans, Oates, and Schwab 1992).  Furthermore, without 
controlling for initial student ability, it is impossible to view a positive impact on test 
scores as evidence of the benefit of private school attendance (Peterson and Llaudet 
2006). 
This essay seeks to address criticisms of previous studies by using test scores 
from a student’s entrance into kindergarten to control for his or her ability and a host of 
other unobservable characteristics.  By controlling for previous test scores, it is possible 
to disentangle the selection effect.  Table 4.1 provides test scores means by grade level 
and school type to address the causality of school type selection.  Since a child’s home 
environment strongly influences reading ability, research has focused attention to 
mathematics achievement in effort to capture more of a school’s contribution to a child’s 
education (Lubienski and Lubienski 2006; Figlio and Stone 1999; Bryk, Lee, and Holland 
1993; Heyneman 2005).  Following Gamoran (1996) and Kim and Placier (2004), I use 
multiple achievement tests in effort to ascertain a more comprehensive look at a child’s 
academic achievement.  For all three tests, scores are higher for private school students 
when they entered kindergarten in the fall.  Additionally, first grade test scores for all 
three subjects are higher for private schools.   
Kindergarten First Kindergarten First Kindergarten First
Overall 6.52 17.39 5.33 12.55 5.40 9.18
Public 6.18 17.18 5.06 12.40 5.11 9.01
Catholic 7.36 17.97 6.14 12.97 6.34 9.72
Evangelical 7.40 18.33 5.90 13.02 6.30 9.82
Protestant 8.55 18.58 7.13 13.64 6.80 9.74
Secular 10.28 18.46 7.11 13.25 6.76 10.01
Table 4.1: Test Means by Grade Level
Note:  The minimum score for each test is 0.  The maximum score for Reading, Math, and General 
Knowledge tests are twenty, sixteen, and twelve respectively.
Reading Math General Knowledge
School Type, First
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The public mean for each of the three fall kindergarten scores is over one point 
below any private school means.  Private school students, Secular and Protestant in 
particular, enter kindergarten at higher proficiency levels indicating that there is selection 
into the private sector.25, 26  Without these initial ability controls at the child’s entrance to 
kindergarten, it is impossible to look at the impact of private school enrollment has on 
test scores.  Studies that do not control for prior student ability cannot be regarded as 
justification in support of or opposition to the existence of a positive private school effect 
(Peterson and Llaudet 2006).  I seek to examine whether these higher first grade test 
scores are the result of selection into the private sector, which is better students enrolling 
in private schools, or preeminence of the private sector, which is private schools are 
better than public ones. 
I use data from the restricted use the Early Childhood Longitudinal Survey – 
Kindergarten cohort to gauge student performance in public and private schools.  Many 
papers use one particular national survey data, High School and Beyond (HSB), in which 
the students surveyed are now over forty years old (Grogger and Neal 2000).  
Furthermore, changes within the private sector precipitate the need to examine the effects 
of attending religious private schools rather than Catholic private schools alone (Chubb 
and Moe 1990; Gaziel 1997). 
These ECLS-K data are timely, reflecting recent compositional changes within 
the private school sector children, since the children attended kindergarten in Fall 1998 
through Spring 1999 and first grade in Fall 1999 through Spring 2000.  Catholic schools 
                                                          
25 See Appendix D for overall distribution of test scores, by test subject and grade level. 
26 Although public schools may be considered secular as well, through out this essay, secular refers to 
private secular schools only. 
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 no longer constitute the majority of religiously affiliated private schools (Sander 2005).  
At the same time, there has been an increase in private schools, especially conservative 
Christian private schools (Sander 2005).  Examining enrollment numbers for the 
schooling year on which this essay focuses using the Private School Survey data, while 
sixty-four percent of total elementary private students attended Catholic schools in 1999 
– 2000, only forty-eight percent of private first grade enrollment is Catholic.  Hence, 
studies focusing on Catholic schools as a proxy for all private education or all private 
religious education are missing important variances within the private school sector, 
especially at the elementary schooling grades. 
The data used in this essay present the opportunity to look at achievement 
differences very early in a child’s academic career.  A student’s academic achievement in 
the first grade predicts academic achievement in his or her junior year of high school 
(Cunningham and Stanovich 1997).  In addition, elementary school test performance is an 
indicator of labor market productivity (Bishop 1989; Loury and Garman 1995; Murnane, 
Willett, and Levy 1995). 
Findings indicate that first grade private school enrollment transforms below 
average achievers in kindergarten into better students in the first grade, relative to their 
low achieving peers.  Yet, private schools offer no significant benefit for first grade 
enrollment to high achieving kindergarten students.  Above average kindergarten students 
see an increase in their first grade reading scores by attending an Evangelical or Secular 
school for first grade.  High achieving kindergarten students, in many cases, experience a 
significant decrease in first grade achievement scores because of private school 
enrollment, especially Catholic school attendance. 
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 In the next section of this essay, I provide variable definitions and means 
describing these data.  The third section discusses the regression model I employ, 
presents results for all three first grade achievement tests, and connects the empirical 
work this chapter with Chapter Three’s work.  The final section offers several concluding 
remarks. 
4.2 Data 
The Kindergarten cohort of the Early Childhood Longitudinal Survey (ECLS-K) 
is a national data set, released by the National Center for Educational Statistics.  Coupling 
the Private School Survey’s (PSS) detailed religious affiliation data and Glenmary 
Research Center’s categorizations of all religious affiliations, private schools in ECLS-K 
are grouped as follows: Catholic, Evangelical or Fundamentalist Protestant (Evangelical), 
Mainline Protestant or Other Faiths (Protestant), and Secular schools.27, 28  I restrict my 
analysis to first grade students during the 1999-2000 academic year, which is the second 
wave of data collection.29 
Table 4.2 shows the number of children in each school type in kindergarten and 
first grade.  There are approximately eight thousand children in this estimation sample 
with over six thousand first grade students attending public schools.30  There are thirty 
students who changed from a Catholic to a public school in between kindergarten and 
first grade.  Ninety-five students switched from Secular to public in between kindergarten 
                                                          
27 Glenmary Research Center’s grouping of affiliations is consistent with the American Religion Data 
Archive’s taxonomy.  Refer to Appendix A for a detailed list of affiliations within each category. 
28 Additional details, including technical documentation, regarding the ECLS-K and PSS surveys are 
available from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). 
29 This analysis concentrates on regular elementary schools and children without disabilities.  All schools 
for the disabled and all children with mild to severe disabilities have been eliminated from the data for this 
essay. 
30 Since these data are nested, Tables E.1 and E.2 in Appendix E offer additional information regarding the 
number of students, schools, counties and states used in this essay. 
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 and first grade, which is the largest group of switchers in these data.  Overall, the 
majority of children remain enrolled in their kindergarten school type for first grade, as 
there are only two hundred sixty-five children who switch school types between 
kindergarten and first grade.31  
Public Catholic Other Religious Secular Total, by row
Public 6,090 30 20 5 6,145
Catholic 30 1,065 0 0 1,095
Other Religious 30 0 475 5 510
Secular 95 30 20 145 290
Total, by column 6,245 1,125 515 155 8,040
Source: Data are from the restricted use ECLS-K, 1999-2000.
Sample sizes are rounded to comply with NCES restricted use data reporting standards.
Sc
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School Type, First
Table 4.2: Observations by Grade and School Type
 
 
In effort to offer conservative estimates of any observed private school gains, I do 
not employ sample weights to achieve a nationally representative sample.  Consistent 
with Figlio and Stone (1999) and Goldhaber (1996), this essay does not employ sample 
weights to achieve a nationally representative sample.  Grogger and Neal (2000) note that 
using sample weights increases the size of estimated Catholic schooling benefits, in 
particular for minorities.  
 The outcome measures for this study are a child’s reading, mathematics, and 
general knowledge test scores, which were administered for each round of data 
                                                          
31 ECLS-K first grade follow up survey provides a unique PSS identification number for each private 
school, which allows the separation of other religious schools into Evangelical and Protestant 
classifications.  The ECLS-K base year survey does not contain these PSS numbers, but rather a 
nondescript identification number assigned to each school to distinguish one school from another one 
within the survey itself.  Without these PSS identification numbers for the kindergarten school attended, it 
is impossible to separate other religious private schools.  Thus, there are only three types of private schools 
for a child’s kindergarten enrollment: Catholic, Other Religious, and Secular. 
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 collection.32  I use the child’s spring first grade scores as achievement outcomes and the 
fall kindergarten scores as proxies for ability at entrance to kindergarten.  Table 4.3 
presents sample means for these data.33  
The equal split between genders holds in all school sectors except Secular private 
schools where the estimation sample is forty percent male and sixty percent female as 
shown in Table 4.3.  Over all school sectors, as well as in each school type individually, 
the majority of the sample is white.  Public schools and Secular private schools have the 
lowest white population at sixty-three percent.  Catholic has seventy-five percent white 
population while Evangelical and Protestant have the highest white population at eighty 
percent.  The public school portion of the sample is fourteen percent African-American 
while Catholic as well as Protestant equal four percent and two percent respectively.  
Within the private sector, Evangelical has the largest African-American student 
population at nearly ten percent as well as the smallest Hispanic student population at six 
percent.34   
There is a larger representation of only children attending Secular since sixty-nine 
percent have at least one sibling.  Evangelical is eighty-two percent and Protestant, 
Catholic, and Public are above eighty-five percent for children with at least one sibling.  
The highest proportion of bachelor’s degrees or more for educational attainment for the 
child’s mother and father occurs at sixty percent for both Protestant and Secular.  Public 
schools as well as Evangelical schools have the lowest proportion of parents possessing 
at least their bachelor’s degrees at twenty-five percent and thirty percent respectively. 
                                                          
32 Information regarding the subject matter for each of these three tests is provided in Appendix F.  Copies 
of the child assessment questionnaires are not provided by NCES. 
33 Appendix G provides correlations between test scores and school types for kindergarten and first grade. 
34 I acknowledge the disparity regarding the appropriate terminology when discussing racial and ethnic 
categories.  To maintain consistency with ELCS-K data, I employ the same racial and ethnic categories as 
used by ECLS-K. 
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grade schools do. 
                                                          
 Nearly fifty percent of Evangelical schools are located in the Midwest.  While the 
Northeast region is often considered the largest concentration of Catholic schools, this 
does not hold for my estimation sample.  Only one quarter of all Catholic schools are in 
Northeast while thirty-eight percent are found in Midwest and twenty percent in the West. 
Protestant and Secular are nearly one hundred percent located in urban or 
suburban areas.  Eighty-three percent of Catholic schools are found in urban or suburban 
areas while Evangelical has thirty-two percent of schools in rural areas or small towns. 
At the time of these first and second rounds of data collection for this survey, 
mandatory kindergarten attendance legislation was enacted in sixteen states and the 
District of Columbia.35  In this sample there are 1,915 students living in fifteen states 
who attended kindergarten, at least in part, as a result of this requirement.  Forty-one 
percent of students attending Protestant schools for first grade live in mandatory 
kindergarten states while only thirteen percent of students attending Evangelical or 
Secular first 
35 While most states have compulsory schooling laws based on a child’s age, mandatory kindergarten 
enrollment requirements are less common.  Refer to Appendix H for a list of these compulsory kindergarten 
states in 2000. 
 Variable Variable Description Overall Public Catholic Evangelical Protestant Secular
0.483 0.484 0.487 0.478 0.487 0.397
(0.500)
0.657 0.629 0.748 0.799 0.818 0.635
(0.475)
0.120 0.140 0.044 0.095 0.019 0.045
(0.325)
0.118 0.123 0.113 0.064 0.097 0.122
(0.323)
0.050 0.050 0.054 0.008 0.026 0.147
(0.218)
0.054 0.059 0.039 0.031 0.039 0.051
(0.226)
0.806 0.800 0.817 0.866 0.831 0.782
(0.396)
0.864 0.868 0.879 0.816 0.877 0.692
(0.343)
0.784 0.779 0.811 0.757 0.851 0.769
(0.412)
0.290 0.249 0.419 0.327 0.623 0.596
(0.454)
Equals one if student is Hispanic, 
zero otherwise
Equals one if student is Asian, zero 
otherwise
Child Reads
Siblings
Male
White
Black
Hispanic
Equals one if student is male, zero 
otherwise
Equals one if student is white, zero 
otherwise
Equals one if student is Black, zero 
otherwise
Parent Reads
Equals one if parent reads to student 
four or more times per week, zero 
otherwise
Equals one if student's father has 
Bachelor's degree or higher, zero 
otherwise
Father, BA
Table 4.3: Variable Descriptions and Means by Grade School Type
Equals one if student is Multiracial or 
Other race, zero otherwise
Equals one if student reads on own 
four or more times per week, zero 
otherwise
Equals one if student has at least one 
sibling, zero otherwise
Asian
Multiracial
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Variable Variable Description Overall Public Catholic Evangelical Protestant Secular
0.292 0.250 0.427 0.341 0.630 0.571
(0.455)
0.495 0.438 0.708 0.573 0.714 0.814
(0.500)
0.202 0.225 0.103 0.154 0.136 0.167
(0.401)
0.192 0.188 0.252 0.106 0.175 0.141
(0.394)
0.284 0.263 0.379 0.469 0.214 0.071
(0.451)
0.303 0.331 0.163 0.260 0.305 0.288
(0.459)
0.222 0.219 0.206 0.165 0.305 0.500
(0.415)
0.752 0.730 0.834 0.682 0.987 0.962
(0.432)
0.239 0.247 0.216 0.137 0.416 0.135
(0.426)
Source: Data are from the restricted use ECLS-K, 1999-2000.
Urban
Mandatory K State
Equals one if student lives in 
Northeast, zero otherwise
Equals one if student lives in 
Midwest, zero otherwise
Equals one if student lives in South, 
zero otherwise
Equals one if student lives in West, 
zero otherwise
Equals one if student lives in urban or 
suburban area, zero otherwise
Equals one if student lives in a 
mandatory kindergarten state, zero 
otherwise
Northeast
West
Equals one if annual household 
income is above $50,000, zero 
otherwise
Equals one if student lives in a single 
parent household, zero otherwise
Table 4.3: Variable Descriptions and Means by Grade School Type (continued)
Income, 50+
Single Parent
Equals one if student's mother has 
Bachelor's degree or higher, zero 
otherwise
Mother, BA
Note: Standard deviations for overall sample are in parentheses. Means and standard deviations are the unweighted
ECLS-K reporting samples.  They are not weighted to represent students and schools nationwide.
Midwest
South
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 4.3 Results 
First, I present a brief discussion of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
models used in this essay.  Next, separate subsections for each test subject highlight 
regression results of these models.  This section continues with a dialogue regarding the 
implications of these findings.  Lastly, a brief presentation of extensions of predicted  
first grade achievement on first grade school choice is provided. 
4.3.1 Model 
In this essay, I posit a classical linear regression model estimated by OLS where a 
child’s test score is a linear function of independent variables and an error term, where 
the error term has an expected value equal to zero and uniformly distributed variance.  
Thus,  
1t t tY Y Xβ δ ε−= + +           (4.1) 
such that a child’s first grade test score, represented by Yt, is dependent on his or her fall 
kindergarten test scores, Yt-1, and other child and household characteristics, Xt. 
 The first model includes two sets of dummy variables for school types a child 
attends.  One set of these dummy variables represents the private school options for 
kindergarten and the second set of dummy variables signifies the first grade private 
schooling alternatives.  The base cases for school type attended in kindergarten and first 
grade are pubic school enrollment.  In model (2), I regress first grade test scores on 
kindergarten scores to address initial ability as well as kindergarten and first grade school 
types.  The third model incorporates a series of interaction terms where the ranking of a 
child’s fall kindergarten test score performance, divided into quartiles, is multiplied by 
the first grade school type a child attends to investigate whether a child’s level of 
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 achievement in kindergarten and school type attended in first grade are important.36  
Finally, the fourth model adds other child characteristics and household traits into the 
regression to present the full model.37 
Next, first grade reading test regression results are presented followed by the 
estimations for the math and general knowledge first grade tests.  Discussions related to 
implications and extensions conclude this section. 
4.3.2 Reading Test 
 Table 4.4 presents the regression results for the first grade reading test where the 
model number is noted in parentheses at the top of each column.  The first model 
considers the impact of school types attended for kindergarten and first grade on spring 
first grade reading scores and finds that private school attendance for either grade level 
increases a child’s reading score for all school types and all grade levels, where these 
findings are significant for all school types and all grade levels except Secular, K and 
Catholic, First.  The constant term in model (1) reflects that a child attending public 
school for kindergarten and first grade earns an eighty-six percent, seventeen out of 
twenty points, on his or her reading test. 
Once fall kindergarten test scores are incorporated, as shown in column (2) of 
Table 4.4, the significance of school type attended, present in the first model, disappears.  
Attending a Secular school for kindergarten significantly reduces a child’s reading score 
                                                          
36 The four kindergarten test performance quartiles are: low, below average, above average, and high.  
Then, belonging to a certain performance quartile is interacted with a child’s first grade school type 
attended.  These interaction terms equal to one if a child’s kindergarten test performance falls within a 
given quartile and the child attended a certain first grade school type.  Appendix I provides additional 
information on the reading, math, and general knowledge test distributions for kindergarten and first grade.   
37 Difference-in-Differences was not estimated due to the small number of school type switchers.  First 
Difference estimations are provided in Table J.1 of Appendix J.  OLS regressions containing all variables 
except kindergarten test scores are provided in Table J.2 in Appendix J. 
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 by 0.8 points, which equates to a decrease of four percent in a child’s score since the 
reading test consists of twenty questions.  All three fall kindergarten test scores are 
positive and significant.  Fall Reading, K and Fall Math, K each increase a child’s 
reading score by 0.23 points while the fall kindergarten general knowledge test adds 0.09 
points.  By adding these initial controls, the constant term in model (2) shows that a child 
attending public school for kindergarten and first grade earns fourteen points out of 
twenty possible points on his or her first grade reading test.  The constant terms in models 
(3) and (4) remains at fourteen points. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Catholic, First 0.063 -0.055 0.311 0.147
(0.19) (0.22) (1.07) (0.48)
Evangelical, First 0.547 0.375 0.77 0.711
(1.67)* (1.45) (2.58)** (2.41)**
Protestant, First 0.826 0.151 0.771 0.592
(2.44)** (0.50) (2.16)** (1.69)*
Nonsectarian, First 1.065 0.503 0.138 -0.029
(2.03)** (1.33) (0.11) (0.02)
Catholic, K 0.769 0.247 0.254 0.27
(2.33)** (0.98) (1.01) (0.98)
Other Religious, K 0.645 0.21 0.184 0.172
(1.99)** (0.83) (0.79) (0.72)
Nonsectarian, K 0.219 -0.828 -0.845 -0.872
(0.44) (2.64)*** (2.73)*** (2.93)***
Fall Reading, K 0.222 0.24 0.215
(24.74)*** (24.00)*** (21.82)***
Fall Math, K 0.232 0.234 0.219
(18.66)*** (18.84)*** (17.72)***
Fall General, K 0.087 0.084 0.061
(7.01)*** (6.82)*** (5.39)***
Male -0.305
(5.92)***
Black -0.623
(4.96)***
Hispanic -0.172
(1.70)*
Asian 0.335
(2.84)***
Multiracial -0.098
(0.70)
Table 4.4: OLS Results for Spring Reading, First Grade
(Continued)
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Child Reads 0.826
(9.79)***
Siblings -0.058
(0.84)
Parent Reads -0.111
(1.63)
Father, BA 0.029
(0.46)
Mother, BA 0.081
(1.43)
Income, 50+ 0.103
(1.70)*
Single Parent -0.293
(3.47)***
Midwest -0.083
(0.82)
South 0.111
(0.96)
West 0.037
(0.34)
Urban 0.161
(1.76)*
Mandatory K, State -0.033
(0.33)
Constant 17.168 14.2 14.093 14.018
(250.50)*** (122.38)*** (115.36)*** (77.69)***
Observations 8040 8040 8040 8040  
R-squared 0.02 0.32 0.32 0.35
Source: Data are from the restricted use ECLS-K, 1999-2000.
*p<0.10 ; **p<0.05 ; ***p<0.01
Sample sizes are rounded to comply with NCES restricted use data reporting standards.
Table 4.4: OLS Results for Spring Reading, First Grade
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  Results for the interaction terms used in models 
(3) and (4) have been omitted from this table.  A complete version is available in Table 
I.3 of Appendix I.
(Continued)
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 The magnitude, significance, and sign for the three kindergarten test scores 
remain unchanged in the third and fourth models.  Enrollment in a Secular kindergarten 
school lowers a child’s first grade score by 0.85 points.  However, in order to accurately 
determine the impact of first grade private school attendance on a child’s first grade 
reading score in models (3) and (4), it is necessary to consider the interaction terms with 
each school type in addition to the coefficient for the school type dummy variable itself.  
Table 4.7 for model (3) and Table 4.8 for model (4) in Section 4.3.5 present these 
cumulative effects for the first grade reading test. 
 Looking specifically at the fourth model in Table 4.4 again, a boy’s first grade 
reading score is 0.3 points significantly lower than a girl’s score.  An African-American 
child’s score is lowered by 0.6 points compared to a white child whereas a child who is 
Asian experiences an increase of 0.34 points in his or her reading score.  The findings are 
significant for all minorities except Multiracial.  A child who reads to him- or herself 
sees a significant increase of 0.8 points while a child whose parents read to him or her 
experiences a decrease of 0.11 points, although this decline is insignificant.  Having a 
household income above fifty thousand dollars leads to a significant increase of 0.1 
points in a child’s reading score while living in a single parent household significantly 
lowers a child’s score by 0.29 points.  Living in a mandatory kindergarten state does not 
significantly affect a child’s first grade reading score. 
 Looking at the constant term in model (4), the incorporation of additional 
explanatory variables indicates that a child attending public school for both kindergarten 
and first grade answers fourteen out of twenty questions correctly.  Model (4) explains 
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 thirty-five percent of the variation while adding the kindergarten tests alone in model (2) 
explains thirty-two percent. 
4.3.3 Math Test 
Table 4.5 presents the regression results for the first grade math test in the same 
format as the reading test results.  In the first model, attending a Catholic school for 
kindergarten and a Protestant school for first grade are significant and increase a child’s 
math score of 0.76 points and 0.6 points respectively.  All remaining kindergarten and 
first grade school types are positive and insignificant.  When the ability controls are 
added in model (2), Secular, K significantly lowers a child’s math score by 0.4 points, 
which equates to a decrease of 2.5 percent since the math test consists of sixteen 
questions.  The kindergarten reading, math, and general knowledge tests are all highly 
significant for increasing a child’s math score, yet the magnitudes of their impacts are 
different.  Fall Reading, K provides an increase of 0.04 points while the general 
knowledge tests offers an increase of 0.17 points to a child’s math score.  Earning one 
additional point on his or her kindergarten math score increases a child’s first grade math 
score by 0.4 points.   
The magnitude, significance, and sign for the three kindergarten test scores 
remain unchanged in the model (3).  Attending a Secular kindergarten remains the same 
from the second to the third model, a decrease of 0.4 points when a child attends this 
school type.  The incorporation of child and household characteristics in model (4) 
diminishes the finding for Secular, K to a decrease in a child’s math score of 0.37 points.  
The magnitude, significance, and sign for the three kindergarten test scores remain 
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 unchanged in the fourth model except for a slight decrease in the impact of a child’s 
kindergarten general knowledge test on his or her first grade math score. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Catholic, First 0.01 -0.17 -0.15 -0.262
(0.03) (0.81) (0.62) (1.10)
Evangelical, First 0.164 -0.115 0.481 0.431
(0.50) (0.57) (1.51) (1.41)
Protestant, First 0.76 -0.054 -0.36 -0.535
(1.92)* (0.27) (0.85) (1.39)
Secular, First 0.366 -0.038 -0.042 -0.183
(0.77) (0.16) (0.07) (0.31)
Catholic, K 0.596 0.076 0.064 0.096
(1.93)* (0.36) (0.30) (0.44)
Other Religious, K 0.495 0.164 0.171 0.128
(1.51) (0.90) (0.95) (0.75)
Secular, K 0.519 -0.393 -0.404 -0.373
(1.21) (1.96)* (2.03)** (1.91)*
Fall Reading, K 0.04 0.039 0.036
(5.55)*** (5.33)*** (5.01)***
Fall Math, K 0.386 0.404 0.378
(38.72)*** (36.03)*** (35.94)***
Fall General, K 0.173 0.171 0.144
(15.30)*** (15.17)*** (14.06)***
Male 0.171
(3.73)***
Black -0.93
(9.58)***
Hispanic -0.205
(2.49)**
Asian 0.107
(1.07)
Multiracial -0.254
(2.35)**
Child Reads 0.213
(3.43)***
Siblings 0.143
(2.22)**
Parent Reads -0.189
(3.51)***
Father, BA 0.119
(2.30)**
Table 4.5: OLS Results for Spring Math, First Grade
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Mother, BA 0.153
(3.14)***
Income, 50+ 0.027
(0.52)
Single Parent 0.012
(0.19)
Midwest 0.202
(2.41)**
South 0.454
(4.83)***
West 0.231
(2.42)**
Urban 0.182
(2.51)**
Mandatory K, State -0.13
(1.77)*
Constant 12.385 9.312 9.246 9.027
(181.68)*** (100.62)*** (94.03)*** (60.82)***
Observations 8040 8040 8040 8040
R-squared 0.02 0.41 0.41 0.43
Source: Data are from the restricted use ECLS-K, 1999-2000.
*p<0.10 ; **p<0.05 ; ***p<0.01
Sample sizes are rounded to comply with NCES restricted use data reporting standards.
Table 4.5: OLS Results for Spring Math, First Grade
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  Results for the interaction terms used in models 
(3) and (4) have been omitted from this table.  A complete version is available in Table 
I.4 of Appendix I.
(continued)
 
In order to determine the impact of first grade private school attendance on a 
child’s first grade math score in models (3) and (4) accurately, it is necessary to consider 
the interaction terms with each school type in addition to the coefficient for the school 
type dummy variable itself.  Section 4.3.5 offers discussion of these cumulative effects 
for the math test for model (3) in Table 4.7 and for model (4) in Table 4.8. 
Looking specifically at the fourth model in Table 4.5 again, boys earn 0.17 points 
higher on their first grade math tests than girls do, which is significant.  An African-
American child experiences 0.93 points drop in his or her math score, which equates to a 
5.8 percent lower math score.  Hispanic and Multiracial earn 0.21 points and 0.25 points 
less, respectively.  When a child reads to him- or herself, he or she experiences an 
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 increase of 0.21 points.  This increase for Child Reads is matched by a nearly equal 
negative finding when a parent reads to a child.  Parent Reads shows a decrease of 0.19 
points in a child’s math score if a parent reads to the child.  Having siblings and college 
educated parents are significantly and positively related to a child’s first grade math 
score.  Living outside of the New England region results in an increase in the child’s 
math score.  Midwest, South, and West exhibit increases of 0.2 points, 0.5 points, and 0.2 
points respectively.  Living in an urban or suburban area leads to an increase of 0.18 
points in a child’s first grade math score.  
Mandatory K State shows a decrease of 0.13 points, both of which are significant.  
This finding for mandatory kindergarten programs is surprising since many presume 
mathematics is what schools teach.  Since a child’s home environment strongly 
influences reading ability, research has focused attention to mathematics achievement in 
effort to capture more of a school’s contribution to a child’s education (Lubienski and 
Lubienski 2006; Figlio and Stone 1999; Bryk, Lee, and Holland 1993; Heyneman 2005).  
This finding may indicate that mandatory kindergarten states have kindergarten programs 
with different emphases than non-mandatory kindergarten states. 
 Looking at the constant term in model (4), the incorporation of additional 
explanatory variables indicates that a child attending public school for both kindergarten 
and first grade answers nine out of sixteen questions correctly.  Model (4) explains forty-
three percent of the variation while adding the kindergarten tests alone in model (2) 
explains forty-one percent. 
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 4.3.4 General Knowledge Test 
 Table 4.6 provides the regression results for a child’s first grade general 
knowledge test.  In the first model, Catholic, K gives a significant increase of 0.7 points 
and attending an Evangelical school for first grade increases a child’s score by 0.6 points.  
Evangelical, First is the only first grade level private school that significantly affects a 
child’s score.  Upon adding a child’s fall kindergarten test scores, the significance of all 
school types at both grade levels disappears.  Only the three initial control measures 
significantly increase a child’s first grade general knowledge score.  The kindergarten 
reading score has a positive and significant, yet small effect of on a child’s general 
knowledge test score of an increase of 0.02 points.  A child’s kindergarten math score has 
a significant and positive impact of 0.11 points while a child’s kindergarten general 
knowledge score increases a child’s first grade general knowledge score by 0.4 points. 
 Once the kindergarten score and first grade school type interactions are added in 
model (3), accurately determining the impact of first grade private school attendance on a 
child’s first grade general knowledge score in models (3) and (4) requires considering the 
interaction terms with each school type in addition to the coefficient for the school type 
dummy variable itself.  I discuss these cumulative effects for the general knowledge test, 
provided in Table 4.7 for model (3) and Table 4.8 for model (4), in Section 4.3.5. 
 Looking specifically at the fourth model in Table 4.6 again, Male has a small, yet 
significant increase of 0.1 points on a child’s general knowledge score.  All minorities 
score significantly lower than whites do.  African-American students experience the 
largest decrease at 0.7 points while Hispanics and Asian students see a decrease of 0.4 
points in test scores.  Multiracial has the smallest decrease in test score at 0.3 points.  A 
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 child who reads to him- or herself increases his or her test score by 0.14 points.  Having 
siblings reduces a child’s test score by 0.24 points.  A child of a college educated mother 
has an increase of 0.1 points in test score.  Income, 50+ leads to a significant increase of 
0.08 points while living in a single parent household results in a decrease of 0.17 points 
in a child’s first grade general knowledge test score.  Living in the Midwest, relative to 
the northeast, significantly increases a child’s score by 0.16 points.  Living in a 
mandatory kindergarten state does not significantly affect a child’s first grade general 
knowledge score. 
 Model (1) only explains two percent of the variation.  The second model adds 
three kindergarten test scores and increases its explanatory power to forty-six percent.  
Including child and household characteristics in the fourth model increases R-squared to 
forty-eight percent.   
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Catholic, First 0.043 -0.221 0.012 -0.128
(0.18) (1.29) (0.06) (0.58)
Evangelical, First 0.602 0.126 0.517 0.453
(1.77)* (0.44) (1.31) (1.07)
Protestant, First 0.466 -0.319 -0.204 -0.403
(1.24) (1.16) (0.45) (0.90)
Secular, First 0.405 0.07 -0.27 -0.293
(0.88) (0.31) (0.53) (0.60)
Catholic, K 0.699 0.283 0.315 0.302
(2.93)*** (1.63) (1.80)* (1.69)*
Other Religious, K 0.232 0.069 0.049 0.008
(0.71) (0.26) (0.18) (0.03)
Secular, K 0.646 -0.098 -0.098 -0.124
(1.51) (0.47) (0.48) (0.61)
Fall Reading, K 0.023 0.022 0.027
(3.62)*** (3.40)*** (4.13)***
Fall Math, K 0.114 0.114 0.095
(12.82)*** (12.94)*** (11.13)***
Fall General, K 0.419 0.439 0.393
(43.49)*** (39.64)*** (41.77)***
Table 4.6: OLS Results for Spring General Knowledge, First Grade
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male 0.099
(2.74)***
Black -0.696
(7.58)***
Hispanic -0.424
(6.13)***
Asian -0.469
(4.21)***
Multiracial -0.29
(2.82)***
Child Reads 0.138
(2.42)**
Siblings -0.241
(4.85)***
Parent Reads -0.005
(0.10)
Father, BA 0.026
(0.59)
Mother, BA 0.096
(2.41)**
Income, 50+ 0.084
(1.84)*
Single Parent -0.168
(3.02)***
Midwest 0.155
(2.35)**
South 0.044
(0.58)
West 0.033
(0.43)
Urban 0.006
(0.10)
Mandatory K, State 0.037
(0.57)
Constant 8.999 6.156 6.058 6.498
(129.95)*** (68.75)*** (63.49)*** (53.81)***
Observations 8040 8040 8040 8040
R-squared 0.02 0.46 0.46 0.48
Source: Data are from the restricted use ECLS-K, 1999-2000.
*p<0.10 ; **p<0.05 ; ***p<0.01
Table 4.6: OLS Results for Spring General Knowledge, First Grade
Sample sizes are rounded to comply with NCES restricted use data reporting standards.
(continued)
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  Results for the interaction terms used in models 
(3) and (4) have been omitted from this table.  A complete version is available in Table 
I.5 of Appendix I.
 
 118
 4.3.5 Implications 
In order to determine the impact of first grade private school attendance on a 
child’s first grade math score in models (3) and (4) accurately, it is necessary to consider 
the interaction terms with each school type in addition to the coefficient for the school 
type dummy variable itself.  These cumulative effects for first grade private school 
attendance are presented here.  The reference individual in each of these scenarios 
attended public school for kindergarten and first grade.   
Table 4.7 offers a summary of the impact that school type attended in first grade 
has on first grade reading, math, and general knowledge tests for the third model 
specification used for the three tests.  In particular, a student with a high kindergarten 
achievement level for reading, math, or general knowledge improves his or her first grade 
test score by not attending a private school for first grade, compared to low achievers on 
these kindergarten tests.  This finding is significant for all three first grade tests for a high 
kindergarten achiever who attends a Catholic school for first grade.  Table 4.8 provides 
the same information for the fourth model specification employed for the three tests.  
Using model (4) coefficients, kindergarten high achievers, compared to low achievers, for 
all three tests score significantly lower on their first grade tests when they attend a 
Catholic school for first grade.  Although only significant for math and general 
knowledge tests, this finding holds for Evangelical, First as well. 
As shown in Table 4.7, a child scoring below average on his or her kindergarten 
reading test, who attends any type of private school for first grade, increases his or her 
first grade reading test score while this result is only significant for attending a Protestant 
school for first grade.  A child scoring above average on his or her kindergarten reading 
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 test, who attends any type of private school, increases his or her first grade reading test 
score while this result is only significant for attending an Evangelical or Secular school 
for first grade.  In particular, attending Secular, First increases an above average 
achieving child’s score by 1.22 points.  A high achiever on the kindergarten reading test 
who attends a Catholic school for first grade significantly lowers his or her first grade 
reading score by 0.7 points.  Although insignificant, this negative relationship holds for a 
high achieving kindergarten reading test student attending Evangelical, First or 
Protestant, First. 
Reading Math General Knowledge
Below Average 0.01 0.05 0.06
Above Average 0.13 0.05 -0.26
High -0.69*** -0.54** -0.78***
Below Average 0.43 0.02 0.37
Above Average 0.78*** -0.30 0.20
High -0.30 -0.59*** -0.52*
Below Average 0.87** 0.02 -0.11
Above Average 0.02 0.16 -0.23
High -0.32 -0.22 -0.65**
Below Average 0.73 0.22 0.77***
Above Average 1.22*** -0.01 0.29
High 0.15 -0.21 -0.47**
*p<0.10 ; **p<0.05 ; ***p<0.01
Catholic
Evangelical
Protestant
Secular
School Type, First Achievement Level, K Test First Grade Test
Table 4.7: Impact of First Grade School Type on First Grade
Test when Kindergarten Test Performance is Considered,
Using Model (3) Results
 
A high achiever on the kindergarten math test who attends a Catholic or 
Evangelical school in first grade experiences a significant decrease of 0.5 points and 0.6 
points respectively in his or her first grade math score, compared to a low achieving 
student.  Although insignificant, this negative relationship holds for a high achieving 
kindergarten math test student attending a Protestant or Secular school for the first grade. 
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  A high achieving student on the kindergarten general knowledge test, attending 
any private school in the first grade, experiences a significant decrease in his or her first 
grade general knowledge test score relative to low achievers on the kindergarten test.  For 
Catholic, First a high kindergarten achiever lowers his or his first grade score by 0.78 
points while this reduction in first grade score equals 0.65 points for Protestant, First.  
When a student attending a Secular school for first grade also scores below average 
compared to low achievers on the kindergarten general knowledge test, then he or she 
receives a significant increase in his or her first grade test score of 0.77 points. 
As shown in Table 4.8, a child scoring below average on his or her kindergarten 
reading test compared to low achievers, who attends an Evangelical, Protestant, or 
Secular private school, increases his or her first grade reading test score.  However, this 
result is only significant for attending a Protestant school.  A child scoring above average 
on his or her kindergarten reading test increases his or her first grade reading test score by 
attending any type of private school for first grade except Protestant.  In particular, 
attending Secular, First significantly increases a child’s score one point while 
Evangelical, First shows an increase of 0.66 points.  A high achiever on the kindergarten 
reading test who attends a Catholic school for first grade significantly lowers his or her 
first grade reading score by 0.66 points.  Although insignificant, this negative relationship 
holds for a high achieving kindergarten reading test student attending Evangelical, First 
or Protestant, First. 
A high achiever on the kindergarten math test who attends a Catholic or 
Evangelical school in first grade experiences a significant decrease of 0.6 points and 0.5 
points respectively in his or her first grade math score, compared to a low achieving 
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 student.  Although insignificant, this negative relationship holds for a high achieving 
kindergarten math test student attending a Protestant or Secular school for the first grade. 
Reading Math General Knowledge
Below Average -0.12 -0.06 -0.07
Above Average 0.02 -0.04 -0.33*
High -0.66** -0.59*** -0.74***
Below Average 0.33 -0.08 0.23
Above Average 0.66** -0.24 0.14
High -0.15 -0.50** -0.50*
Below Average 0.88** -0.11 -0.18
Above Average -0.19 0.02 -0.31
High -0.31 -0.28 -0.59*
Below Average 0.67 0.13 0.65**
Above Average 1.05** -0.15 0.28
High 0.11 -0.37 -0.35
*p<0.10 ; **p<0.05 ; ***p<0.01
Achievement Level, K Test First Grade Test
Table 4.8: Impact of First Grade School Type on First Grade Test
when Kindergarten Test Performance is Considered, Using Model (4) Results
Evangelical
Protestant
Secular
School Type, First
Catholic
 
 
 A high achieving student on the kindergarten general knowledge test, attending 
any private school in the first grade, experiences a decrease in his or her first grade 
general knowledge test score relative to low achievers on the kindergarten test.  This 
result is significant for all private schools except Secular.  For Catholic, First a high 
kindergarten achiever lowers his or his first grade score by 0.74 points while this 
reduction in first grade score equals 0.59 points for Protestant, First.  When a student 
attending a Secular school for first grade also scores below average compared to low 
achievers on the kindergarten general knowledge test, then he or she receives a 
significant increase in his or her first grade test score of 0.65 points. 
 One significant finding holds Catholic first grade enrollment across all three first 
grade tests for both models (3) and (4).  If a child is a high achiever in kindergarten, then 
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 he or she earns higher first grade test scores by not attending a Catholic school for first 
grade, relative to low kindergarten achievers.  Catholic first grade programs appear to 
focus on basic skills that aid lower performing kindergarten students.  Thus, high 
achieving kindergarten students lose focus and interest in first grade material, which 
lowers their first grade test scores in comparison to low kindergarten achievers.  A 
second possible explanation for this is that earning a low achievement level on the 
kindergarten tests captures a child’s difficulty in adjusting to school.  Therefore, by the 
time of the first grade tests, these low performing students are well acclimated to school 
and able to demonstrate true high achieving abilities. 
4.3.6 Extensions 
For this portion of Section 4.3, I connect the two empirical chapters of my paper 
together.  I include the predicted first grade test scores from this fourth chapter into the 
school choice model used in the third chapter to investigate whether parents factor their 
children’s anticipated performance in first grade into their decision making processes.  
Table 4.9 presents the results of this re-estimation of the school choice decision.  The 
smaller sample size of 7,755 observations for this estimation is the result of performing 
separate, distinct extractions for data used in each chapter.  This sample size represents 
the number of observations the two datasets share in common.38   
A second difference in Table 4.9 is the exclusion of models D and E, as featured 
in Table 3.5.  These models were omitted due to computation difficulties associated with 
multinomial probit estimations of four and five schooling alternatives.  Model A in Table 
4.9 corresponds to model A in Table 3.4 with the only differences being the additional 
three predicted first grade test scores.  The same relationship among tables holds for the 
                                                          
38 For variable means for this smaller estimation sample, please see Appendix K.   
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model B specifications in Table 4.9 and Table 3.4 as well as the model C specifications in 
Table 4.9 and Table 3.5. 
In model A of Table 4.9, a boy is thirty-three percent more likely than a girl to 
attend a private school, which is significant.  A child who is a minority is significantly 
less likely to attend a private school.  Specifically, an African-American child is nearly 
thirty percent less likely to attend a private school compared to a child who is white.     
A child’s fall kindergarten test scores are all significant.  Answering one 
additional question correctly on the reading test leads to a nearly four percent decrease in 
the likelihood of attending a private school in first grade.  Answer one additional question 
correctly on the math and general knowledge tests increases a child’s probability by 
twenty-six percent and twenty-two percent respectively.   
The three predicted first grade test scores are all highly significant.  A higher 
predicted first grade reading test score increases the probability a child attends a private 
school by forty-three percent whereas a higher predicted math or general knowledge 
score decreases a child’s likelihood of attending private by ninety-four percent and 
twenty-nine percent respectively.  These results suggest that parents do consider their 
children’s expected academic performances in first grade when selecting schools.  In 
particular, reading achievement is considered differently than math and general 
knowledge performance. 
 Model A Model B
Coefficient
(Z-Score)
[Marginal Effect]
(Z-Score)
Coefficient
(Z-Score)
[Marginal Effect]
(Z-Score)
All Private Catholic Catholic Non-Catholic
Male 1.341 1.577 1.708 1.924
(17.66)*** (15.47)*** (16.34)*** (15.30)***
[0.334] [0.2771] [0.191] [0.130]
(15.57)*** (11.06)*** (9.27)*** (8.31)***
Black -3.718 -5.160 -5.306 -4.442
(-12.63)*** (-17.19)*** (-15.45)*** (-8.24)***
[-0.296] [-0.2405] [-0.192] [-0.086]
(-14.26)*** (-11.36)*** (-9.82)*** (-6.88)***
Hispanic -1.013 -1.355 -1.227 -1.534
(-7.41)*** (-8.99)*** (-6.90)*** (-6.22)***
[-0.163] [-0.1112] [-0.093] [-0.056]
(-10.14)*** (-8.76)*** (-7.27)*** (-6.63)***
Asian -0.925 -0.956 -0.929 -1.692
(-4.91)*** (-4.38)*** (-3.85)*** (-4.52)***
[-0.142] [-0.0838] [-0.072] [-0.051]
(-8.10)*** (-6.99)*** (-4.87)*** (-6.71)***
Multiracial -1.181 -1.633 -1.614 -1.534
(-8.37)*** (-9.25)*** (-7.70)*** (-6.69)***
[-0.158] [-0.0989] [-0.098] [-0.048]
(-12.04)*** (-8.56)*** (-8.40)*** (-6.98)***
Fall Reading, K -0.155 -0.123 -0.165 -0.281
(-6.84)*** (-4.43)*** (-5.53)*** (-6.16)***
[-0.038] [-0.0196] [-0.017] [-0.019]
(-6.72)*** (-4.35)*** [-4.450] [-5.090]
Spring Reading, K 0.010 0.009 0.01 0.02
(1.01) (0.73) (0.60) (1.18)
[0.003] [0.0015] [0.001] [0.001]
(1.01) (0.73) (0.47) (1.09)
Fall Math, K 1.081 1.532 1.558 1.284
(13.01)*** (19.35)*** (18.33)*** (8.50)***
[0.265] [0.2447] [0.181] [0.074]
(12.20)*** (11.27)*** (10.06)*** (5.78)***
Spring Math, K 0.017 0.005 0.017 0.036
(1.53) (0.35) (1.00) (1.73)*
[0.004] [0.0007] [0.002] [0.002]
(1.53) (0.35) (0.77) (1.60)
Fall General, K 0.912 1.304 1.223 1.206
(9.90)*** (11.74)*** (11.83)*** (7.59)***
[0.224] [0.2083] [0.139] [0.073]
(9.45)*** (9.14)*** (8.28)*** (5.59)***
Model C
Table 4.9: Chapter Three School Choice Estimates Including
Predicted First Grade Test Scores
Coefficient
(Z-Score)
[Marginal Effect]
(Z-Score)
Variable
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 Model A Model B
Coefficient
(Z-Score)
[Marginal Effect]
(Z-Score)
Coefficient
(Z-Score)
[Marginal Effect]
(Z-Score)
All Private Catholic Catholic Non-Catholic
Spring General, K -0.011 -0.005 -0.012 -0.016
(-0.85) (-0.36) (-0.61) (-0.72)
[-0.0027] [-0.0009] [-0.001] [-0.001]
(-0.84) (-0.36) (-0.53) (-0.64)
Reading, First - 1.768 1.809 2.052 2.871
 Predicted (15.99)*** (11.89)*** (13.83)*** (13.29)***
[0.434] [0.2889] [0.221] [0.188]
(13.61)*** (9.12)*** (8.52)*** (7.97)***
Math, First - -3.826 -4.813 -5.202 -5.029
 Predicted (-17.66)*** (-20.22)*** (-20.66)*** (-13.16)***
[-0.939] [-0.7686] [-0.593] [-0.305]
(-15.10)*** (-11.25)*** (-10.22)*** (-7.60)***
General Knowledge, -1.190 -1.849 -1.503 -1.697
First - Predicted (-5.39)*** (-7.04)*** (-6.19)*** (-4.13)***
[-0.292] [-0.2953] [-0.168] [-0.107]
(-5.33)*** (-6.44)*** (-5.29)*** (-3.46)***
Siblings 0.025 0.026 0.059 -0.013
(1.11) (1.09) (1.83)* (-0.28)
[0.006] [0.0041] [0.008] [-0.002]
(1.11) (1.09) (1.92)* (-0.55)
Mother, 0.181 0.191 0.318 0.142
High School (1.83)* (1.61) (2.03)** (0.72)
[0.046] [0.0324] [0.041] [0.006]
(1.76)* (1.53) (1.85)* (0.38)
Mother, 0.396 0.341 0.552 0.508
Some College (3.98)*** (2.79)*** (3.44)*** (2.72)***
[0.103] [0.0586] [0.068] [0.032]
(3.72)*** (2.56)*** (2.84)*** (1.92)*
Mother, BA 0.995 1.195 1.423 1.195
(8.71)*** (8.66)*** (8.03)*** (5.92)***
[0.303] [0.2867] [0.216] [0.084]
(7.55)*** (6.49)*** (5.43)*** (3.11)***
Mother, 0.904 0.958 1.106 1.345
Advanced (6.96)*** (6.27)*** (5.52)*** (5.85)***
[0.295] [0.2448] [0.151] [0.138]
(5.92)*** (4.61)*** (3.28)*** (3.09)***
Father, 0.248 0.158 0.26 0.401
High School (2.38)** (1.42) (1.70)* (2.06)**
[0.065] [0.0267] [0.028] [0.030]
(2.23)** (1.34) (1.33) (1.63)
Model C
Table 4.9: Chapter Three School Choice Estimates Including
Predicted First Grade Test Scores (continued)
Coefficient
(Z-Score)
[Marginal Effect]
(Z-Score)
Variable
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 Model A Model B
Coefficient
(Z-Score)
[Marginal Effect]
(Z-Score)
Coefficient
(Z-Score)
[Marginal Effect]
(Z-Score)
All Private Catholic Catholic Non-Catholic
Father, 0.201 0.174 0.269 0.219
Some College (1.91)* (1.44) (1.65)* (1.17)
[0.052] [0.0295] [0.033] [0.013]
(1.82)* (1.37) (1.45) (0.86)
Father, BA 0.655 0.729 0.848 0.904
(5.64)*** (5.55)*** (4.93)*** (4.28)***
[0.192] [0.1562] [0.113] [0.071]
(4.95)*** (4.39)*** (3.53)*** (2.68)***
Father, 0.630 0.656 0.731 0.998
Advanced (4.96)*** (4.74)*** (3.98)*** (4.24)***
[0.190] [0.1453] [0.090] [0.094]
(4.30)*** (3.74)*** (2.66)*** (2.63)***
Religiosity, Head 0.292 0.325 0.494 0.177
(5.16)*** (5.29)*** (5.95)*** (1.77)*
[0.074] [0.0544] [0.063] [0.006]
(4.81)*** (4.51)*** (5.06)*** (0.78)
Religiosity, Spouse 0.188 0.135 0.207 0.346
(3.08)*** (2.03)** (2.28)** (3.19)***
[0.048] [0.0225] [0.022] [0.025]
(2.92)*** (1.92)* (1.78)* (2.53)**
Single Parent 0.753 0.511 0.789 1.308
(6.50)*** (4.04)*** (4.67)*** (6.82)***
[0.223] [0.0993] [0.085] [0.131]
(5.63)*** (3.36)*** (2.97)*** (4.25)***
Midwest 1.218 1.409 1.438 1.994
(5.82)*** (5.91)*** (4.60)*** (4.93)***
[0.361] [0.3234] [0.168] [0.196]
(5.24)*** (4.62)*** (2.85)*** (2.98)***
South 1.103 1.267 1.201 1.93
(4.14)*** (4.14)*** (2.96)*** (3.84)***
[0.319] [0.2742] [0.127] [0.192]
(3.72)*** (3.23)*** (1.84)* (2.42)**
West 0.609 0.672 0.537 1.408
(2.10)** (2.09)** (1.23) (2.52)**
[0.174] [0.1382] [0.040] [0.156]
(1.85)* (1.67)* (0.63) (1.71)*
Urban 0.603 0.832 0.966 0.533
(3.23)*** (3.73)*** (3.19)*** (1.71)*
[0.126] [0.1016] [0.093] [0.025]
(3.87)*** (4.72)*** (3.78)*** (1.39)
Model C
Table 4.9: Chapter Three School Choice Estimates Including
Predicted First Grade Test Scores (continued)
Coefficient
(Z-Score)
[Marginal Effect]
(Z-Score)
Variable
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 Model A Model B
Coefficient
(Z-Score)
[Marginal Effect]
(Z-Score)
Coefficient
(Z-Score)
[Marginal Effect]
(Z-Score)
All Private Catholic Catholic Non-Catholic
Income, 15-20 0.117 0.022 0.078 0.326
(0.73) (0.12) (0.33) (0.93)
[0.030] [0.0035] [0.004] [0.028]
(0.70) (0.12) (0.14) (0.77)
Income, 20-25 0.160 -0.098 -0.037 0.548
(0.96) (-0.52) (-0.15) (1.68)*
[0.042] [-0.0147] [-0.015] [0.057]
(0.90) (-0.55) (-0.52) (1.34)
Income, 25-30 0.509 0.390 0.554 0.891
(3.70)*** (2.30)** (2.49)** (3.40)***
[0.151] [0.0770] [0.062] [0.087]
(3.17)*** (1.90)* (1.58) (2.13)**
Income, 30-35 0.574 0.357 0.6 1.016
(4.27)*** (2.18)** (2.81)*** (3.89)***
[0.174] [0.0698] [0.065] [0.107]
(3.61)*** (1.81)* (1.68)* (2.33)**
Income, 35-40 0.596 0.433 0.653 1.053
(4.29)*** (2.45)** (2.85)*** (4.12)***
[0.181] [0.0875] [0.073] [0.109]
(3.64)*** (1.99)** (1.75)* (2.49)**
Income, 40-50 0.829 0.658 0.995 1.306
(6.38)*** (4.34)*** (4.99)*** (5.01)***
[0.261] [0.1441] [0.127] [0.132]
(5.35)*** (3.30)*** (3.00)*** (2.77)***
Income, 50-75 0.951 0.947 1.282 1.251
(6.98)*** (5.66)*** (5.93)*** (4.70)***
[0.288] [0.2110] [0.183] [0.098]
(5.96)*** (4.26)*** (3.92)*** (2.58)***
Income, 75-100 0.922 0.878 1.256 1.203
(6.64)*** (5.31)*** (5.77)*** (4.37)***
[0.292] [0.2062] [0.189] [0.098]
(5.59)*** (3.91)*** (3.71)*** (2.26)**
Income, 100-200 0.969 0.904 1.283 1.313
(6.28)*** (4.70)*** (5.13)*** (4.72)***
[0.314] [0.2199] [0.192] [0.117]
(5.33)*** (3.47)*** (3.23)*** (2.41)**
Income, 200+ 1.082 0.869 1.298 1.625
(6.00)*** (4.20)*** (4.64)*** (4.87)***
[0.370] [0.2208] [0.178] [0.187]
(5.19)*** (3.05)*** (2.53)** (2.45)**
Model C
Table 4.9: Chapter Three School Choice Estimates Including
Predicted First Grade Test Scores (continued)
Coefficient
(Z-Score)
[Marginal Effect]
(Z-Score)
Variable
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 Model A Model B
Coefficient
(Z-Score)
[Marginal Effect]
(Z-Score)
Coefficient
(Z-Score)
[Marginal Effect]
(Z-Score)
All Private Catholic Catholic Non-Catholic
House Value, 0.0000023 0.0000028 0.0000045 0.0000011
 County a (1.33) (1.36) (1.51) (0.46)
[0.0000006] [0.00000045] [0.00000056] [0.00000002]
(1.33) (1.38) (1.53) (0.09)
Income, County a -0.000018 -0.000025 -0.0000393 0.00000494
(-1.56) (-1.73)* (-1.98)** (0.30)
[-0.0000044] [-0.0000039] [-0.0000051] [0.0000010]
(-1.57) (-1.76)* (-2.10)** (0.82)
White, County a -0.380 -0.688 -0.881 1.033
(-0.66) (-1.15) (-1.04) (0.69)
[-0.093] [-0.1098] [-0.128] [0.092]
(-0.65) (-1.14) (-1.19) (0.82)
Catholic, County b 1.017 0.979 1.381 1.171
(1.65)* (1.44) (1.52) (0.98)
[0.250] [0.1563] [0.160] [0.068]
(1.65)* (1.43) (1.40) (0.77)
Evangelical, 0.989 1.086 1.196 1.634
 County b (1.31) (1.26) (1.00) (1.26)
[0.243] [0.1735] [0.129] [0.106]
(1.31) (1.25) (0.85) (1.11)
Protestant, 0.053 -0.403 -0.723 1.149
 County b (0.08) (-0.53) (-0.66) (1.05)
[0.013] [-0.0643] [-0.110] [0.098]
(0.08) (-0.53) (-0.79) (1.20)
Student-Teacher, 0.026 0.034 0.05 0.005
Public a (1.78)* (1.90)* (1.89)* (0.24)
[0.006] [0.0055] [0.0063] [-0.0003]
(1.77)* (1.91)* (1.91)* (-0.21)
Black, Public a -0.0006 -0.0019 -0.002 0.008
(-0.10) (-0.30) (-0.27) (0.63)
[-0.00015] [-0.00031] [-0.00043] [0.00065]
(-0.10) (-0.30) (-0.38) (0.68)
Hispanic, Public a -0.003 -0.009 -0.014 0.017
(-0.49) (-1.16) (-1.26) (1.04)
[-0.0008] [-0.0014] [-0.0020] [0.0015]
(-0.49) (-1.16) (-1.46) (1.24)
Model C
Table 4.9: Chapter Three School Choice Estimates Including
Predicted First Grade Test Scores (continued)
Coefficient
(Z-Score)
[Marginal Effect]
(Z-Score)
Variable
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 Model A Model B
Coefficient
(Z-Score)
[Marginal Effect]
(Z-Score)
Coefficient
(Z-Score)
[Marginal Effect]
(Z-Score)
All Private Catholic Catholic Non-Catholic
Free Lunch a 0.0041 0.0029 0.002 0.014
(0.80) (0.50) (0.22) (1.56)
[0.0010] [0.00046] [0.000021] [0.0010]
(0.80) (0.50) (0.02) (1.59)
Constant 14.191 27.464 24.495 7.767
(5.66)*** (12.96)*** (9.88)*** (1.52)
Observations 7755 7100
Log Likelihood -2746.4282 -1947.4749
Wald chi2(50) 1173.22 1029.94
Pseudo R2 0.3398 0.3666
Source: Unless otherwise indicated, data are from the restricted use ECLS-K, 1999-2000.
Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses
*p<0.10 ; **p<0.05 ; ***p<0.01
Sample sizes are rounded to comply with NCES restricted use data reporting standards.
a 
denotes Census 2000 data
b  denotes Glenmary Research Center's 2000 Religious Congregations & Membership Data
Model C
7755
Table 4.9: Chapter Three School Choice Estimates Including
Predicted First Grade Test Scores (continued)
-3728.0048
1747.4
Coefficient
(Z-Score)
[Marginal Effect]
(Z-Score)
Variable
 
 
 Parent educational attainment and religiosity of household are positive and 
significant factors in the probability of attending a private school.  Household income 
categories in the range of twenty-five thousand dollars and higher are also positive and 
significant.  When the Catholic adherents in the county increases by one percent, a child’s 
probability of attending a private school is twenty-five percent.  The only county-level 
public school characteristic measure that is significant is the student teacher ratio.  When 
the average class size in public schools increases, then a child’s likelihood of attending 
private school increases also.  Specifically, an increase in class size of ten students leads 
to an increase of six percentage points in attending private. 
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  Many of the variables maintain the same sign and significance in model B, which 
is the probability of attending a Catholic school compared to a public school.  A male 
child experiences a positive probability of attending a Catholic school compared to a girl.  
A boy is twenty-eight percentage points more likely to attend a Catholic school than a 
girl.  Minorities are less likely to attend Catholic schools.  Hispanic, Asian, and 
multiracial children all experience a ten percentage point decrease in the probability of 
attending Catholic while an African-American child sees a decrease of twenty-four 
percentage points.  All three of the fall kindergarten test scores are significant.  An 
additional point on a child’s kindergarten reading test reduces his or her likelihood of 
attending a Catholic school by two percent.  An additional point on the math or general 
knowledge kindergarten tests increases a child’s probability by twenty-four percent and 
twenty-one percent respectively. 
The three predicted first grade test scores are all highly significant.  A higher 
predicted first grade reading test score increases the probability a child attends a Catholic 
school by twenty-nine percent whereas a higher predicted math or general knowledge 
score decreases a child’s likelihood of attending private by seventy-seven percent and 
thirty percent respectively.  These results suggest that parents do consider their children’s 
expected academic performances in first grade when selecting schools.  These findings 
continue to suggest that parents view reading achievement differently than math and 
general knowledge. 
Many of the variables maintain the same sign and significance in model C, which 
is the probability of attending a Catholic or non-Catholic school compared to a public 
school.  A male child experiences a significant positive probability of attending a 
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 Catholic or non-Catholic school compared to a girl equaling nineteen percent for Catholic 
and thirteen percent for non-Catholic.  Minorities are less likely to attend Catholic 
schools as well as non-Catholic schools.  An African-American child sees significant 
decreases of nineteen percentage points for attending a Catholic school and nine 
percentage points for a non-Catholic school.   
All three of the fall kindergarten test scores are highly significant.  An additional 
point on a child’s fall kindergarten reading test reduces his or her likelihood of attending 
a Catholic or non-Catholic school by two percent for each school type.  An additional 
point on the fall math or general knowledge kindergarten tests increases a child’s 
probability of attending a Catholic school by eighteen percent and fourteen percent 
respectively.  An additional point on the fall math or general knowledge kindergarten 
tests increases a child’s probability of attending a non-Catholic school by seven percent 
for each. 
The three predicted first grade test scores are all highly significant.  A higher 
predicted first grade reading test score increases the probability a child attends a Catholic 
school by twenty-two percent whereas a higher predicted math or general knowledge 
score decreases a child’s likelihood of attending Catholic by nearly sixty percent and 
seventeen percent respectively.  A higher predicted first grade reading test score increases 
the probability a child attends a non-Catholic school by nineteen percent whereas a 
higher predicted math or general knowledge score decreases a child’s likelihood of 
attending non-Catholic by nearly thirty percent and ten percent respectively. 
These results suggest that parents do consider their children’s expected academic 
performances in first grade when selecting schools.  These findings for model C continue 
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 to suggest that parents view reading achievement differently than math and general 
knowledge. 
4.4 Conclusions   
This essay attempts to address criticisms of previous studies by using test scores 
from a student’s entrance into kindergarten to control for his or her ability and a host of 
other unobservable characteristics.  By controlling for previous test scores, it is possible 
to disentangle the selection effect.  For all three tests, raw scores are higher for private 
school students when they entered kindergarten in the fall.  Additionally, raw first grade 
test scores for all three subjects are higher for private schools. 
Findings indicate that first grade private school enrollment makes below average 
achievers in kindergarten into better students in the first grade.  Yet, private schools offer 
no significant benefit for first grade enrollment to high achieving kindergarten students.  
Private schools help below average achieving kindergarten students earn higher first 
grade test scores, relative to their low achieving peers.  Above average kindergarten 
students see an increase in their first grade reading scores by attending an Evangelical or 
Secular school for first grade.  High achieving kindergarten students experience a 
significant decrease in first grade achievement scores for all three tests because of 
Catholic school enrollment in the first grade.  High achievers in kindergarten experience 
a significant decrease in their first grade math score because of attending an Evangelical 
school for first grade.  This significant negative relationship as holds for first grade 
general knowledge test for high achieving kindergarten students attending a Protestant 
school for first grade.   
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 Other significant factors on a child’s first grade reading test score include child’s 
race and reading habits.  Living in a single parent household or in an urban area are 
significant household characteristics for first grade reading achievement.  Findings for the 
first grade general knowledge test are similar.  Additional significant factors for a child’s 
math performance include parental educational attainment and siblings in the household.  
All three geographic regions are significant relative to New England.   
For a child’s first grade math test score, living in a state that requires kindergarten 
attendance significantly reduced a child’s score.  This finding for mandatory kindergarten 
programs is surprising since many presume mathematics is what schools teach.  Since a 
child’s home environment strongly influences reading ability, research has focused 
attention to mathematics achievement in effort to capture more of a school’s contribution 
to a child’s education (Lubienski and Lubienski 2006; Figlio and Stone 1999; Bryk, Lee, 
and Holland 1993; Heyneman 2005).  This finding may indicate that mandatory 
kindergarten states have kindergarten programs with different emphases than non-
mandatory kindergarten states. 
Predicted first grade scores are all highly significant when added to the school 
choice estimation from the third chapter.  A higher predicted first grade reading score 
increased the probability of attending a private school while a higher predicted first grade 
math or general knowledge score lowered the likelihood of attending a private school.  
These results suggest that parents do consider their children’s expected academic  
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 performances in first grade when selecting schools.  Specifically, parents view reading 
achievement differently than math and general knowledge performance when selecting 
whether to send their children to private schools. 
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 Chapter Five:  
Conclusions 
 
5.1 Motivation 
For the purposes of this dissertation, the definition on school choice allows 
competition to occur among public and private schools.  This view draws criticism for the 
inclusion of religious schools within a household’s choice set even after U.S. Supreme 
Court upheld the use of government-funded vouchers to attend religious schools in 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002).   
In this case, the Cleveland voucher program allowed for a multitude of schooling 
options including attending a neighboring public school, a religious private school, a 
secular private school, and remaining at current public school and receiving tutoring 
assistance (Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 2002).  Yet, faced with so many options, ninety-
six percent of voucher program participants selected to attend a religiously affiliated 
private school (Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 2002).  Investigating the schooling decision 
by incorporating a variety of school types within the private sector, especially for 
religious schools, is warranted. 
While most Catholic schooling is undertaken at the elementary school level, the 
focus of academic research on the effects of private schools on performance and 
measures of educational outcomes has been primarily on Catholic high schools (Sander 
2005).  The implication of this is that the vast majority of secondary school choice studies 
are incomplete; the elementary schooling decision of the parents should be included for 
all secondary school choice analyses.  No studies, to my knowledge, isolate this choice 
made for first grade attendance or achievement at the beginning of a child’s academic 
career using a rich model of private schooling options. 
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 Examining this decision at the start of a child’s schooling years is critical for three 
reasons.  First, a student’s academic achievement in the first grade predicts academic 
achievement in his or her junior year of high school (Cunningham and Stanovich 1997).  
Second, elementary school test performance is an indicator of labor market productivity 
(Bishop 1989; Loury and Garman 1995; Murnane, Willett, and Levy 1995).  Lastly, 
evidence suggests that students do not switch between schooling alternatives often once a 
school type is selected.  Thus, this decision for first grade may determine a child’s entire 
schooling path.  Lee and Marks (1992) report that nearly one-half of their sample of high 
school seniors attended the same school since kindergarten while Goldhaber (1996) cites 
the “actual or perceived deleterious effects on children” (p59) as justification as for why 
parents are unlikely to switch school sectors. 
Studies focusing on Catholic schools as a proxy for all private education or all 
private religious education are missing important variances within the private school 
sector, especially at the elementary schooling grades.  While treating a household’s 
choice between public and private school as synonymous with a choice between public 
and Catholic schools may have been appropriate when examining the educational choices 
of households in the 1970s and 1980s, since then there have been numerous changes in 
the composition of private schools, which precipitate the need to examine the effects of 
attending religious private schools rather than Catholic private schools alone (Chubb and 
Moe 1990; Gaziel 1997).  Catholic schools no longer constitute the majority of 
religiously affiliated private schools.  While Catholic has fallen, there has been an 
increase in private schools, especially conservative Christian private schools (Sander 
2005).   
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 5.2 School Choice Results 
In this dissertation, I move beyond admitting these private sector differences are 
present to augment the scope of this choice by offering a rich model that incorporates the 
different types of private schools.  In addition to including the public schooling option, 
my dissertation offers the most detailed typology of private schools to date by separating 
private schools into four distinct categories: Catholic, Evangelical or Fundamental 
Protestant (Evangelical), Mainline Protestant or Other Faith (Protestant), and Secular.  
Focusing on the determinants of school selection enhances the policy forum regarding 
vouchers, tuition tax credits, and school choice (Lankford, Lee, and Wykcoff 1995).  
When estimating the choice of school to attend, I find kindergarten test 
performance, household income, and parental education levels are important factors in 
selecting a school.  Additionally, religiosity of the household and denomination 
membership in a county are significant determinants.  The two simulations presented 
indicate that not all voucher recipients would attend the same type of private school.  In 
particular, the differences appear to follow racial lines.  I observe in both simulations that 
white and Hispanic, in different households and area environments, exhibit very similar 
predicted enrollment probabilities among varying school types.  Evidence suggests that 
African-American girls respond differently to school selection than white and Hispanic 
girls do.  The predicted probabilities in the simulations demonstrate that households do 
not view all private schools as identical.  In particular, the probability patterns over a 
change in income are very different for Evangelical and Protestant school types.   
Clearly, an increase in private school attendance does not translate to uniform 
enrollment increases at all types of private schools.  White and Hispanic girls display 
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 similar patterns for Catholic and Protestant schools.  African-American and white girls 
select Evangelical schools in analogous trends.  Thus, the design of voucher and school 
choice programs should be examined to accommodate different choices made by 
different households, especially along racial and ethnic divisions.  Findings indicate that a 
voucher program affects the diversity of student populations in private schools differently 
depending on the type of private school.   
5.3 Comparative Performance Results 
In general, school choice proponents deem that competition is required in order to 
incite transformation within public schools.  The choice-based market-driven approach 
employed by voucher programs forces underperforming schools to improve due to 
newfound competition from higher performing challengers (Hoxby 1994; Chubb and 
Moe 1990).  Some purport that these better performing schools are located in the private 
sector by reasoning that private schools are forced to be more efficient in their operations 
and instructional methods, which leads to better schools that yield higher levels academic 
achievement for students (Bryk, Lee, and Holland 1993, p.268-9; Harris 2000; Hallinan 
2000).   
Some studies have called for the incorporation of Catholic school curriculum into 
the public school system as part of the reform of education system in the United States 
(Bushweller 1997; Hudolin-Gabin 1994).  However, the foundation of these policies is 
the underlying assumption that private schools, not their students, are generating the 
higher test scores.  Critics argue that selection and omitted variable biases generate these 
observed positive effects for students rather than private school superiority.  This essay 
attempts to address criticisms of previous studies by using test scores from a student’s 
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 entrance into kindergarten to control for his or her ability and a host of other 
unobservable characteristics.   
By controlling for previous test scores, it is possible to disentangle the selection 
effect.  Studies that do not control for prior student ability cannot be regarded as 
justification in support of or opposition to the existence of a positive private school effect 
(Peterson and Llaudet 2006).  I seek to examine whether these higher first grade test 
scores are the result of selection into the private sector (i.e., better students enrolling in 
private schools) or preeminence of the private sector (i.e., private schools are better than 
public ones). 
Findings suggest that, while a student’s ability is the driving force behind first 
grade achievement, the type of school attended in first grade does affect a child’s test 
score for all three tests.  In particular, achievement estimations indicate that first grade 
private school enrollment transforms below average achievers in kindergarten into better 
students in the first grade, relative to their low achieving peers.  Yet, private schools offer 
no significant benefit for first grade enrollment to high achieving kindergarten students.  
Above average kindergarten students see an increase in their first grade reading scores by 
attending an Evangelical or Secular school for first grade.  High achieving kindergarten 
students, in many cases, experience a significant decrease in first grade achievement 
scores because of private school enrollment, especially for Catholic school. 
Findings indicate that private school enrollment does not affect all students in the 
same manner.  Enabling private school enrollment for all students, through school choice 
and voucher programs, as a means of attaining blanket school reform is not optimal.  In 
effort to obtain higher a student achievement level, evidence suggests that reforms should 
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 tailor private school attendance for different student performance levels.  High achieving 
kindergarten students should not attend any type of private school in effort to gain higher 
first grade test scores.  Evangelical and Protestant first grade enrollment benefits students 
who are above average kindergarten achieving students.  Private school attendance in 
first grade, however, does transform below average achievers in kindergarten into better 
students in the first grade.  Policy reforms should target below average kindergarten 
students and encourage them to attend Evangelical and Protestant first grade schools 
while high performing kindergarten students should be enticed to remain in public 
schools.  Further investigation is warranted to investigate the possible explanations for 
why these different school types affect different students in very different ways.   
For a child’s first grade math test score, living in a state that requires kindergarten 
attendance significantly reduced a child’s score.  I find no significant result for the 
reading and general knowledge tests.  This finding for mandatory kindergarten programs 
for math tests is surprising since many presume mathematics is what schools teach.  
Since a child’s home environment strongly influences reading ability, research has 
focused attention to mathematics achievement in effort to capture more of a school’s 
contribution to a child’s education (Lubienski and Lubienski 2006; Figlio and Stone 
1999; Bryk, Lee, and Holland 1993; Heyneman 2005).  This finding suggests that 
mandatory kindergarten states have kindergarten programs with different emphases than 
those found in non-mandatory kindergarten states.  A comprehensive examination of 
mathematics curriculum in mandatory and non-mandatory kindergarten programs is 
needed to explore this further. 
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 5.4 Concluding Remarks 
No studies, to my knowledge, isolate this choice made for first grade attendance 
or achievement at the beginning of a child’s academic career using a rich model of four 
private schooling options.  In addition to including the public schooling option, I offer the 
most detailed typology of private schools to date by separating private schools into four 
distinct categories: Catholic, Evangelical or Fundamental Protestant (Evangelical), 
Mainline Protestant or Other Faith (Protestant), and Secular.   
Catholic schools no longer constitute the majority of religiously affiliated private 
schools so it is imperative to account for this diversity within the private school sector.  
Hence, studies focusing on Catholic schools as a proxy for all private education or all 
private religious education are missing important variances within the private school 
sector, especially at the elementary schooling grades. 
As students progress from elementary school to high school, an observed 
downward trend in Catholic school enrollment, as well as private school enrollment 
overall, indicates that there is some attrition from the private school sector.  Most private 
schooling occurs at the elementary school level while the majority of school choice 
works fail to acknowledge the primary schooling grades in any manner.  The implication 
is that the vast majority of secondary school choice studies are incomplete.  Examining 
the school choice decision at the first grade level, as opposed to the high school grades, is 
crucial.  Parents are not likely to switch their children among school types at any grade 
level once determining this schooling decision.  Additionally, performance in elementary 
school links to high school achievement and labor market productivity. 
 142
 When estimating the choice of school to attend, I find kindergarten test 
performance, household income, and parental education levels are important factors in 
selecting a school.  Additionally, religiosity of the household and denomination 
membership in a county are significant determinants.  Clearly, an increase in private 
school attendance does not translate to uniform enrollment increases at all types of 
private schools.  White and Hispanic girls display similar patterns for Catholic and 
Protestant schools.  African-American and white girls select Evangelical schools in 
analogous trends.  Thus, the design of voucher and school choice programs should be 
examined to accommodate different choices made by different households, especially 
along racial and ethnic divisions.  Findings indicate that a voucher program affects the 
diversity of student populations in private schools differently depending on the type of 
private school.  
Findings suggest that, while a student’s ability is the driving force behind first 
grade achievement, the type of school attended in first grade does affect a child’s test 
score for all three tests.  In particular, achievement estimations indicate that first grade 
private school enrollment transforms below average achievers in kindergarten into better 
students in the first grade, relative to their low achieving peers.  Yet, private schools offer 
no significant benefit for first grade enrollment to high achieving kindergarten students.  
Above average kindergarten students see an increase in their first grade reading scores by 
attending an Evangelical or Secular school for first grade.  High achieving kindergarten 
students, in many cases, experience a significant decrease in first grade achievement 
scores because of private school enrollment, especially for Catholic school. 
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Findings indicate that private school enrollment does not affect all students in the 
same manner.  Enabling private school enrollment for all students, through school choice 
and voucher programs, as a means of attaining blanket school reform is not optimal.  In 
effort to obtain higher a student achievement level, evidence suggests that reforms should 
tailor private school attendance for different student performance levels. 
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 Appendix A: Glenmary Research Center’s Theology Listing of Churches
 
Roman Catholic 
 
Evangelical or Fundamental Protestant  
• Two-Seed-in-the-Spirit 
Predestinarian Baptists 
• Church of the Lutheran Confession 
• Fundamental Methodist 
Conference, Inc. 
• Pentecostal Church of God 
• Allegheny Wesleyan Methodist 
Connection 
• Church of the Brethren 
• General Six Principle Baptists 
• International Pentecostal Holiness 
Church 
• Advent Christian Church 
• Church of the Lutheran Brethren of 
America 
• Hutterian Brethren 
• Presbyterian Church in America 
• African Methodist Episcopal Zion 
Church 
• Church of the Nazarene 
• Independent Fundamental 
Churches of America 
• Primitive Advent Christian Church 
• American Baptist Association, The 
• Christian and Missionary Alliance, 
The 
• Independent, Charismatic Churches 
• Primitive Baptists Associations 
• Amish 
• Christian Brethren 
• Independent, Non-Charismatic 
Churches 
• Primitive Baptist Churches--Old 
Line 
• Apostolic Christian Churches 
(Nazarene) 
• Christian Churches and Churches 
of Christ 
• Independent Free Will Baptists 
Associations 
• Primitive Baptists, Eastern District 
Association of 
• Apostolic Christian Church of 
America, Inc. 
• Christ Catholic Church 
• International Churches of Christ 
• Primitive Methodist Church in the 
USA 
Evangelical or Fundamental Protestant 
(Continued) 
• Apostolic Lutheran Church of America 
• Christian Reformed Church in North 
America 
• International Church of the Foursquare 
Gospel 
• Progressive Primitive Baptists 
• Associate Reformed Presbyterian Church 
Christian Union 
• International Pentecostal Church of Christ 
• The Protestant Conference (Lutheran) 
• Assemblies of God 
• Churches of Christ 
• Interstate & Foreign Landmark Missionary 
Baptists Association 
• Protestant Reformed Churches in America 
• Baptist General Conference 
• Community of Christ 
• Jasper Baptist and Pleasant Valley Baptist 
Associations 
• Reformed Baptist Churches 
• Baptist Missionary Association of America 
• Conservative Mennonite Conference 
• Landmark Missionary Baptists, Independent 
Associations and Unaffiliated Churches 
• Reformed Episcopal Church 
• Beachy Amish Mennonite Churches 
• Conservative Baptist Association of 
America 
• American Association of Lutheran Churches 
• Reformed Mennonite Church 
• Central Baptist Association Ministries 
• Evangelical Lutheran Synod 
• New Testament Association of Independent  
• Baptist Churches and other Fundamental  
• Baptist Associations/Fellowships 
• Southwide Baptist Fellowship 
• Church of God in Christ, Mennonite 
• Evangelical Mennonite Church 
• Old Missionary Baptists Associations 
• Truevine Baptists Association 
• Church of God General Conference 
• Evangelical Methodist Church 
• Old Order Amish Church 
• Church of the United Brethren in Christ 
• Church of God (Anderson, Indiana) 
• Evangelical Presbyterian Church 
• Old Order Mennonite 
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 Evangelical or Fundamental Protestant 
(Continued) 
• United Christian Church 
• Church of God (Cleveland, 
Tennessee) 
• Fellowship of Evangelical Bible 
Churches 
• Old Order River Brethren 
• United Reformed Churches in 
North America 
• Church of God, Mountain 
Assembly, Inc. 
• Fire Baptized Holiness Church, 
(Wesleyan), The 
• Old Regular Baptists 
• United Baptists 
• Church of God of Prophecy 
• Association of Free Lutheran 
Congregations, The 
• Open Bible Standard Churches, 
Inc. 
• Vineyard USA 
• Berean Fundamental Church 
• Conservative Congregational 
Christian Conference 
• Lutheran Church--Missouri Synod 
• General Association of Regular 
Baptist Churches 
• Bible Church of Christ, Inc. 
• Cumberland Presbyterian Church 
• Mennonite Brethren Churches, U.S. 
Conference of 
• Regular Baptists 
• Black Baptists Estimate 
• Duck River and Kindred Baptists 
Associations 
• Mennonite Church USA 
• Seventh-day Adventist Church 
• Brethren Church, The (Ashland, 
Ohio) 
• Eastern Pennsylvania Mennonite 
Church 
• Mennonite; Other Groups 
• Salvation Army, The 
• Brethren In Christ Church 
• Enterprise Baptists Association 
• Midwest Congregational Christian 
Fellowship 
• Schwenkfelder Church 
• Barren River Missionary Baptists 
• Evangelical Congregational 
Church, The 
• Missionary Church, The 
Evangelical or Fundamental Protestant 
(Continued) 
• Seventh Day Baptist General Conference, 
USA and Canada 
• Bruderhof Communities, Inc. 
• Evangelical Covenant Church, The 
• National Primitive Baptist Convention, USA 
• Separate Baptists in Christ 
• Calvary Chapel Fellowship Churches 
• Evangelical Free Church of America, The 
• New Hope Baptist Association 
• Southern Baptist Convention 
• Church of God (Seventh Day) 
• Free Methodist Church of North America 
• Original Free Will Baptists 
• Churches of God, General Conference 
• National Association of Free Will Baptists 
• Orthodox Presbyterian Church, The 
• Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod     
• Strict Baptists 
• Wesleyan Church, The 
• Wayne Trail Missionary Baptist Association 
 
Mainline Protestant or Other Faith 
• Albanian Orthodox Diocese of America 
• Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church 
• Netherlands Reformed Congregations 
• United Methodist Church, The 
• American Baptist Churches in the USA 
• Friends (Quakers) 
• Orthodox Church in America: Albanian 
Orthodox Archdiocese 
• Bahá'í 
• Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese 
of North  America, The 
• Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of 
Vasiloupulis 
• Orthodox Church in America: Bulgarian 
Diocese 
• Buddhism 
• Armenian Apostolic Church / Catholicossate 
of Cilicia 
• Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America 
• Orthodox Church in America: Romanian 
Orthodox Episcopate of America 
• Church of Christ, Scientist 
• Armenian Apostolic Church / Catholicossate 
of Etchmiadzin 
• Holy Orthodox Church in North America 
• Orthodox Church in America: Territorial 
Dioceses 
• Hindu 
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Mainline Protestant or Other Faith 
(continued) 
• Apostolic Catholic Assyrian 
Church of the East, North 
American Dioceses 
• International Council of 
Community Churches 
• Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) 
• Jain 
• Bulgarian Orthodox Diocese of the 
USA 
• Latvian Evangelical Lutheran 
Church in America 
• Reformed Church in America 
• Jewish Estimate 
• Byelorussion Council Of Orthodox 
Churches In North America 
• Macedonian Orthodox Church: 
American Diocese 
• Reformed Church in the United 
States 
• Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints, The 
• American Carpatho-Russian 
Orthodox Greek Catholic Church 
• Malankara Orthodox Syrian 
Church, American Diocese of the 
• Russian Orthodox Church Outside 
of Russia 
• Muslim Estimate 
• Christian Church (Disciples of 
Christ) 
• Malankara Archdiocese of the 
Syrian Orthodox Church in North 
America 
• Patriarchal Parishes of the Russian 
Orthodox Church in the USA 
• Sikh 
• Congregational Christian Churches, 
Additional (not part of any national 
CCC body) 
• Universal Fellowship of 
Metropolitan Community Churches 
• Serbian Orthodox Church in the 
USA 
• Tao 
• National Association of 
Congregational Christian Churches 
• Moravian Church in America--
Alaska Province 
• Serbian Orthodox Church in the 
USA (New Gracanica 
Metropolitanate) 
Mainline Protestant or Other Faith (continued) 
• Unitarian Universalist Association of 
Congregations 
• Coptic Orthodox Church 
• Moravian Church in America--Northern 
Province 
• Syrian Orthodox Church of Antioch 
• Zoroastrian 
• Evangelical Lutheran Church in America 
• Moravian Church in America--Southern 
Province 
• Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the USA 
• Episcopal Church 
• North American Baptist Conference 
• United Church of Christ
 Appendix B: Nested Data Details, Chapter Three 
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Overall Public Private Catholic OtherReligious Secular
Number of students 8,460 6,550 1,910 1,195 555 160
Number of schools 1,230 990 240 125 75 40
Number of counties 310 275 170 105 75 30
Number of states 45 40 40 30 30 15
Student is level of observation for this essay.
Sample sizes are rounded to comply with NCES restricted use data reporting standards.
Overall Public Private Catholic
Evangelical 
or 
Fundamental 
Protestant
Mainline 
Protestant
 or Other 
Faith
Secular
Number of students 8,460 6,550 1,910 1,195 385 170 160
Number of schools 1,230 990 240 125 55 20 40
Number of counties 310 275 170 105 55 25 30
Number of states 45 40 40 30 25 15 15
Student is level of observation for this essay.
Sample sizes are rounded to comply with NCES restricted use data reporting standards.
Appendix B, Table B.1b: Sample Size Details for Nested Data, Four Types of Private Schools
Appendix B, Table B.1a: Sample Size Details for Nested Data, Three Types of Private Schools
 
 Variable
Evangelical or 
Fundamental 
Protestant
Mainline 
Protestant
or Other Faith
Male 0.47 0.51
White 0.81 0.81
Black 0.09 0.02
Hispanic 0.06 0.09
Asian 0.01 0.04
Multiracial 0.03 0.04
Fall Reading, K 7.42 8.48
Spring Reading, K 12.10 12.16
Fall Math, K 5.87 7.14
Spring Math, K 9.18 9.70
Fall General, K 6.31 6.73
Spring General, K 7.71 8.22
Siblings 1.35 1.67
Mother, Some High School 0.01 0.01
Mother, High School 0.23 0.10
Mother, Some College 0.40 0.26
Mother, BA 0.28 0.37
Mother, Advanced 0.07 0.27
Father, Some High School 0.02 0.01
Father, High School 0.24 0.10
Father, Some College 0.26 0.13
Father, BA 0.24 0.30
Father, Advanced 0.10 0.33
Religiousity, Head 0.65 0.51
Religiosity, Spouse 0.49 0.45
Single Parent 0.15 0.13
Northeast 0.11 0.20
Midwest 0.46 0.20
South 0.27 0.31
West 0.16 0.29
Appendix B, Table B.2: Summary Mean Statistics for Other 
Religious, Detailed
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 Variable
Evangelical or 
Fundamental 
Protestant
Mainline 
Protestant
or Other Faith
Urban 0.67 0.99
Income, 0-15 0.02 0.01
Income, 15-20 0.02 0.01
Income, 20-25 0.04 0.02
Income, 25-30 0.05 0.03
Income, 30-35 0.05 0.02
Income, 35-40 0.07 0.08
Income, 40-50 0.16 0.10
Income, 50-75 0.29 0.15
Income, 75-100 0.13 0.15
Income, 100-200 0.09 0.20
Income, 200+ 0.03 0.15
House Value, County a 115,433 148,867
Income, County a 43,303 45,842
White, County a 0.75 0.63
Catholic, County b 0.24 0.31
Evangelical, County b 0.18 0.09
Protestant, County b 0.15 0.18
Student-Teacher, Public a 16.50 15.91
Black, Public a 13.24 26.65
Hispanic, Public a 13.47 17.26
Free Lunch a 24.86 32.65
Number of observations 385 170
a denotes Census 2000 data
Source: Unless otherwise indicated, data are from the restricted use ECLS-
K, 1999-2000.
Appendix B, Table B.2: Summary Mean Statistics for Other 
Religious, Detailed (continued)
b  denotes Glenmary Research Center's 2000 Religious Congregations &
Membership Data
Note: Sample sizes, means, and standard deviations are all the
unweighted ECLS-K reporting samples.  They are not weighted
to represent students and schools nationwide.  Sample sizes 
are rounded to comply with NCES restricted use data reporting standard
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 Variable Minimum Maximum
Fall Reading, K 0 20
Spring Reading, K 0 20
Fall Math, K 0 16
Spring Math, K 0 16
Fall General, K 0 12
Spring General, K 0 12
Siblings 0 10
House Value, County a 42,800 493,300
Income, County a 20,566 82,929
White, County a 0.17 0.99
Catholic, County b 0.01 0.62
Evangelical, County b 0.01 0.60
Protestant, County b 0.02 0.73
Student-Teacher, Public a 0 22.60
Black, Public a 0 97
Hispanic, Public a 0 84.83
Free Lunch a 0 92.31
a denotes Census 2000 data
Appendix B, Table B.3: Minimum and Maximum
Values for Continuous Variables
Source: Unless otherwise indicated, data are from the 
retricted use ECLS-K, 1999-2000.
b  denotes Glenmary Research Center's 2000 Religious  
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 Appendix C: Simulations 
 
Simulation Values 
 
FEMALE 
FOR Male = 0 
 
AVERAGE TEST SCORES 
50% FOR Fall Reading, K = 6 
50% FOR Spring Reading, K = 11 
50% FOR Fall Math, K = 5 
50% FOR Spring Math, K = 8 
50% FOR Fall General, K = 5 
50% FOR Spring General, K = 7 
 
3 SIBLINGS 
 FOR Siblings = 3 
 
HS MOM 
FOR Mother, High School = 1 
 
SOME HS DAD 
FOR Father, Some High School = 1 
 
NOT RELIGIOUS 
FOR Religiousity, Head = 0 
FOR Religiousity, Spouse = 0 
 
SINGLE PARENT HOUSEHOLD 
FOR Single Parent = 1 
 
URBAN 
 FOR Urban = 1 
 
NE  
 FOR Northeast = 1 
 
IN POOR AREA 
25% FOR House Value, County =84200 
25% FOR Income, County =36868 
25% FOR White, County =0.5750737 
 
BELOW AVERAGE ADHERENTS 
25% FOR Catholic, County = 0.1000463 
25% FOR Evangelical, County = 0.0502003 
25% FOR Protestant, County = 0.096914 
 
BAD SCHOOLS 
95% FOR Student-Teacher, Public = 22.1 
95% FOR Black, Public = 57.89474 
75% FOR Hispanic, Public = 16.89877 
95% FOR Free Lunch = 55.28964 
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Simulation Values 
 
FEMALE 
FOR Male = 0 
 
AVERAGE TEST SCORES 
50% FOR Fall Reading, K = 6 
50% FOR Spring Reading, K = 11 
50% FOR Fall Math, K = 5 
50% FOR Spring Math, K = 8 
50% FOR Fall General, K = 5 
50% FOR Spring General, K = 7 
 
0 SIBLINGS 
 FOR Siblings = 0 
 
MOM BA 
FOR Mother, BA = 1 
 
DAD BA 
FOR Father, BA = 1 
 
RELIGIOUS 
FOR Religiosity, Head = 1 
FOR Religiosity, Spouse = 1 
 
TWO PARENT HOUSEHOLD 
FOR Single Parent = 1 
 
URBAN 
 FOR Urban = 1 
 
NE  
 FOR Northeast = 1 
 
AVERAGE AREA 
50% FOR House Value, County =110100 
50% FOR Income, County =42189 
50% FOR White, County =0.7450405 
 
AVERAGE ADHERENTS 
50% FOR Catholic, County =0.2153982 
50% FOR Evangelical, County =0.0927293 
50% FOR Protestant, County =0.1251003 
 
HORRIBLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
90% FOR Student-Teacher, Public =21.1  
90% FOR Black, Public =41.82828  
90% FOR Hispanic, Public =39.69226,  
90% FOR Free Lunch=50.76366 
 Variable Name 0 1 5 10 20 25 30 40 50 60 70
Fall Reading, K 0 0 1 2 3 4 4 5 6 7 8
Spring Reading, K 0 2 4 6 8 8 9 10 11 12 13
Fall Math, K 0 0 1 2 3 3 3 4 5 6 7
Spring Math, K 0 1 3 4 6 6 7 8 8 9 10
Fall General, K 0 0 1 1 3 3 4 4 5 6 7
Spring General, K 0 1 2 3 5 5 6 7 7 8 9
House Value, County 23,100 39,700 61,000 68,900 82,900 84,200 86,800 96,600 110,100 123,540 148,500
Income, County 17,235 20,035 30,134 33,313 35,867 36,868 38,173 39,978 42,189 45,062 47,617
White, County 0.044 0.170 0.311 0.421 0.513 0.575 0.615 0.689 0.745 0.820 0.865
Catholic, County 0.000 0.002 0.027 0.044 0.090 0.100 0.128 0.174 0.215 0.267 0.346
Evangelical, County 0.000 0.016 0.020 0.026 0.047 0.050 0.059 0.074 0.093 0.120 0.175
Protestant, County 0.019 0.031 0.057 0.070 0.091 0.097 0.102 0.119 0.125 0.133 0.154
Student-Teacher, Public 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.46 14.20 14.70 15.00 15.70 16.20 16.80 17.70
Black, Public 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.66 1.46 2.69 3.59 6.69 11.22 13.94 19.89
Hispanic, Public 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.46 0.82 1.25 1.88 3.21 4.77 7.94 14.43
Free Lunch 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.48 12.60 16.10 20.61 22.84 27.44 32.56
Percentile
Table C.1: Values Used in Simulations
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Variable Name 75 80 90 95 99 100
Fall Reading, K 9 10 12 13 18 20
Spring Reading, K 13 14 16 18 20 20
Fall Math, K 7 8 9 10 13 16
Spring Math, K 10 11 12 13 15 16
Fall General, K 8 8 9 10 11 12
Spring General, K 9 10 10 11 12 12
House Value, County 154,300 173,800 212,000 253,000 422,600 493,300
Income, County 48,655 52,102 61,455 65,288 74,335 82,929
White, County 0.886 0.914 0.947 0.967 0.978 0.986
Catholic, County 0.367 0.399 0.457 0.515 0.542 0.602
Evangelical, County 0.204 0.211 0.337 0.418 0.583 0.664
Protestant, County 0.171 0.176 0.211 0.275 0.595 0.728
Student-Teacher, Public 18.10 18.80 21.10 22.10 22.40 22.60
Black, Public 23.98 28.93 41.83 57.89 92.24 97.82
Hispanic, Public 16.90 23.04 39.69 58.69 60.79 84.83
Free Lunch 35.13 39.63 50.76 55.29 71.83 93.12
Percentile
Table C.1: Values Used in Simulations (continued)
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Appendix D: Observations by Test Score and Grade 
 
Score Overall Public Catholic
Other 
Religious Secular Score Overall Public Catholic Evangelical Protestant Secular
0 285 255 20 5 5 0 285 260 20 5 0 0
1 475 430 30 10 5 1 475 435 30 10 5 0
2 525 455 40 20 5 2 525 470 40 15 0 0
3 625 525 65 35 5 3 625 525 65 20 15 0
4 880 705 105 50 20 4 880 710 105 40 15 10
5 870 685 115 45 20 5 870 690 125 35 10 10
6 745 565 115 50 15 6 745 570 115 40 10 10
7 650 475 110 50 15 7 650 480 110 35 15 10
8 585 420 100 40 30 8 585 430 100 25 15 15
9 520 370 90 35 20 9 520 370 95 25 10 10
10 495 340 85 45 25 10 495 350 85 35 15 15
11 420 285 75 40 20 11 420 295 80 25 15 10
12 440 310 70 40 25 12 440 310 70 20 20 15
13 175 110 20 20 25 13 175 115 25 10 5 20
14 95 65 15 10 10 14 95 70 15 5 0 5
15 75 45 10 10 5 15 75 50 10 5 0 5
16 50 25 10 5 10 16 50 25 10 5 0 10
17 30 20 5 0 5 17 30 20 5 0 0 5
18 40 30 10 5 0 18 40 30 10 5 0 0
19 30 20 0 0 10 19 30 25 0 0 0 5
20 30 15 5 0 5 20 30 15 10 0 5 0
Total 8,040 6,150 1,095 515 280 Total 8,040 6,245 1,125 360 155 155
Sample sizes are rounded to comply with NCES restricted use data reporting standards.
Appendix D: Observations by Test Score and Grade
Table D.1a: Fall Reading Scores, Kindergarten Table D.1b: Spring Reading Scores, First Grade
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Appendix D: Observations by Test Score and Grade (continued) 
 
 
 
Score Overall Public Catholic
Other 
Religious Secular Score Overall Public Catholic Evangelical Protestant Secular
0 185 170 5 10 0 0 185 170 10 5 0 0
1 495 445 30 10 10 1 495 450 30 10 5 0
2 790 680 60 30 20 2 790 685 70 30 0 5
3 925 745 110 50 20 3 925 750 115 40 10 10
4 1,030 815 130 60 25 4 1,030 825 130 45 10 20
5 1,050 805 155 60 30 5 1,050 820 155 40 20 15
6 930 695 140 70 25 6 930 710 140 45 20 15
7 750 530 130 60 30 7 750 540 130 40 20 20
8 650 470 95 55 30 8 650 475 100 35 20 20
9 510 350 90 40 30 9 510 360 95 25 15 15
10 335 210 65 35 25 10 335 215 65 25 15 15
11 190 120 40 15 15 11 190 125 40 10 5 10
12 95 55 15 10 15 12 95 60 15 5 10 5
13 45 30 10 0 5 13 45 30 10 0 0 5
14 40 20 10 10 0 14 40 20 10 5 5 0
15 15 10 5 0 0 15 15 10 5 0 0 0
16 5 0 5 0 0 16 5 0 5 0 0 0
Total 8,040 6,150 1,095 515 280 Total 8,040 6,245 1,125 360 155 155
Sample sizes are rounded to comply with NCES restricted use data reporting standards.
Table D.2a: Fall Math Scores, Kindergarten Table D.2b: Spring Math Scores, First Grade
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Score Overall Public Catholic
Other 
Religious Secular Score Overall Public Catholic Evangelical Protestant Secular
0 285 260 15 5 5 0 285 260 15 10 0 0
1 530 470 35 15 10 1 530 480 30 10 5 5
2 740 635 65 25 15 2 740 645 65 15 5 10
3 830 685 85 40 20 3 830 695 85 35 5 10
4 825 670 85 55 15 4 825 670 90 40 10 15
5 875 675 130 45 25 5 875 685 135 30 10 15
6 930 690 135 75 30 6 930 695 145 50 25 15
7 920 675 140 65 40 7 920 690 145 45 20 20
8 765 525 140 65 35 8 765 535 140 45 25 20
9 635 415 120 65 35 9 635 430 120 40 25 20
10 425 275 90 35 25 10 425 280 95 25 15 10
11 210 130 40 20 20 11 210 135 45 10 10 10
12 70 45 15 5 5 12 70 45 15 5 0 5
Total 8,040 6,150 1,095 515 280 Total 8,040 6,245 1,125 360 155 155
Sample sizes are rounded to comply with NCES restricted use data reporting standards.
Table D.3a: Fall General Knowledge Scores, Kindergarten Table D.3b: Spring General Knowledge Scores, First Grade
 
Appendix D: Observations by Test Score and Grade (continued) 
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Appendix E: Nested Data Details, Chapter Four 
Appendix E, Table E.1: Sample Size Details for Nested Data, Three Types of Private Schools
Overall Public Private Catholic Other Religious Secular
Number of students 8,040 6,245 1,795 1,125 515 155
Number of schools 1,240 1,000 240 130 70 40
Number of counties 310 280 170 105 75 30
Number of states 45 40 45 30 30 15
Student is level of observation for this essay.
Sample sizes are rounded to comply with NCES restricted use data reporting standards.
Appendix E, Table E.2: Sample Size Details for Nested Data, Four Types of Private Schools
Overall Public Private Catholic
Evangelical or 
Fundamental 
Protestant
Mainline 
Protestant
or Other Faith
Secular
Number of students 8,040 6,245 1,795 1,125 360 155 155
Number of schools 1,240 1,000 240 130 50 20 40
Number of counties 310 280 170 105 55 25 30
Number of states 45 40 45 30 25 15 15
Student is level of observation for this essay.
Sample sizes are rounded to comply with NCES restricted use data reporting standards.  
 
 
 
 
 Appendix F: Additional Details Regarding Direct Child Cognitive Assessments 
 
All of the following information is from chapters two and three of the ESLC-K 
user’s manual for the ECLS-K first grade restricted-use data file and electronic codebook 
(NCES 2002-128, 2-1 – 3-30). 
The direct cognitive assessment of each child occurred in two stages.  First, the 
child answered between twelve and twenty questions on a routing test.39  Performance on 
this routing test determined which second stage test the child was given.  The reading and 
mathematics tests had three alternate exams for this second stage of assessment while the 
general knowledge test only had two alternate exams.   
Within the reading test, the hierarchical score was letter recognition (upper and 
lower case letters by name), then beginning sounds (associating letters and sounds at the 
beginning of words), then ending sounds (associating letters and sounds at the end of 
words), then site words (recognizing common words by site), and then comprehension of 
a words in context (reading words in context). 
Within the mathematics test, it was number and shape (identifying some one digit 
numerals, recognizing geometric shapes, and one to one counting of up to ten objects), 
then relative size (reading all single-digit numbers numerals, counting beyond ten, 
recognizing a sequence of patterns, and using nonstandard units of length to compare 
objects), then order and sequence (reading two digit numbers, recognizing the next 
number in a sequence, identifying the ordinal position of an object, and solving a simple 
word problem), then addition and subtraction (solving simple addition and subtraction 
                                                          
39 There were separate reading, mathematics, and general knowledge routing tests.  Each of these three tests 
had at least 12 questions, but no more than 20 questions, to assess and assign the student to the second 
stage test having the appropriate level of difficulty. 
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problems), and then followed by multiplication and division (solving simple 
multiplication and division problems, and recognizing more complex number patterns). 
Questions for the general knowledge test did not follow a hierarchical pattern.  
Questions measured knowledge in the natural sciences and social studies.  The science 
domain included questions from the fields of earth, space, physical, and life sciences.  
The social studies portion of this test covered questions about history, government, 
culture, geography, economics, and law.  Many questions related to more than one of the 
categories.  This test captured information of children’s conceptions and understanding of 
the social, physical, and natural world and of their ability to draw inferences and 
comprehend implications. 
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Appendix G: Correlation Table 
 Fall R
eading, K
Fall M
ath, K
Fall G
eneral, K
Spring R
eading, First
Spring M
ath, First
Spring G
eneral, First
C
atholic, First
Evangelical, First
Protestant, First
Secular, First
C
atholic, K
O
ther R
eligious, K
Secular, K
Fall Reading, K 1.00
Fall Math, K 0.66 1.00
Fall General, K 0.43 0.55 1.00
Spring Reading, First 0.51 0.50 0.36 1.00
Spring Math, First 0.45 0.61 0.48 0.55 1.00
Spring General, First 0.38 0.48 0.66 0.43 0.52 1.00
Catholic, First 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.10 1.00
Evangelical, First 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.06 -0.09 1.00
Protestant, First 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.04 -0.06 -0.03 1.00
Secular, First 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.05 -0.06 -0.03 -0.02 1.00
Catholic, K 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.95 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 1.00
Other Religious, K 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.07 -0.10 0.78 0.47 -0.02 -0.10 1.00
Secular, K 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.06 -0.02 -0.04 0.06 0.68 -0.08 -0.05 1.00
 
 Appendix H: Mandatory Kindergarten States 
Yes No
Alabama Alaska
Arizona California 
Arkansas Colorado 
Delaware Connecticut 
District of Columbia Georgia 
Florida Hawaii 
Louisiana Idaho 
Maryland Illinois 
New Mexico Indiana
Ohio Iowa 
Oklahoma Kansas 
Rhode Island Kentucky 
South Carolina Maine 
Tennessee Massachusetts 
Utah Michigan
Virginia Minnesota 
West Virginia Mississippi 
Missouri
Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New York 
North Carolina 
North Dakota 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
South Dakota 
Texas 
Vermont 
Washington 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
Source: Table 150, 2002 Digest of Education Statistics
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Appendix I: Percentiles for K Test Scores 
Percentile Value Percentile Value  Percentile Value
0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 0
5 1 5 1 5 1
10 2 10 2 10 1
20 3 20 3 20 3
25 4 25 3 25 3
30 4 30 4 30 4
40 5 40 4 40 5
50 6 50 5 50 5
60 7 60 6 60 6
70 8 70 7 70 7
75 9 75 7 75 8
80 10 80 8 80 8
90 12 90 9 90 9
95 13 95 10 95 10
99 18 99 13 99 11
100 20 100 16 100 12
Low 1-4 Low 1-3 Low 1-3
Below Average 5-6 Below Average 4-5 Below Average 4-5
Above Average 7-9 Above Average 6-7 Above Average 6-8
High 10-20 High 8-16 High 9-12
Note: The separations for the first, second, third, and fourth quartiles occur at the twenty-fifth, fiftieth, and seventy-
fifth percentiles, respectively, for the reading and math tests.  The general knowledge test employs the same first and 
second quarti
General Knowledge, KReading Test, K Math Test, K
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Appendix J: Additional Regression Results 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fall Reading, K -0.778 0.04 0.023
(86.83)*** (5.55)*** (3.62)***
Fall Math, K 0.232 -0.614 0.114
(18.66)*** (61.46)*** (12.82)***
Fall General, K 0.087 0.173 -0.581
(7.01)*** (15.30)*** (60.37)***
Catholic, First -0.037 -0.055 -0.19 -0.17 -0.527 -0.221
(0.11) (0.22) (0.79) (0.81) (2.36)** (1.29)
Evangelical, First 0.428 0.375 -0.066 -0.115 -0.465 0.126
(0.81) (1.45) (0.22) (0.57) (1.33) (0.44)
Protestant, First -0.245 0.151 -0.585 -0.054 -0.984 -0.319
(0.38) (0.50) (2.06)** (0.27) (2.72)*** (1.16)
Secular, First -0.602 0.503 -0.264 -0.038 -0.132 0.07
(1.14) (1.33) (1.06) (0.16) (0.54) (0.31)
Catholic, K -0.355 0.247 -0.325 0.076 0.017 0.283
(1.07) (0.98) (1.31) (0.36) (0.07) (1.63)
Other Religious, K -0.563 0.21 -0.172 0.164 0.09 0.069
(1.09) (0.83) (0.64) (0.90) (0.28) (0.26)
Secular, K -2.417 -0.828 -1.021 -0.393 -0.568 -0.098
(6.68)*** (2.64)*** (5.45)*** (1.96)* (2.99)*** (0.47)
Constant 11.038 14.2 7.355 9.312 3.91 6.156
(171.37)*** (122.38)*** (175.46)*** (100.62)*** (110.12)*** (68.75)***
Observations 8040 8040 # 8040 8040 # 8040 8040
R-squared 0.02 0.56 0.01 0.38 0.01 0.46
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*p<0.10 ; **p<0.05 ; ***p<0.01
Sample sizes are rounded to comply with NCES restricted use data reporting standards.
Table J.1: First Differences with and without Kindergarten Test Scores
Reading, First - Reading, K Math, First - Math, K General, First - General, K
 
 
  
Spring Reading, First Spring Math, First Spring General, First
Catholic, First -0.283 -0.369 -0.327
(0.78) (1.29) (1.62)
Evangelical, First 0.579 0.166 0.509
(1.92)* (0.61) (1.46)
Protestant, First 0.448 0.307 0.077
(1.42) (0.92) (0.20)
Secular, First 0.737 0.072 0.327
(1.77)* (0.22) (1.02)
Catholic, K 0.634 0.48 0.549
(1.79)* (1.67)* (2.66)***
Other Religious, K 0.237 0.087 -0.151
(0.80) (0.34) (0.46)
Secular, K -0.314 0.06 0.157
(0.83) (0.20) (0.52)
Male -0.359 0.235 0.161
(6.20)*** (4.54)*** (3.68)***
Black -1.194 -1.762 -1.657
(8.22)*** (13.81)*** (12.86)***
Hispanic -0.737 -0.902 -1.141
(6.38)*** (9.19)*** (12.98)***
Asian 0.321 -0.241 -1.232
(2.66)*** (1.97)** (8.69)***
Multiracial -0.499 -0.796 -0.929
(2.94)*** (5.30)*** (5.80)***
Child Reads 1.195 0.515 0.319
(12.50)*** (6.92)*** (4.78)***
Table J.2: OLS Results without Kindergarten Test Scores
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Spring Reading, First Spring Math, First Spring General, First
Siblings -0.246 0.016 -0.407
(3.00)*** (0.21) (6.34)***
Parent Reads -0.261 -0.279 0.008
(3.36)*** (4.41)*** (-0.15)
Father, BA 0.425 0.495 0.297
(6.10)*** (7.87)*** (5.54)***
Mother, BA 0.558 0.646 0.547
(8.60)*** (10.85)*** (10.75)***
Income, 50+ 0.436 0.385 0.439
(6.03)*** (6.09)*** (8.15)***
Single Parent -0.406 -0.084 -0.283
(4.08)*** (1.06) (3.99)***
Midwest 0.017 0.337 0.208
(0.16) (3.12)*** (2.34)**
South 0.296 0.556 0.047
(2.35)** (4.71)*** (0.46)
West 0.035 0.203 -0.054
(0.29) (1.69)* (0.51)
Urban 0.415 0.374 0.147
(3.81)*** (4.09)*** (1.77)*
Mandatory K, State -0.143 -0.169 -0.004
(1.26) (1.91)* (0.05)
Constant 16.36 11.505 9.005
(91.69)*** (71.46)*** (68.45)***
Observations 8040 8040 8040
R-squared 0.16 0.17 0.21
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*p<0.10 ; **p<0.05 ; ***p<0.01
Sample sizes are rounded to comply with NCES restricted use data reporting standards.
Table J.2: OLS Results without Kindergarten Test Scores (continued)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Catholic, First 0.063 -0.055 0.311 0.147
(0.19) (0.22) (1.07) (0.48)
Evangelical, First 0.547 0.375 0.77 0.711
(1.67)* (1.45) (2.58)** (2.41)**
Protestant, First 0.826 0.151 0.771 0.592
(2.44)** (0.50) (2.16)** (1.69)*
Secular, First 1.065 0.503 0.138 -0.029
(2.03)** (1.33) (0.11) (0.02)
Catholic, K 0.769 0.247 0.254 0.27
(2.33)** (0.98) (1.01) (0.98)
Other Religious, K 0.645 0.21 0.184 0.172
(1.99)** (0.83) (0.79) (0.72)
Secular, K 0.219 -0.828 -0.845 -0.872
(0.44) (2.64)*** (2.73)*** (2.93)***
Fall Reading, K 0.222 0.24 0.215
(24.74)*** (24.00)*** (21.82)***
Fall Math, K 0.232 0.234 0.219
(18.66)*** (18.84)*** (17.72)***
Fall General, K 0.087 0.084 0.061
(7.01)*** (6.82)*** (5.39)***
Catholic, First * Fall Reading, K (Below Average Score) -0.302 -0.262
(1.58) (1.39)
Catholic, First * Fall Reading, K (Above Average Score) -0.178 -0.13
(1.01) (0.75)
Catholic, First * Fall Reading, K (High Score) -1.004 -0.81
(5.01)*** (4.17)***
Table J.3: Complete OLS Results for Spring Reading, First Grade
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Evangelical, First * Fall Reading, K (Below Average Score) -0.341 -0.377
(1.23) (1.40)
Evangelical, First * Fall Reading, K (Above Average Score) 0.009 -0.056
(0.03) (0.23)
Evangelical, First * Fall Reading, K (High Score) -1.066 -0.863
(4.09)*** (3.43)***
Protestant, First * Fall Reading, K (Below Average Score) 0.099 0.284
(0.25) (0.70)
Protestant, First * Fall Reading, K (Above Average Score) -0.749 -0.778
(1.49) (1.62)
Protestant, First * Fall Reading, K (High Score) -1.087 -0.902
(3.03)*** (2.71)***
Nonsectarian, First * Fall Reading, K (Below Average Score) 0.59 0.698
(0.48) (0.57)
Nonsectarian, First * Fall Reading, K (Above Average Score) 1.077 1.081
(0.84) (0.84)
Nonsectarian, First * Fall Reading, K (High Score) 0.007 0.141
(0.01) (0.12)
Male -0.305
(5.92)***
Black -0.623
(4.96)***
Hispanic -0.172
(1.70)*
Asian 0.335
(2.84)***
Multiracial -0.098
(0.70)
Child Reads 0.826
(9.79)***
Table J.3: Complete OLS Results for Spring Reading, First Grade (continued)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Siblings -0.058
(0.84)
Parent Reads -0.111
(1.63)
Father, BA 0.029
(0.46)
Mother, BA 0.081
(1.43)
Income, 50+ 0.103
(1.70)*
Single Parent -0.293
(3.47)***
Midwest -0.083
(0.82)
South 0.111
(0.96)
West 0.037
(0.34)
Urban 0.161
(1.76)*
Mandatory K, State -0.033
(0.33)
Constant 17.168 14.2 14.093 14.018
(250.50)*** (122.38)*** (115.36)*** (77.69)***
Observations 8040 8040 8040 8040
R-squared 0.02 0.32 0.32 0.35
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*p<0.10 ; **p<0.05 ; ***p<0.01
Sample sizes are rounded to comply with NCES restricted use data reporting standards.
Table J.3: Complete OLS Results for Spring Reading, First Grade (continued)
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Catholic, First 0.01 -0.17 -0.15 -0.262
(0.03) (0.81) (0.62) (1.10)
Evangelical, First 0.164 -0.115 0.481 0.431
(0.50) (0.57) (1.51) (1.41)
Protestant, First 0.76 -0.054 -0.36 -0.535
(1.92)* (0.27) (0.85) (1.39)
Secular, First 0.366 -0.038 -0.042 -0.183
(0.77) (0.16) (0.07) (0.31)
Catholic, K 0.596 0.076 0.064 0.096
(1.93)* (0.36) (0.30) (0.44)
Other Religious, K 0.495 0.164 0.171 0.128
(1.51) (0.90) (0.95) (0.75)
Secular, K 0.519 -0.393 -0.404 -0.373
(1.21) (1.96)* (2.03)** (1.91)*
Fall Reading, K 0.04 0.039 0.036
(5.55)*** (5.33)*** (5.01)***
Fall Math, K 0.386 0.404 0.378
(38.72)*** (36.03)*** (35.94)***
Fall General, K 0.173 0.171 0.144
(15.30)*** (15.17)*** (14.06)***
Table J.4: Complete OLS Results for Spring Math, First Grade
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Catholic, First * Fall Math, K (Below Average Score) 0.2 0.204
(1.18) (1.21)
Catholic, First * Fall Math, K (Above Average Score) 0.2 0.227
(1.13) (1.30)
Catholic, First * Fall Math, K (High Score) -0.394 -0.323
(2.41)** (2.10)**
Evangelical, First * Fall Math, K (Below Average Score) -0.462 -0.515
(1.46) (1.64)
Evangelical, First * Fall Math, K (Above Average Score) -0.785 -0.67
(2.54)** (2.29)**
Evangelical, First * Fall Math, K (High Score) -1.069 -0.931
(3.42)*** (3.05)***
Protestant, First * Fall Math, K (Below Average Score) 0.383 0.43
(0.85) (1.00)
Protestant, First * Fall Math, K (Above Average Score) 0.523 0.551
(1.23) (1.39)
Protestant, First * Fall Math, K (High Score) 0.141 0.259
(0.40) (0.86)
Secular, First * Fall Math, K (Below Average Score) 0.266 0.314
(0.44) (0.53)
Secular, First * Fall Math, K (Above Average Score) 0.033 0.035
(0.05) (0.06)
Secular, First * Fall Math, K (High Score) -0.164 -0.184
(0.27) (0.31)
Table J.4: Complete OLS Results for Spring Math, First Grade (continued)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male 0.171
(3.73)***
Black -0.93
(9.58)***
Hispanic -0.205
(2.49)**
Asian 0.107
(1.07)
Multiracial -0.254
(2.35)**
Child Reads 0.213
(3.43)***
Siblings 0.143
(2.22)**
Parent Reads -0.189
(3.51)***
Father, BA 0.119
(2.30)**
Mother, BA 0.153
(3.14)***
Income, 50+ 0.027
(0.52)
Single Parent 0.012
(0.19)
Midwest 0.202
(2.41)**
Table J.4: Complete OLS Results for Spring Math, First Grade (continued)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
South 0.454
(4.83)***
West 0.231
(2.42)**
Urban 0.182
(2.51)**
Mandatory K, State -0.13
(1.77)*
Constant 12.385 9.312 9.246 9.027
(181.68)*** (100.62)*** (94.03)*** (60.82)***
Observations 8040 8040 8040 8040
R-squared 0.02 0.41 0.41 0.43
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*p<0.10 ; **p<0.05 ; ***p<0.01
Sample sizes are rounded to comply with NCES restricted use data reporting standards.
Table J.4: Complete OLS Results for Spring Math, First Grade (continued)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Catholic, First 0.043 -0.221 0.012 -0.128
(0.18) (1.29) (0.06) (0.58)
Evangelical, First 0.602 0.126 0.517 0.453
(1.77)* (0.44) (1.31) (1.07)
Protestant, First 0.466 -0.319 -0.204 -0.403
(1.24) (1.16) (0.45) (0.90)
Secular, First 0.405 0.07 -0.27 -0.293
(0.88) (0.31) (0.53) (0.60)
Catholic, K 0.699 0.283 0.315 0.302
(2.93)*** (1.63) (1.80)* (1.69)*
Other Religious, K 0.232 0.069 0.049 0.008
(0.71) (0.26) (0.18) (0.03)
Secular, K 0.646 -0.098 -0.098 -0.124
(1.51) (0.47) (0.48) (0.61)
Fall Reading, K 0.023 0.022 0.027
(3.62)*** (3.40)*** (4.13)***
Fall Math, K 0.114 0.114 0.095
(12.82)*** (12.94)*** (11.13)***
Fall General, K 0.419 0.439 0.393
(43.49)*** (39.64)*** (41.77)***
Table J.5: Complete OLS Results for Spring General Knowledge, First Grade
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Catholic, First * Fall General, K (Below Average Score) 0.043 0.063
(0.28) (0.41)
Catholic, First * Fall General, K (Above Average Score) -0.274 -0.199
(1.76)* (1.31)
Catholic, First * Fall General, K (High Score) -0.794 -0.612
(4.21)*** (3.38)***
Evangelical, First * Fall General, K (Below Average Score) -0.146 -0.227
(0.52) (0.77)
Evangelical, First * Fall General, K (Above Average Score) -0.313 -0.309
(1.16) (1.08)
Evangelical, First * Fall General, K (High Score) -1.037 -0.952
(3.23)*** (2.80)***
Protestant, First * Fall General, K (Below Average Score) 0.092 0.227
(0.15) (0.39)
Protestant, First * Fall General, K (Above Average Score) -0.023 0.089
(0.05) (0.21)
Protestant, First * Fall General, K (High Score) -0.449 -0.191
(1.13) (0.50)
Secular, First * Fall General, K (Below Average Score) 1.044 0.944
(1.91)* (1.77)*
Secular, First * Fall General, K (Above Average Score) 0.559 0.569
(1.14) (1.19)
Secular, First * Fall General, K (High Score) -0.202 -0.057
(0.41) (0.12)
Table J.5: Complete OLS Results for Spring General Knowledge, First Grade (continued)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male 0.099
(2.74)***
Black -0.696
(7.58)***
Hispanic -0.424
(6.13)***
Asian -0.469
(4.21)***
Multiracial -0.29
(2.82)***
Child Reads 0.138
(2.42)**
Siblings -0.241
(4.85)***
Parent Reads -0.005
(0.10)
Father, BA 0.026
(0.59)
Mother, BA 0.096
(2.41)**
Income, 50+ 0.084
(1.84)*
Single Parent -0.168
(3.02)***
Midwest 0.155
(2.35)**
Table J.5: Complete OLS Results for Spring General Knowledge, First Grade (continued)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
South 0.044
(0.58)
West 0.033
(0.43)
Urban 0.006
(0.10)
Mandatory K, State 0.037
(0.57)
Constant 8.999 6.156 6.058 6.498
(129.95)*** (68.75)*** (63.49)*** (53.81)***
Observations 8040 8040 8040 8040
R-squared 0.02 0.46 0.46 0.48
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*p<0.10 ; **p<0.05 ; ***p<0.01
Sample sizes are rounded to comply with NCES restricted use data reporting standards.
Table I.5: Complete OLS Results for Spring General Knowledge, First Grade (continued)
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Appendix K: Data Definitions and Means 
Variable Variable Description Overall Public Private Catholic NonCatholic
0.48 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.46
(0.50)
0.67 0.64 0.76 0.76 0.77
(0.47)
0.12 0.14 0.05 0.04 0.07
(0.33)
0.12 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.08
(0.32)
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
(0.21)
0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.21)
6.54 6.19 7.74 7.37 8.35
(3.97)
10.92 10.61 12.01 11.70 12.54
(3.86)
5.36 5.09 6.29 6.18 6.48
(2.94)
8.28 8.01 9.18 9.02 9.44
(3.01)
5.44 5.15 6.44 6.39 6.53
(2.91)
Spring Reading, K
Fall Math, K
Equals one if student is male,
zero otherwiseMale
White Equals one if student is white,zero otherwise
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Multiracial
Fall Reading, K
Spring Math, K
Fall General, K
Equals one if student is Black,
zero otherwise
Equals one if student is
Hispanic, zero otherwise
Equals one if student is Asian,
zero otherwise
Equals one if student is Multiracial 
or Other race, zero otherwise
Reading test, administered during 
fall of Kindergarten year  (Maximum: 20)
Reading test, administered during 
spring of Kindergarten year  (Maximum: 20)
Math test, administered during 
fall of Kindergarten year   (Maximum: 16)
Math test, administered during
spring of Kindergarten year   (Maximum: 16)
General Knowledge test, administered
during fall of Kindergarten year   (Maximum: 12)
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Variable Variable Description Overall Public Private Catholic NonCatholic
7.10 6.86 7.92 7.86 8.00
(2.78)
17.41 17.19 18.15 17.98 18.43
(1.67)
12.57 12.42 13.08 13.00 13.23
(1.62)
9.21 9.04 9.79 9.75 9.85
(1.51)
1.48 1.50 1.43 1.48 1.33
(1.06)
0.08 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.26)
0.27 0.29 0.18 0.19 0.16
(0.44)
0.35 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.34
(0.48)
0.22 0.19 0.32 0.34 0.30
(0.41)
0.07 0.06 0.12 0.09 0.16
(0.26)
General Knowledge,
First-Predicted
Predicted spring first grade general knowledge test
score, from Chapter four estimation
Reading, First - Predicted Predicted spring first grade reading test score,from Chapter four estimation
Math, First - Predicted Predicted spring first grade math test score,from Chapter four estimation
Spring General, K
Siblings
Mother, Some 
High School
Mother, 
High School
Mother, 
Some College
Mother, BA
Mother, Advanced
General Knowledge test, administered
during spring of Kindergarten year   (Maximum: 12)
Number of siblings student has
Equals one if student's mother completed
some high school or less, zero otherwise
Equals one if student's mother completed
high school or equivalent, zero otherwise
Equals one if student's mother completed
some college, zero otherwise
Equals one if student's mother has
Bachelor's degree, zero otherwise
Equals one if student's mother has an
advanced degree, zero otherwise
 
 
 Appendix K: Data Definitions and Means (continued) 
Variable Variable Description Overall Public Private Catholic NonCatholic
0.31 0.34 0.21 0.17 0.28
(0.46)
0.21 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.27
(0.41)
0.76 0.74 0.83 0.83 0.82
(0.43)
0.08 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.28)
0.05 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.22)
0.05 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.02
(0.22)
0.07 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.05
(0.26)
0.06 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.04
(0.23)
0.07 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.07
(0.26)
0.11 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.13
(0.32)
Income, 40-50 Equals one if annual household incomeis between $40,000 and $50,000, zero otherwise
Income, 30-35 Equals one if annual household incomeis between $30,000 and $35,000, zero otherwise
Income, 35-40 Equals one if annual household incomeis between $35,000 and $40,000, zero otherwise
West
Urban
Income, 0-15
Income, 15-20
South
Income, 20-25
Income, 25-30
Equals one if student lives in West,
zero otherwise
Equals one if student lives in urban or
suburban area, zero otherwise
Equals one if annual household income
is below $15,000, zero otherwise
Equals one if annual household income
is between $20,000 and $25,000, zero otherwise
Equals one if annual household income
is between $15,000 and $20,000, zero otherwise
Equals one if student lives in South,
zero otherwise
Equals one if annual household income
is between $25,000 and $30,000, zero otherwise
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 Appendix K: Data Definitions and Means (continued) 
Variable Variable Description Overall Public Private Catholic NonCatholic
0.22 0.20 0.27 0.30 0.24
(0.41)
0.14 0.12 0.19 0.20 0.16
(0.34)
0.11 0.09 0.16 0.16 0.17
(0.31)
0.04 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.10
(0.19)
129,039 127,151 135,448 134,230 137,501
(66,524)
44,189 44,047 44,669 44,448 45,043
(11,043)
0.71 0.71 0.70 0.71 0.69
(0.21)
0.24 0.23 0.27 0.28 0.26
(0.15)
0.14 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.14
(0.13)
0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15
(0.09)
Income, 200+ Equals one if annual household incomeis above $200,000, zero otherwise
Income, 75-100 Equals one if annual household incomeis between $75,000 and $100,000, zero otherwise
Income, 100-200
Equals one if annual household income
is between $100,000 and $200,000, 
zero otherwise
Income, 50-75 Equals one if annual household incomeis between $50,000 and $75,000, zero otherwise
House Value, County a
Income, County a
Evangelical, County  b
Protestant, County b
White, County a
Catholic, County b
Median house value in student's home
county, in dollars
Median household income in student's
home county, in dollars
Per capita white population in student's
home county
Per capita Catholic adherents in student's
home county
Per capita Evangelical or Fundamental
Protestant adherents in student's home county
Per capita Mainline Protestant or
Other Faith adherents in student's home county
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Appendix K: Data Definitions and Means (continued) 
 
Variable Variable Description Overall Public Private Catholic NonCatholic
15.88 15.70 16.48 16.42 16.57
(4.69)
16.59 16.54 16.73 16.70 16.79
(18.82)
12.82 12.37 14.37 12.77 17.07
(17.14)
25.47 25.28 26.10 24.87 28.17
(17.64)
Number of observations 7755 5990 1765 1110 655
Source: Unless otherwise indicated, data are from the restricted use ECLS-K, 1999-2000.
a 
denotes Census 2000 data
b  denotes Glenmary Research Center's 2000 Religious Congregations & Membership Data
Average percent Hispanic students enrolled
in public schools in student's home county
Average percent students receiving free or reduced 
lunch in public schools in student's home county
Average student-teacher ratio in public
schools in student's home county
Average percent Black students enrolled
in public schools in student's home county
Hispanic, Public a
Free Lunch a
Student-Teacher, Public a
Black, Public a
Note: Standard Errors of overall sample are in parenthesis. Sample sizes, means, and standard deviations are all the unweighted ECLS-K reporting 
samples.  They are not weighted to represent students and schools nationwide.  Sample sizes are rounded to comply with NCES reporting standards.
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